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Editor’s Introduction
Upon its inception in 2006, Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Jour-
nal 1:1 published a special issue entitled ‘‘Genocide in Darfur.’’ At that time, the crisis
in Darfur had already been the focus of international attention for some three years.
That special issue provided an overview of the crisis, the crimes perpetrated against
black African women and girls of Darfur by government of Sudan (GoS) troops and
the Janjaweed, the legal implications of the US determination that the atrocities in
Darfur constituted genocide, a comparative analysis of the atrocities perpetrated in
Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur in the early 2000s, and a critical analysis of the US gov-
ernment’s Atrocities Documentation Project whose data were used by the US govern-
ment to make its determination of genocide.
Today, the Darfur crisis is about to enter its seventh year. Rebel groups and GoS
troops continue to engage in battle, but just as often rebel groups fight among them-
selves. Periodic attacks continue to be carried out by the GoS against civilians, which
have resulted in the continuance of spasmodic but still relatively massive refugee
flows. It is now estimated that over 2.5 million black Africans are internally displaced
in Darfur and some 275,000 to 300,000 are refugees in Chad. Girls and women con-
tinue to be raped, but not just by Janjaweed and GoS forces but also by members of
various rebel groups (in other words, by black African males).
The African Union, which finally came to the realization that it did not have the
requisite mandate, manpower, firepower, and resources to handle the mission in
Darfur, acquiesced to international pressure and, in conjunction with the United Na-
tions, formed the hybrid United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
Unfortunately, UNAMID is now suffering many of the same handicaps faced by its
predecessor.
As time has crept by, the GoS has played cat to the international community’s
mouse. Indicative of this is how the GoS treats and mistreats those agencies providing
humanitarian aid, periodically declaring certain groups and individuals personae non
gratae and kicking them out of Darfur, thus leaving the internally displaced persons
(IDPs) to desperately fend for themselves in an already harsh and forbidding climate
and situation. Another classic illustration of the cat and mouse game the GoS plays is
the fact that it has, more than once, breached the agreement that it would no longer
off-load military personnel or material in Darfur. Not only has it breached the agree-
ment but, in the process of doing so, it has also stooped to whitewashing planes and
affixing UN insignias to them before flying them into Darfur.
It is little wonder that the situation in Darfur has been described by various
actors, including UNAMID personnel, as chaotic and ‘‘a conflict of all against all.’’
Yet, it is also true that the international community’s various threats and actions
have, in various ways though to an extremely limited extent, pushed the GoS into
being somewhat more pliable vis-a`-vis certain Darfur-related issues. For example,
the GoS allowed the UNAMID force onto Sudanese territory. But, even then, the GoS
used brinkmanship and, in the end, significantly limited the ultimate effectiveness of
the new force.
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It is also true that the number of killings that peaked between 2004 and 2005 has
fallen precipitously in the years since. Still, the GoS and the Janjaweed continue
to kill black Africans civilians, and many continue to die from unattended injuries,
dehydration, malnutrition, and disease.
The exact number of black Africans who have been killed and who have perished
due to other causes continues to be a matter of great, and in some ways, maddening
debate. By late 2004, various scholars and groups proffered estimates ranging from
180,000 to 400,000. In 2005, though, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick
asserted that the US State Department’s estimate of deaths in Darfur was 60,000 to
160,000. While roundly lambasted by many for sorely underestimating the number of
Darfurian deaths, he was praised by others for presenting a more ‘‘sensible’’ number.
Since then, the numbers cited have ranged from the low 100,000s to the high 500,000s
and above.
An example of how the numbers of dead have been bandied about is evident in the
way various individuals and organizations mindlessly latched on to a number issued
by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2004. WHO reported that 70,000 had
died, and the number was readily accepted by many, without question, as being the
‘‘new’’ total of deaths. In fact, WHO was only referring to deaths that had occurred
over a seven-month period and not the entire twenty-six months that the crisis had
spanned by that point in time. Furthermore, the 70,000 deaths referred solely to those
who died from malnutrition and disease and not from violence. Furthermore, the num-
ber only referred to the deaths in those areas in the region to which WHO had access.
A constant in the discussion over the crisis in Darfur is whether the actions by the
GoS and Janjaweed amount to genocide or crimes against humanity. Following the
US Atrocities Documentation Project’s investigation into the alleged crimes perpe-
trated by the GoS and the Janjaweed, the United States government declared, in Sep-
tember 2004, that the GoS and Janjaweed had perpetrated genocide in Darfur in 2003
and 2004. The United States then referred the matter to the United Nations. In late
January 2005, following its own investigation—the Commission of Inquiry into Darfur
(COI)—the United Nations asserted that what had taken place constituted crimes
against humanity but not genocide (though it did leave the door open for a finding
of genocide contingent upon more detailed data indicating such). Subsequently, it
referred the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Following an extensive investigation by the ICC, its lead prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Campo submitted an application on 14 July 2008 for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest for the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir.
Ultimately, by a majority, the ICC judges found that the materials presented by
the prosecutor failed to provide reasonable grounds to indicate that the GoS acted
with the specific intention to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Massaleit, and
Zaghawa peoples. Subsequently, the judges issued an indictment charging Sudanese
president Omar al-Bashir with five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, exter-
mination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape) and two counts of war crimes (direct-
ing attacks on the civilian population and pillaging). One judge, Anita Usacka from
Latvia, wrote a dissent, stating that she believed the charge of genocide was accurate.
Moreno-Ocampo filed an appeal in which he asserted that the judges’ standard for
adding the genocide charge to the warrant was too high, that the judges’ desire for
him to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that al-Bashir committed genocide was not
required for a warrant and only required a reasonable inference of guilt, and that the
judges were asking for ‘‘a level of evidence that is the level of evidence required at the
trial stage, not at the beginning of the process.’’
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Scholars find themselves embroiled in much the same debate, some arguing that
it is, at the very least, clear that the GoS committed genocide early in the crisis (2003–
2005), while others argue, for various reasons, that while the GoS certainly committed
crimes against humanity it did not commit genocide. In doing so, the latter focus
largely on what they claim is the lack of intent by the GoS to destroy in whole or in
part the Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa. Straddling these two poles are those who
have deemed the atrocities everything from ‘‘an ambiguous genocide’’ to ‘‘genocide-
like.’’
Early on in the crisis, the media provided extensive coverage of what was taking
place in Darfur. Over the past year and a half to two years (2007 through the summer
of 2009), though, the coverage has tapered off to a great extent. Indeed, following the
Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics, the stream of news about Darfur fell off sharply.
Likewise, coverage of the fact that UNAMID continues to struggle mightily in Darfur
is slight. All of this is reminiscent of a trenchant observation made many years ago by
Milan Kundera in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting:
the bloody massacre in Bangladesh quickly covered the memory of the Russian inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia; the assassination of Allende drowned out the groans of Bangla-
desh; the war in the Sinai desert made people forget Allende; the Cambodian massacre
made people forget Sinai; and so on and so forth, until ultimately everyone lets everyone
be forgotten.1
Fortunately, we’re not totally at that stage yet vis-a`-vis Darfur, but it’s also true that
other issues and events have pushed it out of the headlines, including but not limited
to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, worry over the fate of Pakistan, the ongoing bel-
licosity between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and the recent political turmoil in
Iran.
In comparison to the decline in media attention, scholars and activists are focus-
ing ever-increasing attention on Darfur, and over the past several years well over a
dozen books have appeared in print about various aspects of the Darfur crisis. Among
some of the more notable include Darfur: A Short History of a Long War by Julie Flint
and Alex De Waal; War in Darfur and the Search for Peace edited by Alex De Waal;
Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan edited by Samuel Totten
and Eric Markusen; A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide
by Eric Reeves; Darfur: Genocide Before Our Eyes edited by Joyce Apsel; Darfur: The
Ambiguous Genocide by Ge´rard Prunier; Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide by Ge´rard
Prunier; The World and Darfur: International Response to Crimes Against Humanity
in Western Darfur edited by Amanda Grzyb; Darfur and the Crime of Genocide by
John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond; Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruc-
tion and Genocide by M.W. Daly; The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to
the Genocide in Darfur by Brian Steidle and Gretchen Steidle Wallace; and The Trans-
lator: A Tribesman’s Memoir of Darfur by Daoud Hari.
Several of the contributors to this special issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention
(GSP) are some of the most active scholars on Darfur. It is worth noting that whereas
the first GSP special issue on Darfur provided a roadmap of the crisis, this special
issue focuses critical attention on what has transpired in Darfur over the past five
years (2004–2009), with a particular focus on the events leading up to and eventuat-
ing in the ICC charges against President Omar al-Bashir.
In this special issue’s first article, ‘‘Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again?’’
Alan J. Kuperman offers a provocative argument regarding various facets of the crisis
in Darfur, particularly in relation to the ongoing demand by many for an intervention
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in Darfur. More specifically, he asserts that he and a group of select others ‘‘contend
that the prospect of luring Western intervention to tip the balance of power in their
favor is what drives the rebels to fight a war that they cannot win on their own. If
not for the prospect of such intervention . . . the rebels long ago would have sued for
peace, which the government would have accepted, thereby ending the violence.
Thus, . . . Western calls for intervention have backfired, perpetuating fighting in Dar-
fur and the resultant suffering of its civilians.’’ Kuperman offers a new way of examin-
ing the potential seeds and prolongation of the crisis, and raises a host of issues that
demand to be analyzed and weighed by diplomats, politicians, and scholars, even if
the argument initially puts them off and/or counters their past way of thinking about
what has transpired in Darfur.
In ‘‘The International Criminal Court, the Security Council, and the Politics of
Impunity in Darfur,’’ Victor Peskin sets out to ‘‘highlight the ways in which the ICC
and Sudan have and are likely to continue to wage the battle over Sudan’s legal obli-
gation to comply with international prosecutions by handing over suspects and other-
wise assisting the pursuit of international justice.’’ Based on a series of interviews, the
author provides readers with an in-depth examination of far-reaching and thorny
political and legal issues that are not only germane to the case in Darfur but also
likely to impact future ICC cases. In his conclusion, Peskin, in part, cogently argues,
‘‘The struggle with Khartoum is not only about fulfilling the Court’s central mission of
prosecutions in its most high-profile situation. Also at stake is the ICC’s legitimacy
and viability as a permanent court of global justice.’’
In the third article, which complements Peskin’s, Alex De Waal and Gregory H.
Stanton engage in an exchange of views as to whether the president of Sudan should
be charged and arrested by the ICC. In ‘‘Should President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan
Be Charged and Arrested by the International Criminal Court? An Exchange of
Views,’’ they each raise a host of thought-provoking issues and challenge one another,
and the reader, to ruminate long and hard over the value (or, conversely, the danger)
of pursuing charges against al-Bashir.
In ‘‘A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into Darfur,’’
Samuel Totten critiques both the UN investigation in Darfur and its finding that
crimes against humanity but not genocide had been perpetrated against the black
Africans by the GoS and the Janjaweed. Ultimately, Totten asserts that the COI was
possibly short-circuited by (1) a biased view of what the findings might lead to before
the investigation was even conducted, (2) an investigation that was unsystematic and
hastily carried out, and (3) an incorrect analysis of the facts and data collected by the
COI.
This special issue is rounded out with reviews of two book on Darfur: Alex De
Waal’s War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, and Samuel Totten and Eric Marku-
sen’s Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan.
Samuel Totten
GSP Editor
Notes
1. Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (New York: Viking, 1979), 7.
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Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again?
Alan J. Kuperman
LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin
Although most humanitarians advocate more international intervention in Darfur,
some analysts urge the opposite on grounds that intervention has backfired due to
the problem of moral hazard. These contrarians argue that the expectation of bene-
fiting from intervention is what emboldens Darfur’s rebels to fight, which provokes
state-sponsored retaliation against their perceived civilian supporters, thereby exac-
erbating and prolonging the humanitarian emergency. This article tests the moral-
hazard hypothesis against four other potential explanations for why Darfur’s mili-
tants launched and perpetuated their rebellion despite being unable to protect their
civilians from genocidal retaliation. The evidence indicates that moral hazard—
the expectation of humanitarian intervention—increased both the magnitude and
duration of Darfur’s rebellion, and therefore the retaliation it provoked against
civilians. Competing hypotheses are less plausible but cannot be ruled out com-
pletely based on available evidence. The article explores the policy implications for
intervention in Darfur and other humanitarian emergencies, and offers suggestions
for further research.
Key words: Darfur, Sudan, humanitarian, intervention, moral hazard, genocide
Introduction
For over five years, Western media, politicians, and non-governmental organizations
have criticized the relatively modest level of international intervention in Darfur, a
region of northwest Sudan that was obscure until war broke out in 2003. Nearly all
of these critics argue that intervention has been inadequate in light of the scope of
violence and suffering, which includes 3 million displaced persons and a death toll
estimated up to half a million. But a small band of contrarians, including me, has
argued that the problem is essentially the opposite: the prospect of more intervention.
We acknowledge that violence has been perpetrated mainly by Sudan’s army and
state-supported Arab Janjaweed militias against villages accused of supporting African
tribal rebels, and that intervention to date has been inadequate to protect civilians.
But we contend that the prospect of luring Western intervention to tip the balance of
power in their favor is what drives the rebels to fight a war that they cannot win on
their own. If not for the prospect of such intervention, we argue, the rebels long ago
would have sued for peace, which the government would have accepted, thereby end-
ing the violence. Thus, we conclude, Western calls for intervention have backfired,
perpetuating fighting in Darfur and the resultant suffering of its civilians.
If correct, this radical hypothesis has important implications for intervention in
Sudan and elsewhere. Indeed, I have argued previously for redesigning intervention
policy so as not to reward rebels unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate,
and for promoting instead the cause of nonviolent protest movements.1 The hypothe-
sis, however, has yet to be tested rigorously in Darfur, so this article represents a first
attempt to do so. It starts by summarizing the recent literature on the ‘‘moral hazard
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of humanitarian intervention.’’ Next, it lays out a methodology to assess the hypothe-
sis in Darfur, and then conducts such a test. The final section analyzes the policy
implications for intervention in Darfur and beyond, and offers recommendations for
further research.
Moral Hazard and Its Critics
In economics, ‘‘moral hazard’’ is the phenomenon in which the provision of insurance
against risk unintentionally encourages the insured to act irresponsibly or fraudu-
lently based on the expectation that any resulting short-term loss will be compensated
by the subsequent insurance payout. Analogously, I have argued that the emerging
norm of humanitarian intervention, now subsumed in the concept of the ‘‘Responsibil-
ity to Protect’’ as explained below, inadvertently encourages rebellion by members of
sub-state groups that are vulnerable to retaliation by increasing their expectation of
success and decreasing their expected cost.2 Moral hazard can be caused by a wide
range of humanitarian intervention, not confined to military deployment but including
‘‘any international action that is primarily motivated by the humanitarian desire to
protect civilian targets of state violence,’’3 if that intervention also encourages rebel-
lion. This includes rhetorical condemnation and economic sanctions against states,
diplomatic recognition of secessionist entities, and covert military assistance to rebels.
When such intervention encourages members of a sub-state group to launch or perpet-
uate an armed challenge, the state often retaliates against the group’s civilians. Inter-
vention ultimately may assist the rebels to attain their political goals but typically is
too late or inadequate to protect the civilians from state retaliation. Thus, the emerg-
ing norm sometimes backfires by helping to cause the tragic outcomes that it intends
to prevent. I have demonstrated this phenomenon in two cases from the Balkans
in the 1990s, Bosnia and Kosovo, by testing the hypothesis against competing ex-
planations based on evidence, including interviews with the leaders of each armed
challenge.4
Some advocates of the Responsibility to Protect norm claim that it is more expan-
sive and less belligerent than the older concept of humanitarian intervention, because
it emphasizes first the responsibility of states to protect their own people and second
the responsibility of other states to offer consensual assistance. Only failing those
efforts does the new concept contemplate more intrusive international measures, and
it explicitly relegates military intervention to a last resort. In reality, however, this
ostensibly innovative concept merely codifies the practice of humanitarian interven-
tion as it has emerged since 1991. Typically, when civilians have been threatened
by a state, the international community has first exhorted the state to desist, next
offered assistance ranging from mediation to peacekeeping, then imposed non-military
coercive measures such as economic sanctions, and only as a last resort contemplated
non-consensual military intervention. This escalatory ladder of intervention, ranging
from least to most intrusive, is driven by the dual objectives of providing humani-
tarian protection while minimizing the violation of traditional state sovereignty. The
attempted ‘‘re-branding’’ of the intervention norm as the Responsibility to Protect may
have broadened its nominal support among developing states but has neither altered
the substance of the emerging norm nor mitigated the moral-hazard problem.5
In a previous essay, I suggested reforming the practice of humanitarian interven-
tion in five ways. First, do not help sub-state rebels unless state retaliation is grossly
disproportionate, so that both sides have incentive to restrain their violence. Second,
deliver humanitarian aid to affected civilians in ways that minimize the benefit to
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rebels, such as via transportation corridors and displaced-person camps that are
patrolled to exclude militants or at least their weapons. Third, expend substantial
resources to persuade states to address the legitimate grievances of non-violent
domestic groups, to further discourage rebellion. Fourth, do not coerce states to sur-
render territory or authority to a domestic opposition unless and until a robust peace-
keeping force is deployed to protect against the potential violent backlash. Fifth, do
not falsely claim humanitarian motives for interventions that are driven primarily by
other objectives—such as securing resources, fighting terrorism, or preventing nuclear
proliferation—because this can inadvertently increase the expectation of sub-state
groups elsewhere that they can attract intervention by provoking a humanitarian
emergency.6
Timothy Crawford has refined the theory by specifying more precisely the poten-
tial causes and consequences of moral hazard.7 First, he differentiates four possible
sources of expectations within a sub-state group about prospective intervention: re-
cent signals by a potential intervener regarding the specific case; recent interventions
elsewhere, especially nearby; older interventions in the region; or the more general
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. Second, he differentiates two putative
effects: the initiation of an armed challenge and the perpetuation of such a rebellion.
He argues deductively that moral hazard should be most intense when third parties
signal their intention to intervene in a specific case, and that moral hazard is more
likely to perpetuate than to initiate a rebellion.
Other critics of the moral-hazard theory dispute or refine its claims about the
Balkans. Jon Western argues that the armed challenges in Bosnia and Kosovo were
triggered not by hopes of intervention but by an escalatory spiral of grievance and
insecurity.8 Arman Grigorian insists that the US threat of intervention in Kosovo
was motivated not by humanitarian concern but by a desire for vengeance against
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic.9 In that same case, Harrison Wagner emphasizes
that the expectation of intervention compelled the state to perpetrate ethnic cleans-
ing in anticipation of, but prior to, the ultimate rebel escalation anticipated by the
theory.10
Moral Hazard in Darfur?
Since 2004, several Western analysts have argued that calls for intervention in Darfur
have backfired by emboldening the rebels, thereby prolonging that region’s conflict
and the resultant suffering of its civilians. But these contrarians have cited little evi-
dence in support of their claims and typically have failed to distinguish between the
outbreak and perpetuation of rebellion. None of these critics, including me, heretofore
has tested the moral-hazard hypothesis against other potential explanations for the
rebellion in Darfur.11
A rigorous examination of moral hazard in Darfur entails three steps. First, the
hypothesis should be tested against other plausible explanations for the rebellion.
Next, if moral hazard is determined to play some causal role, that role should be pin-
pointed as either triggering the rebellion, perpetuating it, or both. Finally, the sources
of the rebels’ expectations about intervention should be specified, in accordance with
the critiques of Crawford and Grigorian. All three steps are susceptible to the case-
study inferential method of ‘‘process-tracing,’’ by positing the evidence that would
prove or disprove each hypothesis and then searching for such proof in primary and
secondary sources.12
As I have argued previously, there are only five plausible reasons, including moral
hazard, why members of a sub-state group would launch and perpetuate a rebellion
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that provokes massive state retaliation against the group’s civilians, which I call ‘‘sui-
cidal rebellion’’ (Table 1).13 First, the militants may not expect the state’s reaction,
which could explain the initial rebellion although not its perpetuation in the face of
retaliation. Second, prior to the rebellion, these militants may expect the state inevi-
tably to attack the group’s civilians, so that they perceive nothing to lose by rebelling
even without an expectation of victory. Third, the militants may expect the rebellion
to succeed without intervention and may view the retaliation against their civilians as
an acceptable cost. Fourth—the moral hazard explanation—the militants may rebel
only because they expect state retaliation to trigger international intervention that
enables them to prevail at an acceptable cost. Finally, the rebellion may be driven by
something other than strategic calculus, such as frustration. Each hypothesis could be
confirmed by evidence that either supported it or disproved all the others.
Rebellion, Retaliation, and Resistance to Compromise
Sudan has endured multiple civil wars since independence in 1956, often arising from
challenges to the traditional Arab Islamic elite in the northern capital of Khartoum
who monopolize power and wealth. The first war, pitting Khartoum against racially
and religiously distinct rebels from the south, persisted from 1956 to 1972. That fight
resumed in 1983 and raged until the July 2002 Machakos Protocol, which laid out
principles of a power-dividing settlement that subsequently was codified in a January
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The north–south wars were brutal, as the
government employed its armed forces and allied militias in a scorched-earth counter-
insurgency against rebel areas, inflicting an estimated 2 million deaths, many from
war-induced deprivation.
In Darfur, conflict has multiple roots that stretch back more than four decades,
including the spillover of the war between neighboring Libya and Chad; land disputes
between settled tribes and nomadic Arab pastoralists, exacerbated by increasing
desertification; an Arab supremacist movement sponsored by Libya; political reforms
that disempowered local tribes; and monopolization of power and wealth by Khar-
toum.14 Despite widespread grievances and a history of low-level conflict, however,
Darfur avoided full-scale civil war until 2003. Indeed, in 1991, when southern Sudan’s
rebels attempted to spread war to Darfur by sponsoring an invasion from neighboring
Kordofan province, the outsiders received little local support and were quickly de-
feated by Sudan’s army and an allied Arab militia.15
Starting around 1999, however, militants among Darfur’s largest African tribes
prepared for rebellion. In that year, Masalit militants traveled to Eritrea to be trained
by rebels from southern Sudan. In 2000, Fur rebels set up training camps in central
Darfur and extracted taxes from the local populace. In 2001, Masalit and Fur mili-
tants traveled to southern Sudan to gain combat skills by fighting alongside the rebels
there. Then, in February 2002, Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit rebels launched their first
Table 1: Possible Explanations for Suicidal Rebellions
1 Do not expect retaliation
2 Perceive victimization as inevitable
3 Expect victory without intervention
4 Expect intervention to enable victory
5 Not driven by strategic calculus
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joint attack, under the rubric of the Darfur Liberation Army, burning an army garri-
son in central Darfur and seizing arms. A year later, these militants launched a full-
blown rebellion under a new name: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). Days later, a
second Darfur rebel group, comprising mainly Zaghawa and closely tied to the Islamist
leader Hassan Turabi, who recently had been purged by the Khartoum regime, an-
nounced itself as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).16 The SLA had more
grass-roots support and concentrated its demands on Darfur, while the JEM enjoyed
greater resources from its external Islamist connections and announced a nationwide
reform agenda, in keeping with Turabi’s political aspirations.
The SLA’s first major attack, in February 2003, killed 200 soldiers in Golu, in
western Darfur. More spectacularly, in April 2003, both rebel groups attacked two
army outposts in central and southern Darfur, killing dozens of soldiers, destroying
several fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and capturing a base commander. Over
the next four months, the rebels killed hundreds more soldiers in three attacks on
north Darfur.17
Sudan’s government responded initially by trying to negotiate with the rebels. In
March 2003, Khartoum dispatched North Darfur’s governor to London to forge a deal
with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, but ‘‘the governor came back empty-handed.’’ Addi-
tional overtures by government officials later that spring also failed, reportedly due to
opposition from hardliners on both sides.18 It is difficult to assess Khartoum’s sincer-
ity in these early talks, but it is notable that the government’s first response to the
rebellion was to negotiate rather than to deploy overwhelming force. Only after four
months of rebel attacks and failed peace talks did Khartoum, in June 2003, switch
to a devastatingly violent counterinsurgency strategy, combining the army, popular
defense forces, aerial bombardment, and local Janjaweed Arab militias to attack hun-
dreds of villages suspected of supporting the rebels. Typically, the attacks started with
imprecise bombing from aircraft to sow terror, after which militias arrived on horse-
back to loot and then burn the villages, often killing or raping a few residents and gen-
erally compelling most of the rest to flee. By late 2003, thousands of Darfur’s Africans
had been killed, while hundreds of thousands were displaced from their homes. Inter-
national relief organizations began delivering aid in 2003 to the displaced in camps in
Darfur and neighboring Chad, and African Union (AU) monitors entered Darfur in
2004. But persistent low-level fighting has perpetuated the humanitarian deprivation
of many Darfuris. Over the course of the war, thousands have been killed directly by
fighting, while tens of thousands of additional deaths are attributed to higher than
normal mortality inside and outside the camps.19
Despite the rebels’ inability to defeat the government forces and militia or to de-
fend civilians against retaliation, they repeatedly refused to test the sincerity of the
government’s overtures to end the fighting, which potentially could have alleviated
humanitarian suffering via negotiated compromise. Some critics of Sudan’s regime
claim that it does not sincerely want peace in Darfur because a power-sharing deal
would weaken the central government prior to south Sudan’s secession referendum
in 2011, increasing the risk of the country’s disintegration. More likely, however,
Khartoum seeks to maximize its military potential prior to the 2011 referendum, in
order to coerce the south not to vote for secession or otherwise to defeat it. In that
light, Khartoum has a very strong incentive to end the war in Darfur, so it can free
up its security forces to deter or win a renewed war in the south.
The sincerity of Khartoum’s peace offers in Darfur remains unknown because the
rebels have refused to explore them in good faith. In November 2003, the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM), the political arm of the SLA, abandoned peace talks in
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Chad. The following month, despite rapidly diminishing prospects on the battlefield
and mounting humanitarian suffering, the rebels actually increased their demands,
blocking any chance for peace.20 From April to July 2004, both main rebel groups re-
fused to attend peace talks in Chad and Ethiopia.21 In December 2004, the SLA failed
to attend peace talks in Nigeria. In September 2005, following a split in the SLA, the
representative of the Zaghawa wing failed to attend another round of those talks. In
November 2005, the rebels stalled negotiations by unrealistically demanding 90 per-
cent of the positions in local government. (Even under the north-south peace deal,
negotiated by rebels who were much stronger, the government retained 70 percent of
such positions.) Finally, in May 2006, when Sudan’s government signed the Darfur
Peace Agreement, brokered by the United States and the African Union, only the
SLA’s Zaghawa faction (led by Minni Minawi) signed, while the JEM (led by Khalil
Ibrahim) and the SLA’s Fur wing (led by Abdel Wahid) rejected it.22 As a result, the
war continued, rebel factions splintered, Darfur descended into anarchy, and attacks
mounted against relief organizations, which reacted by cutting back their operations,
thereby increasing humanitarian suffering.
The puzzle addressed in this article is why the Darfur rebels, who could neither
defeat the government nor defend civilians from retaliation, chose to launch and per-
petuate a rebellion that provoked such massive violence against their own civilians,
while persistently rejecting government overtures for a negotiated peace. This does
not imply that the rebels bear primary responsibility for the violence, nor does it
deny the legitimate grievances and aspirations of Darfur’s African tribes, nor does it
excuse as mere retaliation the crimes committed by Sudan’s government forces and
allied militias. Rather, the question is about motivation and strategy: Why did the
rebels pursue a course that imposed such a high cost on the civilians that they pur-
ported to represent, if this course also offered little prospect of attaining their political
goals through military success? A rigorous explanation also must address timing: Why
did Darfur’s rebels launch and perpetuate their armed challenge from 2003 onwards,
when the region’s African tribes had overwhelmingly rejected calls for rebellion since
at least 1991?
Hypothesis 1: Surprised by Retaliation?
All available evidence contradicts the first hypothesis: that Darfur’s rebels were sur-
prised when their rebellion provoked widespread government retaliation against civil-
ians.23 First, government authorities previously had issued explicit threats of such
retaliation. On a visit to Darfur in November 2002, Sudan’s vice-president Ali Osman
Taha warned militants ‘‘not to repeat in your area the colonial error which has para-
lyzed Southern Sudan,’’ because Darfur would ‘‘be pulled backward for many years.’’
In March 2003, just days after the rebels’ first major attack, the governor of south
Darfur threatened that ‘‘if dialogue does not work in Darfur, the Army can solve the
situation in 24 hours.’’24
The rebels had every reason to perceive such threats as credible, given the govern-
ment’s nearly two decades of brutal response to previous rebellions in Sudan. During
the north–south civil war, the government and its typically Arab militias targeted
civilians throughout the south: in Bahr el Ghazal starting in 1986, Wau in 1988,
Juba in 1992, the Nuba Mountains in 1992–1995 (the government aimed to relocate
the entire Nuba population), and the upper Nile in 1998–2003. As Julie Flint and
Alex DeWaal observe, when Sudan’s government was faced with rebellion, ‘‘scorched
earth, massacre, pillage, and rape were the norm.’’ Darfur’s rebels surely were aware
of these preceding events elsewhere in Sudan, but they also had precedent in Darfur
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itself. In 1987, in retaliation for incursions by rebels from southern Sudan, Arab militias
in southeast Darfur killed more than 1,000 Dinka civilians who had been displaced
from the south and thus were perceived as rebel sympathizers.25 In 1991, when south-
ern rebels sponsored their invasion of Darfur, Sudan’s army and allied militia ‘‘burned
entire villages on suspicion of having welcomed’’ the invaders. In 1999, when the
Khartoum regime crushed a low-intensity Masalit insurgency in west Darfur, govern-
ment forces killed an estimated 2,000 and displaced more than 100,000. In 2001,
when southern rebels launched an offensive toward Darfur from Bahr el Ghazal,
government-allied Arab militias retaliated in that neighboring state with ‘‘indiscrimi-
nate attacks on civilians.’’26 Moreover, when the Darfur rebels launched their initial,
small-scale operations in 2002, they provoked the Janjaweed’s first significant attacks
on Fur civilians in south Darfur in October 2002. By the end of that year, such re-
taliation had killed hundreds of civilians and burned hundreds of villages across
Darfur, vividly illustrating the costs of rebellion well before Darfur’s rebels escalated
to the high-profile attacks of 2003.27
The strongest evidence that Darfur’s rebels expected their insurgency to provoke
retaliation against the region’s African tribes is that those tribes opposed the rebellion
on precisely such grounds. When Fur militants attempted to recruit in 1999, according
to Flint and de Waal, ‘‘the Masalit were hesitant to take action that might exacerbate
their suffering. They had bitter recent experience of how any action, however small,
could escalate.’’28 Similarly, when Zaghawa militants in the late 1990s argued that
rebellion was the best course, they ‘‘found that most Zaghawa disagreed.’’29 Even
after the fighting started, according to field researchers Abdul-Jabbar Fadul and
Victor Tanner, ‘‘many Darfurian intellectuals criticized the decision to take up arms
against the government. The brutality of Khartoum’s reaction was predictable, they
argued.’’30
If any rebels failed to anticipate such retaliation prior to their first large attacks of
early 2003, they could not have maintained that wishful thinking for long. By June
2003, Khartoum had reinstalled in Darfur the notorious leader of the Janjaweed,
Musa Hilal, whom the government had exiled the previous year in a failed effort to
conciliate the African tribes. During the next four months, the Janjaweed expanded
its attacks, initially targeting rebel strongholds in the region’s northwest and then
broadening to African villages elsewhere in Darfur.31 Sudan’s president, Omar al-
Bashir, issued a clear threat in January 2004: ‘‘We will use all available means, the
army, the police, the mujahideen, the horsemen, to get rid of the rebellion.’’32 In
March 2004, a Janjaweed leader explicitly threatened atrocities if Masalit chiefs failed
to seal the border with Chad against an exodus of refugees: ‘‘If you don’t make this
security, I will kill all your civilians.’’33
Both before and after initiating their attacks, Darfur’s rebel leaders had over-
whelming reason to believe that rebellion would provoke massive retaliation against
the region’s African tribes. Failure to anticipate this cost cannot credibly explain
either the launching or the perpetuation of their rebellion.
Hypothesis 2: Nothing to Lose?
Some claim that Khartoum and its allied Arab militias initiated a genocide plan
against Darfur’s African tribes prior to any revolt, thus explaining the rebellion as
an act of self-defense by targets of violence. For example, Flint and DeWaal quote a
Masalit rebel offering this justification in retrospect: ‘‘We had no choice but to orga-
nize. We were fighting for our lives.’’ Such narratives assert that Darfur’s Africans
turned to rebellion because they ‘‘felt they had nothing left to lose.’’ Fur militants
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offered this explanation when they began mobilizing in 1998: ‘‘The Arabs will not
allow us to stay in our land unless we defend ourselves. It is a war of ‘to be or not to
be.’ ’’34 The SLA’s founder, in July 2002, months prior to the first large-scale rebel
attack, averred that the Fur people already were victims of ‘‘genocide.’’35
But such claims raise several questions: Was genocide actually underway prior to
the rebellion? If not, did Darfur’s Africans nevertheless perceive that genocide was
ongoing or impending? If not, then after the rebellion initially provoked retaliation,
did Darfur’s Africans come to believe that genocide was inevitable and therefore
favor the rebellion on grounds that they now had nothing to lose? If not, then why
did Darfur’s rebel leaders falsely make such claims?
Without question, starting in the 1970s, Darfur harbored Arab militants who
sought to usurp African land and political authority, and in the 1990s Khartoum
increasingly supported them. Political reforms favored the Arabs, prompting some
African tribes to resist violently, which in turn spurred attacks by Arab militias.
These attacks concentrated on Masalit villages that were perceived to support the
uprising of 1994–1999, and less frequently targeted the Fur or the Zaghawa.36 In
2000, Sudan’s government bolstered Darfur’s Janjaweed militias. The next year,
Arab tribesmen killed seventy Zaghawa in a dispute over an important water re-
source, and the government defended the Arabs.
But Darfur experienced no genocide—by any reasonable definition of the word
including that in the UN Convention—prior to the rebellion. The greatest violence,
by the army in January 1999, was intended not to destroy civilians but to crush the
Masalit insurgency, as evidenced by the fact that the army desisted after the insur-
gents were defeated.37 The government armed the Janjaweed in 2000 as a preventive
and deterrent measure because a schism in Khartoum, combined with incipient rebel
mobilization, prompted fears that the recently purged Islamist politician Turabi
would organize a revolt from Darfur (as he soon did through the JEM).38
Nor did Darfur’s African tribes believe that Sudan’s government was committing
genocide against them, or intended to, prior to the rebellion. Throughout this time,
Darfur’s African populace refused to support mobilization for a rebellion. The SLA’s
founder confesses that in the late 1990s when he sought to raise funds for rebellion
in the face of such opposition, ‘‘I lied to the people’’—falsely assuring them that their
donations would be used only to defend against local Arab militants, not to attack the
state.39
When Darfur’s African rebels began training in 1999, and then escalated to their
first joint attack in February 2002, the government supported vicious retaliation by
local Arab militias. As early as April 2002, the militias attacked Masalit areas in
north Darfur. In May 2002, Fur parliamentarians reported that 420 of their civilians
had been killed in 181 attacks on 83 villages. During the final four months of that
year, another 100 or more Fur civilians reportedly were killed.40 But this increased
violence, provoked by the rebels’ initial attacks, did not qualify remotely as genocide,
and was not perceived as such by Darfur’s African tribes, who continued to oppose re-
bellion. Even the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance, which previously had mobilized
Darfur’s African tribes for armed defense, opposed the rebellion. The group’s leader,
an expatriate Fur living in London, ‘‘thought it would be counter-productive and with-
held his support.’’41
After the first year of war, which included the worst violence against African civil-
ians, Darfur’s African tribes still did not believe that the government planned to
target them in the absence of rebellion. According to field surveys in north and west
Darfur in June 2004, all groups regardless of ethnic or tribal affiliation ‘‘stated both
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their opposition to armed rebellion and their belief that the current violence escalated
in response to the insurgency.’’ Strikingly, most respondents were ‘‘supportive of the
rebels’ agenda for change,’’ which underscores that they opposed the rebellion not
over its stated goals but because they felt its violent means endangered rather than
protected them.42
After two more years of displacement and humanitarian deprivation, in May 2006,
Darfur’s African civilians still favored ending the rebellion by embracing the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) that was signed by the government. Although two of the
three rebel factions rejected the deal, a former Darfur government official reported
soon afterward that ‘‘independent groups are the strongest supporters of the DPA
because they . . . believe that even a flawed peace deal is better than continuing the
war.’’43 Field researchers concur that the local populace supported the DPA because
‘‘Darfurians firmly believed that UN troops could and would bring an end to the vio-
lence’’ under the agreement.44 This demonstrates that as late as mid-2006, the rebel-
lion still was not driven by any popular perception that government violence against
civilians was inevitable.
A close analysis of these peace negotiations also suggests that the Fur faction of
the SLA rejected the agreement for reasons other than security. This rebel faction
initially had expressed concerns about the proposed security provisions, but on 14
May 2006 Khartoum accepted in writing the faction’s two main security demands: en-
hanced rebel roles in both protecting the return of displaced persons and monitoring
the disarmament of Arab militia. The leader of this rebel faction, Abdel Wahid, then
declared the security provisions ‘‘acceptable.’’ But he still rejected the agreement,
citing not security concerns but other complaints about insufficient sharing of wealth
and power, according to members of the African Union’s mediation team.45 It is impos-
sible to know whether the government would have honored its security commitments
if all three rebel factions had signed the DPA, but it is noteworthy that the Fur faction
did not cite mistrust of these commitments as the reason it rejected the deal, but
rather its additional demands for wealth and power. This suggests that the rebellion,
at least at this juncture, was motivated by something other than a fear of inevitable
government violence.
Only after two of the three rebel factions rejected the DPA, causing Darfur to
descend into anarchy starting in June 2006, did Darfuris begin to view violence as in-
evitable and thus a reason to embrace rebellion. According to field researchers, Dar-
fur’s African tribes still sought peace, but now ‘‘they believed that only force could
achieve that for them.’’ The same Darfuris who previously had opposed militancy
now ‘‘believed armed rebellion was the only solution.’’46 Thus, it is possible that the
second hypothesis—the expectation of inevitable victimization—explains the insur-
gency after May 2006, but not during the preceding three and a half years of rebellion.
Hypothesis 3: David Expects to Beat Goliath?
The third possible explanation for the rebellion is that Darfur’s African militants
expected to defeat Sudan’s army and allied Arab militias and thereby attain their
political goals—without requiring humanitarian intervention—and viewed the ex-
pected retaliation against their civilians as an acceptable price. Such an expectation
of victory seems implausible, in light of the weakness of Darfur’s rebels, the relative
strength of the Sudanese armed forces and Arab militias in Darfur, the Sudanese
government’s track record of brutal counterinsurgency, the failure of the better-armed
southern Sudan rebels to defeat the army for nearly two decades, the advent in 1999
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of oil exports that provided new revenue for the army, and the army’s availability to
fight in Darfur because of a north–south peace process that relieved it of deployment
requirements in the south. But history is replete with cases of optimistic miscalcu-
lation leading to war,47 so it is necessary to explore whether Darfur’s rebels ever
believed that they could win, even if they never actually stood a chance.
Darfur’s rebels had three potential reasons for optimism prior to launching their
rebellion. First, they had multiple sources of support: finance from their diaspora and
Islamists; training in Eritrea and in southern Sudan; and weapons from these sources
as well as from ethnic Zaghawa in the armies of Sudan, Chad, and Libya. The JEM
enjoyed greater financing from its connections to Islamist sources and thus more rea-
son for optimism on these grounds.48 Second, the rebels might have expected large-
scale defections from Sudan’s security forces to tilt the balance of power in their favor.
Since 1989, Khartoum successfully had recruited Darfur’s African Muslims to wage
‘‘Jihad’’ against southern Sudan’s Christian and animist rebels. But such recruits
were much less likely to fight against fellow Darfuri African Muslims and might even
jump to their side. Third, some of the SLA’s Zaghawa rebels previously had tasted
military victory, having fought successfully in Chad to bring Idriss Deby to power in
1990.49 Although Khartoum represented a far more formidable opponent, it is possible
that these rebels’ past success had bred overoptimism.
On the other hand, Darfur’s rebels initially lacked the two most crucial require-
ments for an insurgency: reliable supply lines and a rear base.50 Based on geography,
only Chad was optimally suited for either task. But until mid-2006, Chad honored a
deal with Sudan not to support each other’s rebels. Chad’s President Deby not only
rejected requests from Darfur’s rebels for support starting in 2002, but in 2003 he
even deployed 500 troops to Sudan to help fight against the rebels.51 Some of Chad’s
soldiers individually may have provided unauthorized support for their Zaghawa
brethren in Darfur prior to 2006, but Chad’s government denied the rebels a secure
rear base or supply lines before or during the first three years of war.
There is as yet too little evidence about the rebels’ military expectations prior to
rebellion to rule out the possibility that they initially expected to prevail without
humanitarian intervention. If so, however, they suffered from substantial optimistic
miscalculation, in light of the objective factors weighing against them. Moreover,
given the likelihood of sparking state retaliation against their own civilians, the rebels
would have had to accept in advance that such humanitarian suffering was a price
worth paying.
After launching the rebellion, the only period when the rebels may have had rea-
son for optimism was during the first few months of the war in 2003, when Khartoum
attempted to negotiate and fought only half-heartedly by deploying lackluster army
recruits while shunning the more motivated and vicious Arab militias. During this
phase, ‘‘Eritrea welcomed the SLA and JEM to Asmara, and quickly became the
main conduit for external support including fuel, food, and weapons,’’ which enabled
the rebels to make rapid progress.52 In mid-2003, however, Sudan’s government
switched to a scorched-earth counterinsurgency policy, embracing the Arab militias
and quickly reversing the rebel gains.
After the summer of 2003, the rebels never again posed a substantial threat, even
though Khartoum could not suppress them entirely because of terrain that was vast
and sometimes inaccessible (which enabled one rebel faction to mount a small but
disastrous attack toward the capital in 2008, as discussed below). As one member of
the AU’s 2006 mediation recalls: ‘‘The government regarded the rebels as unworthy
military, political, and negotiating opponents: it believed that they did not pose a
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serious military threat.’’53 In June 2006, the AU formally acknowledged this military
imbalance in an extraordinary press statement directed at critics of the DPA: ‘‘An ele-
mentary reality, that sometimes appears to be lost on some commentators, is that the
[rebel] Movements did not win a military victory and were therefore not in a position
to impose their terms on the Government of Sudan.’’54
In mid-2006, Darfur’s rebels did receive a boost when Chad’s President Deby, for
domestic political reasons, finally aided them—but even this did not substantially
alter the balance of power in Darfur. Deby had been besieged and nearly overthrown
by Chadian rebels in April 2006, and so in desperation sought help from Darfur’s
JEM, after which he returned the favor by supporting the JEM and a faction of the
SLA (combined briefly as the National Redemption Front), starting in spring 2006.55
At roughly the same time, however, the rebels lost some support from a key backer,
Eritrea, which had cut a deal with Khartoum on oil, trade, and security. Eritrea pres-
sured Darfur’s rebels to make concessions and arrested several senior officials of the
SLA’s Fur faction in June 2006, even reportedly torturing one of them.56 The JEM ac-
cordingly grew more powerful relative to the SLA and other splinter factions, and in
May 2008 launched a small attack toward Khartoum. Within hours, however, Sudan’s
security forces had halted and decimated the attackers, revealing that although the
JEM was now the most powerful rebel faction, it still was quite feeble.57
The rebels as a whole did not benefit from any significant increase in strength or
prospect of victory in mid-2006. In fact, the signing of the DPA by one rebel faction,
and internal disputes within all three factions over whether or not to sign, caused
them to fracture and to begin fighting against each other, which further reduced their
prospects against Khartoum. Some rebels still may have dreamed of prevailing with-
out humanitarian intervention, perhaps envisioning an unlikely alliance with dis-
gruntled local Arabs,58 but most senior rebels had long abandoned any such hopes.
Indeed, most of the top rebel officials had been living abroad since 2004, rather than
pursuing military victory in Darfur, as discussed in the following section.
The final question for Hypothesis 3 is whether the rebels rejected peace overtures
after mid-2003 because they expected to acquire greater bargaining leverage in the
future—not from humanitarian intervention—to compel more generous peace terms
that would justify any interim costs. Although the rebels could not have expected to
defeat Khartoum after mid-2003, they might have anticipated that an eventual boost
in support from Chad, Eritrea, southern Sudan, or another strategic ally—or simply
the perpetuation of a stalemate—would enable them eventually to extract concessions
from Khartoum, while viewing the continued displacement and suffering of their own
people as an acceptable price. This possibility cannot be excluded, although there is
more evidence for Hypothesis 4, detailed in the next section.
To summarize, Darfur’s militants had no reason to expect victory in the absence of
humanitarian intervention, either prior to or after the first few months of rebellion,
and must have expected massive retaliation against their own civilians. Still, the
available evidence does not exclude the possibility that the rebels miscalculated wildly
prior to and during the first few months of rebellion, expecting to prevail without
intervention, while viewing retaliation against their civilians as an acceptable price
of victory. After mid-2003, when the government implemented its brutally effective
counterinsurgency, the rebels could not have expected to prevail without humani-
tarian intervention. But the available evidence does not exclude the possibility that
the rebels continued to reject peace overtures because they anticipated that some
other factor eventually would increase their bargaining leverage, while accepting the
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suffering of their own civilians in the meantime. Although there is little evidence for
the third hypothesis, it cannot yet be rejected.
Hypothesis 4: Gambling on Intervention?
The evidence is strongest for the fourth hypothesis—that the expectation of humanitar-
ian intervention caused both the initial rebellion and its perpetuation. As documented
below, this expectation had four main sources: previous humanitarian intervention in
southern Sudan; intervention elsewhere in the world since 1990; gradual intervention
in Darfur, including by peacekeepers starting in 2004; and vocal international demands
by states and non-governmental organizations for greater intervention in Darfur.
Darfur’s initial rebellion was triggered mainly by the immediately preceding inter-
national intervention in Sudan that compelled Khartoum in 2002 to agree to share
power and wealth with southern rebels. The international community had intervened
because Khartoum’s retaliation against the southern rebellion created a humani-
tarian emergency. The intervention included economic sanctions against Khartoum,
support of the rebels, and pressure for cease-fires, in addition to more traditional relief
operations. Although the South’s civilians paid a terrible price during the southern re-
bellion, the humanitarian intervention ultimately rewarded the rebels and promoted
their political agenda. The resulting 2005 peace agreement installed the rebels as
political authorities in the newly autonomous southern Sudan, gave them consider-
able control over the south’s rapidly growing oil revenue, and promised them a refer-
endum on independence in six years. As Flint and DeWaal aptly note, the ‘‘agreement
is a remarkably good deal for Southern Sudan.’’59
Based on the southern rebels’ achievements, Darfur’s militants apparently in-
ferred that they too would be rewarded with power and wealth if they launched a re-
bellion that provoked retaliation against civilians and thereby attracted humanitarian
intervention. The evidence comes mainly from the reporting and inferences of Western
experts close to Darfur’s rebels. For example, Ge´rard Prunier observes, ‘‘It was largely
the changes in the diplomatic north-south relationship which finally worked as an
eye-opener for the young people of [Sudan’s] west and drove them to take up arms.’’60
Khartoum’s concessions toward the south had been compelled not by rebel strength
but by intense international intervention. As Prunier notes, in the north–south nego-
tiations, the ‘‘actors appeared driven to compromise more by American pressure than
by any inner conviction that peace should actually be negotiated.’’61 Thus, the inter-
national community’s well-intentioned humanitarian intervention in south Sudan
had the tragic unintended consequence of encouraging rebellion in Darfur, which in
turn provoked massive retaliation against civilians.
Unlike the competing hypotheses, moral hazard also explains the timing of Dar-
fur’s rebellion. The region’s African tribes had opposed rebellion for decades, despite
persistent grievances, until in 2002 they saw humanitarian intervention compel Khar-
toum to make substantial concessions to the southern rebels. Based on this precedent,
DeWaal says, ‘‘Part of Darfur’s non-Arab elite . . . decided they could no longer wait on
the sidelines of the north-south negotiations,’’ and instead should launch their own
rebellion.62
After Khartoum’s brutal retaliation starting in mid-2003 eliminated any plausible
rebel hope of victory on their own, the evidence shows that moral hazard—the expec-
tation of humanitarian intervention—is also why the rebels kept fighting and reject-
ing government offers of compromise. By 2004, the SLA’s two main leaders stopped
even trying to lead their troops to victory in Darfur and instead went abroad seeking
intervention. As Julie Flint writes: ‘‘Within a year of launching the rebellion, Abdel
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Wahid and Minawi were spending all their time outside Darfur, setting up headquar-
ters in Asmara [Eritrea] and lobbying for international support and assistance. Fur
leaders who had respected Abdel Wahid . . . grumbled that he had become a ‘hotel
guerrilla.’ ’’ Indeed, for eighteen months from April 2004 to October 2005, Abdel
Wahid did not set foot once in his ostensible rebel headquarters in central Darfur.
Likewise, the SLA’s Zaghawa leader, Minni Minawi, was denounced by subordinates
for ‘‘command by remote control.’’63
By spring 2004, however, the rebels’ international lobbying had started to pay
dividends, as the Darfur crisis became a humanitarian cause ce´le`bre, spurring calls
for intervention. Western media fostered support for the rebels by romanticizing
them as freedom fighters who were defending their people against a premeditated,
racially inspired genocide, even though the killing actually was a response to the
uprising. A respected Sudanese commentator aptly observed: ‘‘As the rebellion grew,
the main support for Darfur came from the international community, which provided
humanitarian assistance to Darfurians and the logistics for the rebel movements to
organize.’’64
The African Union’s initial military deployment, authorized in May 2004, com-
prised fewer than 450 personnel to oversee relief operations, but the broad array of
humanitarian intervention ramped up steadily.65 In July 2004, the United Nations
imposed an arms embargo on Darfur’s Arab militias. In September 2004, the United
States accused Sudan of genocide. In October 2004, the AU increased its authorized
deployment to 3,320 personnel, and five months later to 7,731 personnel. In January
2005, a UN panel declared Sudan guilty of ‘‘serious violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law.’’ In March 2005, the UN expanded the arms embargo to
encompass Sudan’s government and referred Darfur to the International Criminal
Court (ICC). In summer 2005, NATO approved logistical support to the AU peace-
keepers.66 In May 2006, the United States successfully pressured Sudan to sign the
Darfur Peace Agreement and then make further concessions. In July 2007, the United
Nations authorized a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force (UNAMID) of 26,000 per-
sonnel.67 In March 2009, the ICC indicted Sudan’s President al-Bashir for crimes
against humanity and war crimes. (The UN Security Council has the authority to
postpone the ICC prosecution but so far has not, apparently in hopes of deterring
future violence against civilians.68 Contrary to these hopes, however, Sudan reacted
to the indictment by expelling humanitarian aid groups—which it accused of colla-
borating with the court—thereby exacerbating Darfur’s humanitarian suffering. The
indictment, therefore, can be viewed as another element of humanitarian intervention
that has backfired.)69
Negotiations for the failed Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 demonstrate that
at least two of the three rebel factions had continued to fight because they expected to
benefit from additional humanitarian intervention. Minni Minawi, leader of the SLA’s
Zaghawa faction, agreed to sign only when the US negotiator, Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Zoellick, convinced him that no further intervention would be forthcom-
ing. The American official issued a blunt ultimatum: ‘‘I won’t support any change
in this document . . . If you want to choose whoever, like JEM, you can do it—or you
can choose the United States . . . I am a good friend and I am a fearsome enemy.’’70
Minawi reluctantly acceded, explaining his decision the next day: ‘‘I calculated the
balance of forces and I knew I had to sign.’’71 Just as the rebels had been emboldened
by anticipated intervention, now Minawi was chastened by the loss of interna-
tional support. As Fadul and Tanner observe, ‘‘Darfurians perceived a shift in inter-
national opinion . . . [They] are assiduous listeners of . . . Western radio broadcast
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services . . . [and they] felt a growing international impatience with . . . rebel intran-
sigence.’’72
The SLA’s Fur wing, which had fewer warriors than the Zaghawa wing and fewer
resources than the JEM, was motivated even more than the others by the expectation
of humanitarian intervention. As de Waal observes, ‘‘Abdel Wahid saw that his mili-
tary option had closed, but he hoped for third-party military intervention in his
favor.’’73 To address Abdel Wahid’s security concerns, Zoellick presented a letter
from US President George Bush assuring the rebel that—if he signed—the United
States would guarantee the agreement.74 Then Zoellick issued an ominous warning:
‘‘If you pass up this historic opportunity, to whom do you intend to turn? If you pass
this up you will remain victims forever.’’75 Abdel Wahid, however, dismissed this as a
bluff, expecting that by rejecting the deal he could attract still more intervention. The
rebel leader even told Zoellick what he anticipated: American and British intervention
‘‘like in Bosnia.’’76 In that earlier Balkan conflict, the United States had helped arm
and train the weaker side, launched air strikes to forge a peace deal, and then
deployed peacekeepers.77 Abdel Wahid’s comment reveals not only why he kept
fighting—the expectation of humanitarian intervention—but how his expectation
arose in part from a seemingly unrelated intervention a decade earlier and a continent
away. It also demonstrates that he was willing to perpetuate the suffering of his own
civilians as leverage to compel additional intervention in Darfur.
The third rebel faction, the JEM, had the least grass-roots support in Darfur at
the time but the greatest external resources, initially from Islamist connections and,
after spring 2006, from Chad. Accordingly, this faction’s rejection of the DPA may not
have been driven by expectations of humanitarian intervention.
All three rebel factions, consistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis, knowingly
accepted massive retaliation against their own tribes as the price of achieving their
political aims. Such callousness may be explained in part by a principal–agent dy-
namic: the African militants who agitated for rebellion were largely distinct from the
African civilians who paid the price of retaliation. As Flint and DeWaal reveal, it was
members of the Darfur diaspora, facing virtually no risk of retaliation, who led the
charge for rebellion in 2001: ‘‘Zaghawa outside Darfur—expatriates in Libya, mer-
chants and students in Khartoum—now agreed that there was a need to form an
organized resistance.’’78 Similarly, at the peace talks in 2006, the two rebel advisers
who urged Abdel Wahid not to sign the DPA were ‘‘Canadians of Darfurian origin.’’79
Intertribal divides also played a role. In 2003, Zaghawa rebels attacked government
forces in Fur territory, knowing that retaliation would fall on local Fur civilians, not
fellow Zaghawa who lived far away.80 Within individual tribes, as well, there was dis-
connection between rebel leaders and the civilians whom they ostensibly represented.
For example, Abdel Wahid rejected the DPA in 2006, even after Khartoum satisfied his
security conditions, because he continued to demand greater sharing of wealth and
power, even though Darfur’s common ‘‘people always stressed these were secondary
to security,’’ according to field researchers.81 Even within his own delegation at the
negotiations, ‘‘the majority was for signing, but Abdel Wahid refused to put the ques-
tion to a vote.’’82 As an AU negotiating-team member later complained bitterly, the
international mediators ‘‘had always been guided by concern for the people of Darfur
and responsibility for ending their suffering. None of the parties could have made any
of these claims.’’83
The above evidence demonstrates that two of Darfur’s three rebel factions—the
Fur and Zaghawa wings of the SLA—continued to fight in early 2006 only because
their leaders expected additional humanitarian intervention. If not for such expecta-
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tions, it is reasonable to infer that these two factions previously would have agreed
to peace, if they had rebelled at all. The rebellion thus would have been substantially
diminished because the remaining rebel group, the JEM, enjoyed relatively little
grass-roots support in Darfur during the first years of war. Khartoum’s retaliatory
violence against Darfur’s African tribes, which was a direct response to the rebellion,
logically should have been mitigated, too. The unavoidable implication is that the
prospect of humanitarian intervention, as envisioned by the Responsibility to Protect,
unintentionally exacerbated civilian suffering in Darfur.
Hypothesis 5: Non-strategic Rebels?
The final hypothesis contends that Darfur’s militants were driven to rebel by some-
thing other than strategic calculation. Obviously, many factors—including ideological
beliefs and past grievances—may have driven elements of Darfur’s African tribes to
desire change. But the relevant question for this study is whether such factors drove
Darfur’s African militants to embrace rebellion without—or despite—a strategic as-
sessment of the likely consequences. No available evidence supports this hypothesis
for the initial rebellion, which appears to have been a strategic attempt by Darfur’s
African militants to mimic the success of Sudan’s southern rebels by attracting inter-
national intervention. In contrast, the perpetuation of Darfur’s rebellion may be ex-
plained partly by several non-strategic dynamics. Overall, however, these explanations
are less consistent with the evidence than the preceding moral-hazard hypothesis.
The literature on internal war explains that non-strategic action may arise partly
from rebels being insufficiently consolidated to make unified decisions based on
shared preferences. For example, rebels sometimes lack a ‘‘valid spokesperson,’’84 so
that rank-and-file rebels do not follow a leader’s decisions. In September 2003, accord-
ing to Prunier, the SLA’s Zaghawa leader Minni Minawi agreed to a cease-fire and
cantonment of weapons, but the truce ‘‘could not hold since the local guerrilla fighting
units never accepted the cantonment principle.’’85 A related explanation is ‘‘escalatory
outbidding,’’ in which rebel factions reject compromises that otherwise would be ac-
ceptable to them because they fear accusations of treason by other factions.86 During
the 2006 DPA negotiations, says DeWaal, ‘‘the only way in which the two SLMs and
JEM could adopt a united position at the peace talks was to agree on the most hard-
line stance.’’87 A third such explanation stems from the principle-agent dynamic in
which a rebel leader rejects a peace deal, despite it being favored by his constituents,
because of personal concerns such as his own safety.88 Darfur’s rebel leaders had rea-
son for such concerns considering that in March 2003, when they agreed to a brief
cease-fire, Arab militias attacked and killed the most senior Masalit sheikh.89
Non-strategic dynamics also can result from rebels acting irrationally. For exam-
ple, militants may be driven by emotions of vengeance, based on past grievances, to
rebel without contemplating the consequences. Flint and DeWaal offer anecdotes
of Darfur rebels who ostensibly were driven by such emotions.90 In addition, senior
militants may suffer from psychiatric disorders. This possibility was raised by the
Libyan representative at the DPA negotiations, who alleged that the JEM’s leader,
Khalil Ibrahim, was simply ‘‘mad.’’91 Finally, one AU mediator claims that the rebels
were ‘‘frightened of being outwitted in the negotiations,’’ because they had little ex-
perience in high-level bargaining, and so rejected deals that actually were in their
rational interest.92
Many or all of these non-strategic dynamics may have helped perpetuate the
rebellion. But in May 2006, none of these factors prevented the most powerful rebel
faction’s leader, Minni Minawi, from signing the Darfur Peace Agreement. His deci-
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sion spurred the defection of some subordinates and was criticized as treason by other
factions, but he nevertheless signed when he judged that no further intervention was
forthcoming. In return, the government honored its pledge to ally with his forces and
appoint him as senior assistant to the president of Sudan. This demonstrates that
even though Darfur’s militants were not consolidated, rebel leaders still could act
rationally, abandoning rebellion when peace offered greater rewards.
Although non-strategic factors affected the rebels, their most fateful actions are
better explained by strategic calculation. For example, even though vengeful emotions
mounted during the first three years of war, Minawi still was able to sign the DPA–
indeed, mere hours after learning that his own brother had been killed in the fighting.
Khalil might have been ‘‘mad,’’ but he also had rational reasons to reject the DPA: the
agreement failed to address the JEM’s national agenda, and his rebel group could sus-
tain itself with support from Islamist sources and Chad.93 Abdel Wahid’s rejection is
best explained not by irrationality but by his expressed strategic assessment that he
could hold out for greater intervention ‘‘like in Bosnia.’’ (This calculation appears to
have been wrong, perhaps resulting from imperfect information or motivated bias,
which often cause strategic decisions to be suboptimal.) Finally, although the rebels
initially may have lacked experience in high-level negotiations, by the time of the
DPA they were advised by senior diplomats from African and Western states, which
helped to level the bargaining table. Diplomatic inexperience did not stop Sudan’s
southern rebels from signing a peace agreement in 2005, nor Minawi from signing
the DPA the following year. The non-strategic factors above may have inhibited the
rebels from quick and efficient decision-making but did not prevent them from acting
strategically on key decisions of war and peace.
Summary and Conclusions
In an effort to explain Darfur’s rebellion since 2003, the first rigorous test of compet-
ing hypotheses finds strong evidence for moral hazard (Hypothesis 4). The expectation
of humanitarian intervention explains when and why Darfur’s African militants
launched their rebellion, and why they persisted in the face of massive state-sponsored
retaliation against their own civilians despite little apparent chance of victory. Darfur’s
rebels aimed to repeat the success of southern Sudan’s rebels in attracting humanitar-
ian intervention to compel Khartoum to share wealth and power. Darfur’s militants
launched the rebellion in 2003, immediately after seeing the south’s rebels rewarded
in a 2002 peace protocol that resulted from intense international pressure on Khar-
toum. After Darfur’s rebellion provoked massive retaliation against local African
tribes, the leaders of the main rebel group ceased attempting to command their forces
to victory and instead went abroad to lobby for humanitarian intervention. In 2006,
the leader of the SLA’s Zaghawa wing agreed to peace when he was persuaded by a
senior American official that no further intervention was forthcoming. The leader of
the SLA’s Fur wing rejected that peace deal because he still expected more robust
humanitarian intervention ‘‘like in Bosnia.’’ The other rebel group of the time, the
JEM, had national ambitions and other sources of external support, especially after
spring 2006, so the moral-hazard hypothesis may not explain as fully its rebellion.
The sources of moral hazard in Darfur—that is, the reasons the rebels expected to
benefit from humanitarian intervention—are similar to those identified by Crawford
and include the following: previous intervention in other countries, including the
Bosnia precedent cited explicitly by the founder of Darfur’s main rebel group; recent
and nearby intervention in Sudan’s north–south civil war; gradual escalation of inter-
vention in Darfur starting with humanitarian aid in 2003 and peacekeepers in 2004;
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:3 December 2009
296
and persistent calls by Western states and non-governmental organizations for
greater intervention in Darfur.
Competing explanatory hypotheses are not as well supported, but some cannot be
rejected for certain periods of Darfur’s rebellion based on available evidence (see Table
2). Hypothesis 1 is refuted because Darfur’s militants had overwhelming reason to ex-
pect that rebellion would provoke retaliation against their own civilians based on past
experience in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan. Regarding Hypothesis 3, it is possible
that the rebels initially expected to win without humanitarian intervention during
the first months of 2003, or that following the government’s devastating retaliation
the rebels still expected to extract future concessions from Khartoum, but there is
little if any supporting evidence. In the wake of brutal retaliation, the rebels may
have been inhibited from strategic decision making (Hypothesis 5) by lack of con-
solidation, desire for vengeance, and inexperience in negotiation, but these factors
were not decisive because the strongest rebel faction at the time still managed to em-
brace peace in 2006. When the other two rebel factions rejected the DPA in May 2006,
and Darfur descended into anarchy, the rebellion may have been prolonged by a new-
found perception among the region’s African tribes that violence had become unavoid-
able (Hypothesis 2). But no such perception can explain the preceding three years of
rebellion.
As with any claim about causality, assessing the impact of moral hazard in Darfur
involves a counter-factual thought experiment. Simply put, if not for the expectation
of humanitarian intervention, would there have been a rebellion, would it have been
as large and protracted, and would it have provoked as much violence against civil-
ians? 94 The findings above suggest that, even without the prospect of humanitarian
intervention, Darfur still might have experienced small-scale intergroup skirmishes
over land, water, and livestock. But Darfur’s African tribes would have been unlikely
to escalate to full-blown rebellion because, without an expectation of intervention,
such rebellion was widely perceived as counter productive, if not suicidal.
If Darfur’s militants had suffered from severe optimistic miscalculation, they still
might have launched a rebellion. But without an expectation of intervention, the gov-
ernment’s initial brutal retaliation likely would have compelled the SLA to accept
peace in the first year, because the subsequent evidence indicates that both factions
of this rebel group continued fighting only in hopes of attracting such intervention.
The JEM might have fought on because of its national agenda and external sources
of support but, in light of its initially weak grass-roots support in Darfur, this sole
rebel faction would not have represented as significant a threat. Considering that
Table 2: Assessing Explanations for Darfur’s Suicidal Rebellion
Hypothesis Initiation Perpetuation
Do not expect retaliation No No
Perceive victimization as inevitable No No
(through May 2006)
Expect victory without intervention ? ?
Expect intervention to enable victory Probably
(SLA especially)
Probably
(SLA especially)
Not driven by strategic calculus No No
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Khartoum escalated its retaliation against civilians only after the rebels escalated
their own attacks in 2003, a smaller rebellion probably would have provoked less
retaliatory violence against civilians.95 Although no counter-factual scenario ever can
be proved definitively, the evidence suggests that moral hazard—the expectation of
humanitarian intervention—increased both the magnitude and duration of Darfur’s
rebellion, and therefore the retaliation it provoked against civilians.
This study represents an initial effort to assess rigorously the moral hazard of
humanitarian intervention in Darfur. Further research is required to assess more pre-
cisely the expectations and motivations of Darfur’s militants prior to and during their
rebellion, in order to determine with greater confidence the relative explanatory
power of Hypotheses 3 and 4. Moreover, to address the concern raised by Grigorian
in a previous case, additional research should explore whether international interven-
tion in Darfur actually was driven by humanitarian concerns, as this study assumes,
or by other goals such as changing Khartoum’s regime.
In previous work, I have recommended modifying how the Responsibility to Pro-
tect is implemented to reduce its perverse, unintended consequences and to foster its
intent of protecting civilians.96 The essence of my proposal is that intervention should
not reward rebels, unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate, but rather
should aim to induce states to address the legitimate grievances of nonviolent domes-
tic groups. Had this policy guided intervention in 2003, and had Khartoum nonethe-
less perpetrated its grossly disproportionate retaliation to the Darfur rebellion, then
intervention to aid the rebels would have been called for. But this policy also might
have deterred Khartoum from perpetrating disproportionate retaliation, hoping to
avert intervention, or dissuaded Darfur’s militants from rebelling in the first place by
reducing their expectation of benefiting from intervention, so that they instead pur-
sued non-violent resistance.
Some skeptics may reject non-violent protest as useless against a state that is
willing to brutalize defenseless civilians in response to rebellion, but historical evi-
dence suggests that it can work in Sudan. In 1985, for example, protests by Sudanese
who had been displaced by famine helped end the authoritarian rule of President
Jaafar Nimeiri. In 1988, nonviolent demonstrations persuaded Sudan’s government
to continue bread subsidies and ‘‘to begin taking seriously the conflict in Darfur,’’ ac-
cording to a former Darfur government official.97 The Responsibility to Protect should
be implemented in ways that promote such non-violent paths to progress in Sudan
and elsewhere, rather than encouraging rebellion that provokes genocidal retaliation.
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This article analyzes the political challenges confronting the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) in its efforts to bring war crimes suspects to trial in connection
with mass atrocities committed in the Darfur region of Sudan. It chronicles and ex-
amines the battles over cooperation between the ICC and the defiant Sudanese gov-
ernment that have forestalled the handover of suspects such as Sudanese president
Omar Hassan al-Bashir. It also seeks to explain why the Security Council, in its
ambivalence toward the ICC, has not vigorously pressed Sudan to fulfill its legal
obligation to cooperate.
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I. Introduction
In its difficult early years, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) was likened by its founding chief justice to a giant without arms and
legs.1 The analogy sought to describe the paradoxical nature of the ICTY insofar as
it is both a powerful institution—given its authority to prosecute high-level govern-
ment officials—and a powerless one—given its lack of any enforcement powers.
Today’s ad hoc international tribunals and the permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC) have no direct power to compel states to arrest war crimes suspects and
hand them over for trial. State cooperation is as vital for tribunals as it is resisted by
governments complicit in mass atrocities. Although the tribunals and the ICC prose-
cute individuals only, governments and their leaders often perceive such trials as an
assault on the state itself. Nowhere is this more evident than when a head of state is
targeted, as is now occurring with the ICC’s arrest warrant for Sudan’s Omar Hassan
al-Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.
Without power to enforce, the contemporary war crimes tribunals would seem to
lack any leverage whatsoever to bring recalcitrant states into compliance. However,
the hard-won success of the ICTY—which has obtained custody of scores of suspects—
demonstrates that today’s international courts can mount effective challenges against
targeted states. For tribunals, garnering support from key international actors, or
‘‘surrogate enforcers,’’2 is the key to wresting cooperation from a recalcitrant state. In
the face of international pressure, targeted states such as Serbia and Sudan often
mobilize their foreign policy machinery to thwart the tribunals. To counter the tribu-
nal’s attempt to delegitimize the state as an international outlaw, the state seeks to
knock the tribunal off its moral pedestal by highlighting its real and perceived short-
comings.3
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When it comes to the ICC’s quest for cooperation from Sudan, the battle for inter-
national intervention has become even more contentious, particularly given the Secu-
rity Council’s authority to suspend controversial cases. Under Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, the ICC’s founding document, the Security Council can actually halt ICC
cases for renewable one-year periods when they are determined to pose a threat to
international peace and security. Thus, even as the ICC looks to the Security Council
to press Sudan to comply with its obligation to cooperate, the Sudanese government
has—in the aftermath of the chief prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant for
President al-Bashir in July 2008—tried to push the Council to invoke Article 16 by
arguing that the ICC is a spoiler of the peace process in Darfur. Long before the chief
prosecutor’s bid for al-Bashir’s arrest warrant, the Sudanese government sought to
play up the damaging consequences of international justice in Darfur by discouraging
international support for the ICC and mobilizing African and Arab allies to magnify
the government’s opposition to the Court. Ever since ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo announced his intention to prosecute al-Bashir—and ever since
the ICC pre-trial chamber4 issued a warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest on 4 March 2009—
the Sudanese government has been increasingly emphatic in its warnings about the
hazards posed by The Hague-based ICC.
To counter Sudan’s framing of the issue, Moreno-Ocampo has argued that a fail-
ure by the international community to back the ICC’s pursuit of al-Bashir and two
other Sudanese suspects will only embolden Khartoum’s criminality. Unless al-Bashir
is forced to account for his alleged crimes, asserts Moreno-Ocampo, the Sudanese pre-
sident will be in a position to direct more violence against vulnerable civilians in
Darfur.5 When it issued the warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest in March 2009, the ICC
pre-trial chamber granted the prosecutor’s request for war crimes and crimes against
humanity charges, but rejected his request for genocide charges. The prosecutor sub-
sequently filed an appeal of the pre-trial chamber’s rejection of the genocide counts.6 It
is too early to determine when or even whether al-Bashir and two other Sudanese
suspects tied to state violence in Darfur will ever face trial at the ICC. Their fate will
depend in no small part on whether Sudan or the ICC wins the peace versus justice
debate by drawing the Security Council, the African Union, and other key interna-
tional actors to its side.
A decade and a half after the establishment of the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), we know a great deal about the dynamics and
outcomes of their battles for cooperation with the states of the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Much less is known about the ICC’s ongoing efforts to obtain cooperation
from the Sudanese government as well as from the three other African countries in
which the Court has initiated formal investigations. The aim of this article is to iden-
tify and examine the dynamics of the battles over cooperation fought between the ICC
and the Sudanese government. The foregoing analysis is of course incomplete, given
the ICC’s relatively recent intervention in Sudan and the developing nature of the
case against President al-Bashir. Still, this account aims to highlight the ways in
which the ICC and Sudan have and are likely to continue to wage the battle over
Sudan’s legal obligation to comply with international prosecutions by handing over
suspects and otherwise assisting the pursuit of international justice.
II. Khartoum’s Strategic Defiance of the ICC
The last day of March 2005 represented a watershed for the ICC when the Security
Council authorized the ICC to open investigations in Darfur.7 Because Sudan has not
ratified the Rome Statute which established the ICC, and is therefore considered a
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non-State Party, the Court would have had no authority to investigate atrocities on
Sudanese soil unless it received a referral from the Security Council to do so. How-
ever, as will be discussed below in section IV, it was by no means certain that the
Council would authorize ICC intervention in Darfur, given that the United States,
China, and Russia—all permanent members of the Security Council and each with
the power to veto the Darfur referral—are also non-State Parties.
Well before the start of the ICC’s investigation of the Darfur atrocities,8 the Suda-
nese government had reason to fear that even cases brought against mid-level govern-
ment officials and members of the government-supported Janjaweed militia could
implicate senior leaders, including President al-Bashir himself. Yet, up until Moreno-
Ocampo brought the first charges against two Sudanese suspects in early 2007, the
relations between Khartoum and the ICC were at times cordial.9 While the al-Bashir
government did not allow the Court to open up an office in Khartoum,10 it permitted
ICC investigators to meet with government and judicial officials on five separate occa-
sions,11 primarily to determine if Sudanese courts had the capacity and willingness to
prosecute the cases under ICC investigation. Under the complementarity principle,
the ICC can only prosecute cases that a state is either unable or genuinely unwilling
to prosecute itself. If the ICC determines that a state is unable or unwilling to prose-
cute a case, it then becomes admissible for ICC prosecution. The government’s best-
case scenario was to be seen to cooperate with Moreno-Ocampo’s admissibility probe
and then have the ICC conclude that domestic courts in Sudan should retain the au-
thority to prosecute war crimes suspects sought by the chief prosecutor.
Khartoum’s limited cooperation with Moreno-Ocampo came to an end following
the chief prosecutor’s February 2007 announcement designating two Sudanese sus-
pects for ICC prosecution.12 The prospects for state cooperation grew even dimmer a
few months later when the ICC pre-trial chamber issued arrest warrants for the two
suspects—Ahmad Harun, Sudan’s minister of humanitarian affairs, and Ali Kushayb,
a leader of the pro-government Janjaweed militia.13 Harun, the former interior minis-
ter, and Kushayb face fifty-one counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes re-
lating to atrocities in 2003–2004.14 From early 2007, the government has been largely
hostile toward the ICC. This antagonism has only intensified in the wake of Moreno-
Ocampo’s bid to prosecute President al-Bashir. In response to Sudan’s defiance, the
once conciliatory Moreno-Ocampo has become increasingly critical of the government
and of Security Council inaction.
Well before Moreno-Ocampo sought an arrest warrant for al-Bashir in mid-2008,
Sudan attempted to sideline the ICC and discourage international pressure to co-
operate with the Court. In its campaign against the ICC, the government has honed
a number of strategies used by other states, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Rwanda,
whose nationals have been investigated and targeted for prosecution by the ICTY
and ICTR. First, the al-Bashir government has argued that the ICC prosecutor has
no legal right to prosecute Sudanese citizens and that the prerogative belongs exclu-
sively to the Sudanese courts. To bolster its case, the government argues that it has
not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC nor consented to the obligations binding on
State Parties. However, a Security Council referral to the ICC obliges a non-State
Party, such as Sudan, to fully cooperate with the Court. By the terms of the UN
Charter, a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter is
binding on Sudan as a UN member state.
Sudan has also waged an intensive lobbying campaign to discredit the Court and
its claims of impartiality. That the ICC has been imposed on Sudan against its will,
just as the ICTY was created without Serbia’s consent, has been used by Khartoum
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as evidence that the ICC is a political weapon controlled by the powerful states of the
Security Council. Here, the government has accused the ICC of executing ‘‘a political
agenda of countries targeting Sudan’’15 and pursuing a Western-instigated ‘‘con-
spiracy’’ against the government.16 The government has sought to portray the ICC as
‘‘a tool for the exercise of the culture of superiority’’ of Western states to punish weak
states in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.17 Key to the government’s bid
for impunity is its argument of ‘‘double standards,’’18 specifically, that more powerful
countries such as the United States are effectively immune from ICC scrutiny for
crimes that their military may have committed overseas.19 Yet, at least in Darfur,
the ICC’s pursuit of prosecutions is not one-sided. Moreno-Ocampo has also targeted
Darfuri rebels implicated in war crimes. Toward this end, he is seeking to prosecute
three Darfuri rebels for the September 2007 killing of twelve African Union peace-
keepers in Darfur. In May 2009, one rebel commander, Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, volun-
tarily appeared at the ICC for an initial hearing pursuant to a Court summons.20 The
ICC’s targeting of Darfuri rebels has so far done little to soften Khartoum’s defiance.
Indeed, there is the strong likelihood that for the foreseeable future only rebels and
not Sudanese officials will face justice in The Hague.
The Sudanese government has taken the argument of Western bias one step fur-
ther by launching a pan-African appeal for solidarity to thwart the ICC and its bid to
prosecute President al-Bashir. It has portrayed the ICC as a neo-colonial institution
bent on punishing not only Sudan but Africa as a whole. Khartoum has also sought
and received public backing from Arab states by casting the ICC as an enemy of
the Arab world. It is a pillar of Sudan’s claim that the ICC is an anti-African court
because it has so far only opened formal investigations (also referred to as country
situations) on the African continent. This claim of bias ignores the significant ways in
which some African states have engaged the ICC and sought international prosecu-
tions. Indeed, three of the ICC’s four situations (Uganda, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and the Central African Republic)21 were initiated by state referrals to the
Court. The allegations of the ICC’s purported anti-African bias deserve deeper analy-
sis than can be afforded in this article. Suffice it to say here that the question of how
the chief prosecutor selects country situations and particular war crimes cases has
been the subject of increasing scrutiny even among ICC advocates.22 Even as ICC offi-
cials refute the allegations of anti-African bias they are particularly troubling to the
Court. ‘‘It is a very harmful debate for us . . . and it is harmful to perceptions’’ of the
Court, lamented a high-ranking ICC official in a December 2008 interview.23
Sudan’s strategy has not yet derailed the chief prosecutor’s case against al-Bashir.
As of mid-July 2009, the Security Council has not invoked Article 16 of the Rome
Statute to suspend the al-Bashir case. And the near term prospects for such a suspen-
sion seem low, according to ICC observers and diplomats interviewed in mid-2009.24
Nevertheless, Sudan’s anti-ICC campaign, which has been heavily backed by Libya
(whose leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi, has held the chair of the African Union since
early 2009) has borne fruit by rallying African and Arab states to publicly oppose the
Court’s pursuit of President al-Bashir. This opposition has so far culminated in an
African Union statement, adopted in early July 2009 at an AU summit in Libya, call-
ing on members not to cooperate in efforts to arrest al-Bashir and turn him over to the
ICC.25 The AU sought to justify its action at the summit by pointing to the Security
Council’s failure to heed the call from African states to suspend the al-Bashir case.26
A campaign, backed by Sudan and Libya, to press African State Parties to the Rome
Statute to withdraw from the ICC has to date not succeeded.27 However, the potential
for this scenario remains troubling for ICC supporters.28
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In the immediate aftermath of Moreno-Ocampo’s mid-July 2008 request for an
arrest warrant for al-Bashir, the African Union and the Arab League came out in
opposition to the chief prosecutor’s bid to prosecute the Sudanese president and called
for the Security Council to suspend the case.29 The Arab League and the African
Union again called for Security Council intervention after the ICC pre-trial chamber
issued a warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest in March 2009. The Arab League decision
garnered significant international media attention, in part because it occurred at a
summit meeting in Qatar in which al-Bashir attended and was warmly embraced
by fellow Arab leaders.30 In an apparent attempt to flout the ICC arrest warrant and
call attention to his considerable regional support, al-Bashir also traveled to Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in March and April. Along with Qatar, these
states have not ratified the Rome Statute and therefore do not have a legal obligation
to arrest al-Bashir. In this respect, the ICC is at a significant disadvantage relative
to the ICTY and ICTR insofar as all UN member states have a legal obligation to co-
operate with these two UN tribunals. The Arab League’s vocal support for al-Bashir is
not surprising because of the lack of pre-existing support for the ICC among Arab
States. Only three Arab League states (Jordan, Djibouti, and the Comoros Islands)
have ratified the Rome Statute. However, the strong backing Sudan has received
from the African Union has come as a particular disappointment to ICC supporters
because thirty African countries are State Parties to the Rome Statute.31
The disappointment of ICC advocates has been sharpened in the wake of the AU’s
July 2009 statement in which African State Parties appeared to disavow their legal
obligation to arrest al-Bashir if he should travel to their countries. The AU’s state-
ment, which poses a significant challenge to the authority of the ICC, has triggered
strong criticism from human rights activists. ‘‘This resolution, the result of unprece-
dented bullying by Libya, puts the AU on the side of a dictator accused of mass mur-
der rather than on the side of his victims,’’ said Reed Brody of Human Rights Watch.32
Meanwhile, Sudanese officials have trumpeted the AU statement as a virtual in-
vitation for al-Bashir to travel freely to African states that have ratified the Rome
Statute and a sign of African unity against the ICC.33 However, the actual level of
popular opposition in Africa to the al-Bashir case and the ICC more generally is far
from clear. Moreover, not all African states that attended the Libya summit appear
to have strongly backed the AU statement.34 However, in the days following the
summit, Botswana appeared to be the only African state to publicly condemn the AU
statement. Botswana’s vice president, Mompati Merafhe, criticized Libya for not
allowing adequate debate on the matter and called on African leaders not to ‘‘try to
undermine the work of the ICC simply because one head of state . . . has been indicted
by the Court.’’35
An important element in Sudan’s campaign against the ICC is to heighten world
fears that support for the Court will undermine the elusive quest for a negotiated
peace in Darfur as well as jeopardize the tenuous 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment that brought an end to Sudan’s devastating north–south civil war. The gov-
ernment’s apparent aim is to shift international scrutiny from its role in the Darfur
atrocities to the ICC’s alleged interference in a possible peace settlement. As far back
as the Security Council meeting of 31 March 2005, Khartoum warned that the ICC
would subvert the peace process.36 Subsequently, the government called Moreno-
Ocampo ‘‘enemy number one of peace in Darfur.’’37 In the aftermath of the chief pro-
secutor’s request for an al-Bashir arrest warrant in July 2008, government officials,
including al-Bashir himself, intensified this line of attack, going so far as to threaten
retaliation if the ICC pre-trial chamber was to issue a warrant for the president’s
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arrest. Beyond that, Sudanese officials issued thinly veiled threats against the vulner-
able, undermanned international peacekeeping force in Darfur.38 The threats of blood-
shed have hardly demonstrated Sudan’s peaceful motives. The recent governor of
south Darfur, for example, warned that if the al-Bashir case moved forward there
would be ‘‘more genocide such as has never before been seen by anyone.’’39
On the one hand, the government has denied a role in atrocities, as when Presi-
dent al-Bashir in October 2008 dismissed allegations of mass rapes of Darfuri women
as fabrications.40 But on the other hand, the government has at times strategically
acknowledged its hand in the violence, apparently to signal to the ICC and the world
that its threats for yet more violence are deadly serious.
Khartoum has sought to blame any increase in violence and danger to Darfuris on
Moreno-Ocampo’s misguided pursuit of prosecutions. However, in the immediate after-
math of the March 2009 arrest warrant, al-Bashir retaliated by targeting the interna-
tional humanitarian presence in Darfur that provided a lifeline to millions of Darfuris.
Al-Bashir expelled thirteen international and three domestic aid organizations that
together had been responsible for providing crucial humanitarian relief to more than
four million vulnerable civilians in Darfur.41 The expulsions sparked dire warnings
over the fate of the vulnerable Darfuris. Al-Bashir sought to justify the expulsions by
accusing these humanitarian organizations of spying on behalf of the ICC.42
For Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, al-Bashir’s actions have confirmed his crimi-
nal intent, making his arrest even more urgent. Still, the unfolding crisis triggered by
the expulsions have, at least in the short term, appeared to soften international pres-
sure for the president’s arrest as Western diplomats have focused on obtaining
Khartoum’s cooperation to allow other humanitarian aid organizations to replace the
expelled groups. In this respect, the United States appears to have taken a concilia-
tory approach toward Sudan, apparently aimed at ameliorating the Darfur crisis and
preventing the collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.43
The Sudanese government’s repudiation of the ICC is both strategic and deeply
felt, according to Western diplomats. ‘‘If there is one thing that can get them out of
their chair, it’s the ICC issue. It’s really, really upsetting for them,’’ remarked a Euro-
pean diplomat who has met with Sudanese officials in Khartoum.44 Beyond declaring
its intent never to hand over indicted suspects, the government has taken steps to
marginalize the ICC and prevent international intervention on behalf of the Court.
Well before the issuance of the al-Bashir arrest warrant, the government used in-
cendiary rhetoric in an apparent attempt to demonstrate that its non-compliance is
non-negotiable. In March 2007, for instance, Interior Minister Al-Zubayr Bashir Taha
promised to ‘‘cut the throat of any international official . . . who tries to jail a Sudanese
official in order to present him to the international justice.’’45 Then in April 2008,
Sudan’s ambassador to the UN, Abdel-Mohmood Mohamad, called for the arrest of
Moreno-Ocampo, accusing him of ‘‘jeopardizing the political settlement in Darfur.’’46
In early June 2008, President al-Bashir reportedly told members of a Security Council
delegation visiting Khartoum that he would cooperate with the Court ‘‘over his dead
body.’’47 The day after the ICC pre-trial chamber issued a warrant for his arrest,
al-Bashir told a pro-government rally in Khartoum that Sudan is ‘‘ready for any
battle’’ against the ‘‘new colonization’’ represented by the ICC.48 Taken together,
these statements may be interpreted as a government bid both to signal the futility
of international pressure and the political price the international community will
have to pay for exerting such pressure.
Yet even as the chief prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant for al-Bashir pro-
voked hostile reactions in Khartoum, including government-sponsored protests
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against the ICC,49 government officials in the second half of 2008 offered slender olive
branches to the international community, but not to the ICC. The Sudanese govern-
ment promised that the situation in Darfur would improve, although it only offered
minor concessions toward this end.50 Behind what Human Rights Watch called a
‘‘dual strategy of threats of further violence and promises of progress on the ground’’51
was a drive to convince the Security Council to invoke Article 16 and suspend the
al-Bashir case. However, by the end of 2008, the government’s strategy had not per-
suaded the Security Council.
In its quest for an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case in the second half of
2008, the government argued, as it had when Moreno-Ocampo first opened his inves-
tigation in 2005, that under the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle its courts
are capable of handling Darfur-related prosecutions. Sudan’s allies in Africa and the
Arab world sought to broker a compromise to the crisis over the impending ICC war-
rant by encouraging Khartoum to develop a plan for credible domestic war crimes
prosecutions.52 Toward that end, the government announced the appointment of
a special prosecutor for Darfur.53 And in October 2008, the Sudanese government
announced that it had arrested Ali Kushayb.54 (Government authorities had previ-
ously arrested Kushayb, but then released him in 2007.) But by the end of 2008 scant
progress had been made toward domestic prosecutions and there was little sign that
the government planned to prosecute Kushayb or Ahmad Harun, the other Sudanese
suspect facing an ICC arrest warrant.55 Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo was em-
phatic in his criticism of how little Sudan had done in the realm of domestic war
crimes prosecutions, telling the Security Council in December 2008 that ‘‘in spite of
recent announcements and appointments, nothing—nothing—has been done.’’56 In
another attempt to sideline the ICC, a deal was reportedly explored whereby the
Sudanese government would send Harun and or Kushayb for trial in The Hague in
exchange for an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case. In August 2008, the idea
surfaced with potential support from France and Britain, ostensibly the ICC’s two
strongest backers among the Security Council’s five permanent members. But in
October, momentum for such a deal died after Khartoum stood by its long-held refusal
to hand over the two suspects or to make significant concessions in regard to amelio-
rating the conflict in Darfur.57
In the aftermath of the chief prosecutor’s application of an arrest warrant for
al-Bashir, some Western diplomats and many ICC supporters have scoffed at the sug-
gestion that the Court’s work would jeopardize a resolution to the Darfur crisis given
the moribund state of the peace negotiations. ‘‘Show me the peace process, please,’’
one high-level ICC official said in a December 2008 interview.58 Still, the prospect
that the Court’s pre-trial chamber would issue an arrest warrant raised fears in
many capitals that the Darfur crisis would grow worse at the hands of an embattled
leader. Many diplomats also feared that casting al-Bashir as a pariah would, for as
long as he remains in power, make it difficult for the international community to
directly engage him to find a resolution to the Darfur conflict or ensure the success of
the fragile Comprehensive Peace Agreement. To be sure, the indictment of a sitting
head of state is bound to be highly controversial, even if it is enabled by a Security
Council referral. The central concern is that a cornered al-Bashir would have no incen-
tive to bring the war in Darfur to an end and perhaps every reason to prolong it. Yet,
by holding the keys to the Darfur conflict—either by unleashing more violence or by
working toward its resolution—al-Bashir’s behavior may yet be restrained in the
hopes of obtaining the golden prize of an Article 16 suspension.
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Even before the emergence of the al-Bashir case, some Sudan experts expressed
concern that the ICC’s expected charges against senior officials in Khartoum could
provoke further instability in Darfur, trigger violence in the fragile oil-rich Abyei re-
gion leading to a resumption of the north–south war, and prompt government reta-
liation against humanitarian workers and peacekeepers. For instance, former US
Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew S. Natsios warned of a doomsday scenario in which
new ICC indictments ‘‘will drive the country closer to dissolution.’’59 This, Natsios
feared, could destabilize neighboring countries, disrupt Sudan’s oil exports, and force
an increase in world prices.60 The concern that the pursuit of justice could damage the
prospects of an already elusive peace in Darfur have been sharpened in the wake of
the chief prosecutor’s bid to bring al-Bashir to trial in The Hague and the issuance of
the warrant for the Sudanese president. Yet other experts, including representatives
of prominent international human rights organizations, view the move to prosecute
al-Bashir as a potential catalyst to confronting and ultimately ending the atrocities in
Darfur.
Even prior to the chief prosecutor’s targeting of al-Bashir, the Sudanese govern-
ment argued that the ICC interfered with efforts to bring the Darfur conflict to an
end. Specifically, Khartoum warned that the arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb
could disrupt the bid for the deployment of an expanded African Union-UN peacekeep-
ing force in Darfur. President al-Bashir argued that his previous refusal to allow UN
peacekeepers into Darfur was based on his fear that the ICC would take advantage of
evidence possibly collected by the peacekeepers.61 This argument has been refuted by
some analysts who contend that Sudan disingenuously blamed the Court for the gov-
ernment’s long-running resistance to a robust peacekeeping force. These analysts
point to the fact that Sudan’s foot-dragging on allowing an effective peacekeeping force
had begun a year and a half before the Security Council’s 2005 referral of the Darfur
case to the ICC. Moreover, their contention that the government’s announced fear that
the peacekeeping force would be used on the ICC’s behalf is a distortion of the force’s
limited mandate.62
While the ICTY and ICTR have often been stymied by non-cooperation, the states
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have frequently sought to portray themselves
as cooperative in order to avoid international condemnation. When these states have
been accused of non-cooperation, they have often advanced ‘‘good faith’’ reasons for
their behavior, such as a lack of state capacity to locate and arrest fugitives.63 But
Sudan has frequently been unambiguous in its determination to withhold cooperation.
Sudan’s open defiance may serve both as a way to further undermine the ICC and as
an expression of its confidence that the international community will not punish the
government for its non-compliance.
Khartoum has also taken a number of provocative actions to emphasize its opposi-
tion to the ICC. The government has retained Harun in his position as minister of
humanitarian affairs, where he has responsibility over vulnerable refugees in camps
in Darfur. And Khartoum has actually given him the responsibility of investigat-
ing human rights abuses in Darfur and serving as the government’s liaison with the
AU-UN peacekeeping force. ‘‘It’s a real slap to the ICC and the arrest warrants,’’ re-
marked a Western diplomat based in The Hague.64 In the fall of 2007, the government
announced it released Kushayb, who had been arrested by Sudanese authorities on
charges unrelated to the ICC case against him. Then in January 2008, the govern-
ment promoted Musa Hilal—a notorious Janjaweed leader implicated in atrocities
and rumored to be a potential target of the ICC chief prosecutor—as a special advisor
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to President al-Bashir. Court advocates lament that by failing to formally condemn
Khartoum’s defiance, the international community has given Sudan more political
space to thwart the ICC’s calls for compliance.65
Still, the crisis brought on by the prosecutor’s request for an al-Bashir arrest war-
rant has, as discussed earlier, prodded some Sudanese officials to signal a show of
willingness to change their behavior in Darfur. Time will tell whether this takes the
form of substantive concessions and whether this will persuade the Security Council
to exercise its prerogative to suspend the pending ICC case against President al-
Bashir.
III. The Changing Approach of the ICC Chief Prosecutor
The decision of Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo to target a sitting head of state and
to seek charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes have brought
the ICC to the center of world attention. The genocide charge in particular has
sparked controversy and renewed the contentious debate over whether the Darfur
atrocities deserve to be categorized as ‘‘the crime of crimes.’’ Key flashpoints in this
controversy have occurred with the release of the UN-authorized International Com-
mission of Inquiry report in 2005, which did not find that genocide had taken place in
Darfur,66 and the United States government’s 2004 determination that genocide had
occurred.67 The genocide debate has received extensive treatment in the academic
literature.68
The chief prosecutor’s high-profile campaign for al-Bashir’s arrest, together with
his pursuit of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, have cast him as a confrontational pro-
secutor not unlike his former ICTY counterpart, Carla Del Ponte. However, Moreno-
Ocampo’s adversarial approach particularly applies to Sudan, the only country in
which the Security Council has asked the prosecutor to investigate violations of inter-
national humanitarian law.69 By virtue of this Security Council referral, Moreno-
Ocampo, as with his counterparts at the ICTY and ICTR, possesses the ostensible
backing of the highest UN body to target senior political and military officials. This
stands in decisive contrast to the ICC’s involvement in Uganda, the Democratic Re-
public of Congo, and the Central African Republic, where the Security Council has
played no role in initiating the Court’s work. With the Security Council’s referral, the
prosecutor is given a level of authority he lacks in the three other country situations in
which he is currently pursuing war crimes prosecutions. Moreover, when it comes to
the Darfur situation, the prosecutor has access to the high-profile forum of the Secu-
rity Council chambers in New York where he issues biannual progress reports and can
thus garner significant international media attention and political leverage in his
quest for cooperation.
For the chief prosecutors at the UN ad hoc tribunals, and particularly at the ICTY,
confrontation has often been critical to securing cooperation. Since the Security Coun-
cil had given them the task of holding scores of trials within a finite period of time and
equipped them with a legal mandate to demand full and immediate cooperation, the
ICTY chief prosecutors often had reason to take a hard line with non-compliant states.
But as seen in key provisions of the Rome Statute, the founders of the ICC envisioned
a more consensual relationship between Court and states. Whereas the Security
Council established the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR, the ICC was created by a multilateral
treaty to which states have to consent in order to join. And whereas the ICTY and
ICTR have enjoyed primacy vis-a`-vis states and the legal authority to usurp domestic
judiciaries, the ICC is more deferential because it is only authorized to prosecute
when a state is either unwilling or unable to do so itself. The spirit if not the letter of
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the Rome Statute also seemed to call on the ICC chief prosecutor to pursue a more
harmonious relationship with states.
Adopting a conciliatory approach in his external relations also appeared to be a
prudent political strategy for Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo to increase the pros-
pects that powerful states opposed to the Court would reconsider their position. A cru-
sading chief prosecutor could quickly alienate State Parties and provoke the wrath of
powerful non-State Parties—the United States in particular—that the Court hoped
to count on for vital assistance. Accordingly, Moreno-Ocampo signaled his deference
to state sovereignty by declining to initiate investigations himself, although the pro-
prio motu powers in Article 15 of the Rome Statute allows him to do so. Article 15
had been a hard fought victory at the 1998 Rome Conference and is viewed by advo-
cates as crucial to ensuring the prosecutor’s independence.70 However, as the first
chief prosecutor of a fledgling institution that relies on state support and seeks to in-
crease the number of State Parties, Moreno-Ocampo initially seemed more concerned
with signaling his accountability to states than in maintaining his independence from
them.71 Still, under pressure from supporters and skeptics alike to demonstrate the
Court’s relevance, Moreno-Ocampo could not wait indefinitely for State Parties to
come to him with referrals of new country situations.
Laboring under these constraints, Moreno-Ocampo adopted a policy of actively en-
couraging referrals from State Parties.72 In effect, the prosecutor asked these states to
ask him to open investigations. This is apparently the route by which the Office of the
Prosecutor came to investigate atrocities in Uganda73 and Congo.74 The strategy of
self-referrals allowed Moreno-Ocampo to avoid the image of an adversarial prosecutor
and helped secure the state’s cooperation in the ICC’s investigations, at least as long
as he did not actually target the Ugandan and Congolese governments’ role in atro-
cities. That these states invited the ICC into their countries could also be later used
by Moreno-Ocampo and other Court officials to deflect the accusations that the ICC
is an anti-African court imposing justice on Africa.75 However, a central concern
of critics, including some prominent legal scholars, is that Moreno-Ocampo’s reliance
on state referrals can lead to a quid pro quo that insulates state officials from ICC
prosecution.76
The chief prosecutor’s strategic conciliation vis-a`-vis Uganda and Congo initially
seemed a harbinger of a timid approach toward Sudan. To the dismay of some inter-
national human rights activists, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo at first avoided
confronting the al-Bashir regime for its insufficient cooperation.77 These activists
asserted that he did little to build the necessary international pressure that might
have bolstered the prospects of cooperation, but instead advanced an acquiescent
image of the ICC and the Office of the Prosecutor.78 Moreno-Ocampo has not been
alone in employing conciliation in a bid for cooperation. The chief prosecutor’s counter-
parts at the ICTY and ICTR have at times also believed that a softer approach offers
the best opportunity to persuade recalcitrant states to provide some cooperation.79
‘‘He had a strategy . . . [that] if he played nice with the regime he would have much
more chance of getting a degree of cooperation,’’ said a prominent NGO official who
has watched Moreno-Ocampo since he began his tenure as chief prosecutor. ‘‘It is a
legitimate kind of thing for him to think about, but I think it was a complete misread-
ing of the way in which his investigation was perceived [by Khartoum] . . . This was a
threat to the regime.’’80 Moreno-Ocampo came under fire from human rights activists
for two apparent overtures to Sudan. First, in his early reports to the Security Council
in 2005 and 2006, he provided favorable assessments of the government’s limited
cooperation. Next came his request to the ICC’s pre-trial chamber in early 2007 for
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a summons rather than arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb. The request for a
summons—which is usually reserved when there is reason to anticipate voluntary
surrender—was apparently made to lower the domestic political fallout to President
al-Bashir of relinquishing the suspects, since it might have allayed the perception of
government acquiescence.81 Nevertheless, the government spurned Moreno-Ocampo’s
overtures. The ICC’s pre-trial chamber did as well, deciding to issue warrants for
Harun’s and Kushayb’s arrests after citing Sudan’s declarations of resistance.82
Some observers maintain there was a sound basis for a conciliatory approach, at
least during the investigation phase when Khartoum was not unequivocally hostile to
the ICC.83 Alex de Waal, a prominent Sudan expert, believes that because Harun and
Kushayb were not from the highest levels of government, Khartoum could have sent
them to The Hague without significant domestic fallout.84 (In the wake of Moreno-
Ocampo’s bid to prosecute al-Bashir, de Waal has grown sharply critical of the pro-
secutor’s ‘‘overreach’’85 as well as his overall performance as chief prosecutor).86
Moreno-Ocampo has also said that the government indicated some interest in surren-
dering Harun after the arrest warrants for him was issued. ‘‘Khartoum was discussing
internally the possibility to remove Harun from the government; they were asking us
questions about the consequences of surrender,’’ Moreno-Ocampo said.87 It was at this
point, he asserts, that international pressure on Khartoum could have played an im-
portant role in the arrest and transfer of Harun and Kushayb to The Hague. But the
UN and European actors declined to make the arrests a priority.88 ‘‘The international
community preferred to deny the facts and the need to enforce the judges’ decision,’’
Moreno-Ocampo said in a stinging rebuke of UN and European acquiescence.89
Moreno-Ocampo’s decision to adopt a confrontational stance toward Khartoum,
which became evident in mid-2007, likely stemmed from a realization that his previ-
ous approach was not yielding results.90 The nature of his relationship with Sudan
had fundamentally changed with the issuance of the first arrest warrants of Sudanese
suspects that implicated the government in a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.
In the eyes of the al-Bashir government, the warrants for Harun and Kushayb
confirmed its long-held fear that the ICC would target the regime itself. Still, for
Moreno-Ocampo to maintain a conciliatory stance by not criticizing Sudan’s blatant
non-compliance would have sorely undercut his leverage and hopes of building inter-
national pressure for the arrests of Harun and Kushayb.
Since the issuance of the arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb, Moreno-
Ocampo has taken an increasingly adversarial stance toward the Khartoum govern-
ment. Moreno-Ocampo’s confrontational approach reached its apex with his request
for an arrest warrant for al-Bashir and the prosecutor’s subsequent campaign, in
the aftermath of the March 2009 warrant, for the president’s arrest. Well before the
al-Bashir case, the chief prosecutor demonstrated more resolve to obtain arrests, as
seen in his audacious plan, in conjunction with some third-party states, to divert an
airplane that Harun was expected to be on en route to the haj pilgrimage in Saudi
Arabia in December 2007. The plan was unsuccessful because Harun got off the plane
after being tipped off. Still, Moreno-Ocampo has used the disclosure of the arrest
attempt to project his determination and the ICC’s global reach. ‘‘As soon as Harun
leaves Sudan he will be arrested,’’ Moreno-Ocampo said in June 2008. ‘‘He is a fugi-
tive. Inside Sudan he could have freedom. Outside Sudan he will be in jail.’’91 The
Khartoum government responded to the news by denouncing the prosecutor’s action
as ‘‘piracy,’’92 calling for his ouster, and announcing that it had filed domestic terror-
ism charges against him.93
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A key component of Moreno-Ocampo’s strategy for international support has been
to argue that the arrests of all three suspects, but particularly al-Bashir and Harun,
are imperative to stopping the violence against Darfuris. Moreno-Ocampo contends
that al-Bashir, as president, and Harun, as minister of humanitarian affairs, are
responsible for ongoing attacks against civilians in Darfur. Even as the magnitude of
atrocities in Darfur has receded from the height of the conflict in 2003–2004, there is
still violence that the prosecutor maintains poses a threat to the survival of members
of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes in Darfur. In his December 2007 address to
the Security Council, the prosecutor sought to implicate Harun in ongoing abuses
against Darfuris in refugee camps, maintaining that the displaced ‘‘are left with no
hope for the present and no prospect for the future.’’94 Moreno-Ocampo pursued a
similar line of attack in his December 2008 speech to the Security Council, his first
address to the Council following his application for the al-Bashir arrest warrant. He
reported on the continuation of rapes, military attacks against civilians leading to
deaths and wide-scale displacement, and government hindering of humanitarian aid.
‘‘Genocide continues,’’ Moreno-Ocampo alleged in his address to the Security Coun-
cil.95 Then in his June 2009 address to the Council he charged that al-Bashir’s expul-
sion from Darfur of more than a dozen humanitarian aid organizations amounted to
a policy of extermination.96 Moreno-Ocampo also has highlighted the emptiness of
al-Bashir’s promise to his citizens, which he made in the fall of 2008, to provide ‘‘jus-
tice to the oppressed.’’97 Pointing to the regime’s effort to cover up crimes by arresting
and torturing human rights activists who have given information to the ICC, the pros-
ecutor sardonically told the Security Council: ‘‘This is the ‘justice to the oppressed’
that President Al-Bashir is talking about.’’98 In sum, in his recent speeches to the
Security Council and other public statements, the prosecutor has tried to deflect
charges that the ICC undermines peace by framing the pursuit of justice as ‘‘the only
realist solution’’99 to preventing the suspects from endangering more civilians.
Without naming art. 16, Moreno-Ocampo, in his December 2008 speech, also coun-
tered the Sudanese government’s efforts to obtain a suspension of the al-Bashir case.
By casting the regime’s attempts at an Article 16 resolution as a means to win impu-
nity for its crimes, the prosecutor sought to pre-emptively shame the Security Council
from taking this course of action. ‘‘President Al-Bashir is trying to convince organiza-
tions and the Security Council that they have to protect him,’’ Moreno-Ocampo told
the Council. ‘‘The international community cannot be part of any cover-up of genocide
or crimes against humanity.’’100 Even as Moreno-Ocampo’s speeches attest to his
increased confrontation with the Sudanese government, they also have underscored
his growing impatience with the Security Council for its timid approach toward
Khartoum.101 Beyond that, the prosecutor has argued that Sudan’s defiance of the
ICC is defiance of the Security Council itself.102
IV. The ICC in Sudan: Security Council Authorization and Ambivalence
Following their March 2005 referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC, Security Coun-
cil members extolled the virtues of the Court and its potential to advance the pursuit
of peace. The French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Marc de la Sablie`re, hailed Security
Council Resolution 1593 as evidence that the ‘‘Council will remain vigilant to ensure
that there is no impunity.’’103 And UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called the ICC
‘‘an appropriate mechanism to lift the veil of impunity that has allowed human rights
crimes in Darfur to continue unchecked.’’104 Yet, as the discussion herein shows, the
Security Council grew ambivalent over whether prosecutions of Sudanese officials
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would aid the quest for a durable solution to the Darfur crisis. The Council’s ambiva-
lence has become particularly apparent in regard to the ICC’s bid to prosecute Presi-
dent al-Bashir. As a result, the Security Council’s referral of the Darfur situation has
not materialized into a sustained commitment to press Sudan to cooperate with the
ICC.
Since its 2005 referral, the Security Council has taken no punitive steps against
Sudan despite its blatant non-cooperation and public declarations that it will never
cooperate with the Court. With the exception of a June 2008 Security Council state-
ment calling on Khartoum to assist the ICC, the Council as a collective has been silent
about Sudan’s obligation to cooperate.105 Analysis of the numerous resolutions and
statements the Security Council has adopted on Sudan, prior to the June 2008 state-
ment, finds no formal criticism or explicit acknowledgement of Sudan’s non-compliance.
Beyond that, Security Council resolutions and statements on Sudan prior to June
2008 included no mention of the ICC and on only two occasions made reference to the
Council’s referral to the Court. When the Council did list the international obligations
Sudan must fulfill—such as supporting the peace process, halting attacks on civilians
and peacekeepers, and expediting humanitarian relief—cooperation with the ICC
was noticeably omitted.106 The Council mentioned the need for justice in some of its
resolutions and statements on Sudan. But it either did so in vague terms,107 did not
specify the ICC’s role in undertaking prosecutions, or indicated, as it did in a July
2007 resolution, that justice is the responsibility of Sudan’s domestic courts.108 In so
bypassing the ICC, the Council (prior to its June 2008 statement calling for Sudan’s
cooperation) backed away from its own commitment to the ICC. Although hardly
noticed by the international media and the outside world, this eliding of the ICC
appeared to reduce the pressure that the government would have otherwise faced
from the Council. ICC advocates have expressed concern that the Council’s failure to
demand Sudanese cooperation threatens to magnify the Court’s impotence.109
The Security Council’s reluctance to confront Sudan for its non-cooperation with
the ICC bears a striking parallel to the Council’s reticence to take action against
Serbia in the 1990s for failing to cooperate with the ICTY. In both instances, the pros-
pect of war crimes prosecutions provided the Council with leverage to curtail state
violence insofar as the tribunals served to warn state leaders that they might one
day face prosecution. The Council’s establishment of the ICTY and the Council’s refer-
ral of the Darfur situation to the ICC have also served other political functions such as
insulating the UN from its failure to take decisive action to halt mass killings by,
instead, taking the moral high ground of seeking international justice. In this respect,
both the creation of the ICTY and the Darfur referral can partially be seen as a way to
distract attention from the UN’s failure to end the violence in the former Yugoslavia
and Darfur.
The Security Council’s reticence to press Sudan to cooperate with the ICC goes
beyond its hope that the government will agree to a negotiated peace settlement in
Darfur. It has also looked to Khartoum to fulfill its promise to allow the full deploy-
ment of an expanded 26,000-strong joint African Union–UN peacekeeping force in
Darfur. (By early March 2009, approximately 15,000 international peacekeepers and
other members of the AU–UN force had been deployed in Darfur.110) Moreover, the
international community has continued to rely on the government to permit the unfet-
tered delivery of humanitarian relief to vulnerable civilians in Darfur who have been
internally displaced by the violence. This dependence on Sudan has, at times, led even
strong ICC supporters such as the European Union to avoid applying sustained pres-
sure on Sudan to cooperate with the Court. As a senior EU diplomat with first-hand
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knowledge of Sudan explained in a May 2008 interview, the ICC fits in the diplomatic
landscape ‘‘like a stone in a shoe.’’111 Said the EU diplomat: ‘‘It would require robust
pressure on the government to [hand over suspects] to the ICC, robust pressure we’re
not inclined to put because of the need to engage’’ on several agendas.112 In sum,
obtaining Khartoum’s cooperation in the quest for peace, peacekeeping, and humani-
tarian relief—as well as its continued support for the endangered Comprehensive
Peace Agreement that brought an end to the north–south civil war in early 2005—
has so far trumped the ICC’s quest for the international community’s political backing
in the prosecution of war crimes.
Since mid-2007, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has issued increasingly strong
calls for the Security Council to press Khartoum to comply with the ICC. Following
the prosecutor’s June 2007 speech to the Security Council, the UN body effectively
shielded Sudan from public criticism by discussing his remarks in private sessions.113
The Council held a public discussion of the cooperation issue following the chief pro-
secutor’s next report to the Council in December 2007. But, again, Moreno-Ocampo’s
criticism of Khartoum did not lead to punitive Council action or even the less serious
step of issuing a Council statement rebuking Sudan for its non-compliance. Even the
rejected Council statement under consideration was relatively mild, at most a re-
minder of Sudan’s legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC.114 The most pro-ICC
states on the Council—France, Britain, and Belgium—maintained that the Council
should hold Sudan to its obligation to fully cooperate because the quest for justice
complemented the pursuit of peace in Darfur while the anti-ICC states—China, Rus-
sia, and Qatar—countered that Council support for the ICC should be subordinated
to the security question. The Russian delegation called for ‘‘a constructive dialogue’’
between Khartoum and the ICC.115 Yet, without Council pressure on Khartoum, the
call for such dialogue would only benefit Sudan and foster the impression that the
Court’s work was vulnerable to political bargaining.
By spring 2008, the ICC chief prosecutor appeared to gain more international sup-
port for his uphill struggle for cooperation. Moreno-Ocampo’s criticisms of Khartoum’s
non-compliance and international inaction, as well as a concerted NGO campaign that
amplified the prosecutor’s calls for cooperation, appeared to strengthen the prosecu-
tor’s hand, particularly in Europe.116 At the end of March 2008, the presidency of the
European Union issued a statement expressing its ‘‘profound dismay’’117 with Sudan’s
lack of cooperation, indicating that further non-compliance would lead to EU action
against Khartoum.
At the Security Council, there was not enough political support for punitive mea-
sures against Sudan in 2008. Still, when Moreno-Ocampo addressed the Council in
early June 2008, he received more backing than ever before, with a majority of mem-
bers favoring a Council statement addressing Khartoum’s non-compliance. In the
prosecutor’s speech to the Council, he called ‘‘the entire Darfur region a crime scene,’’
implicated the ‘‘entire state apparatus’’ in atrocities, and excoriated Khartoum for a
cover-up.118 Ten days after this no-holds barred speech, the Council approved a state-
ment ‘‘urging’’ the government ‘‘to cooperate fully with the Court . . . in order to put an
end to impunity for the crimes committed in Darfur.’’119 The prosecutor’s accusations
of Ahmad Harun’s ongoing responsibility in attacks against victims in refugee camps
may have prompted the Council to break its silence. Significantly, the United States
which held the Council presidency that month also came out in favor of such a state-
ment and by doing so indicated its strongest support of the ICC to date.120 In the
ensuing months, the United States would increasingly play a supportive role for an
institution it had only recently been determined to undermine. Washington’s refusal
The ICC, the Security Council, and the Politics of Impunity in Darfur
317
to contemplate supporting an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case even as
France and Britain indicated openness to doing so highlighted the significant evolu-
tion in the United States’ relationship with the ICC.
That Moreno-Ocampo sought and received a Security Council statement in June
2008 seemed designed to bolster his leverage with the Council ahead of his request
for an al-Bashir arrest warrant a month later in July.121 Human Rights Watch hailed
the Council’s June statement, characterizing it as a criticism of Khartoum’s non-
compliance and as a sign of the UN’s impatience with impunity in Darfur.122 Yet the
Council statement lacked any explicit criticism of Khartoum’s non-compliance. More-
over, the Council dropped the explicit reference in the draft statement demanding
Sudan’s compliance with the ICC arrest warrants. Libya, a non-permanent member
of the Council, reportedly would not endorse the statement unless the reference to
the warrants was replaced with the vague and less consequential call for an ‘‘end to
impunity.’’123 For its part, the European Union issued a much stronger statement
of its own. After Moreno-Ocampo addressed the EU foreign ministers on 16 June,
the ministers issued a statement deploring the government’s failure to cooperate and
calling for the handover of Harun and Kushayb.124 Still, at their June meeting, EU
leaders decided to hold off on imposing sanctions against Khartoum. For the rest of
the year, European leaders backed away from their threat of taking concrete action
against the Sudanese regime even as the now targeted President al-Bashir flouted
his defiance of the ICC.
The lack of concerted Security Council action on the ICC issue is a product of the
political interests and divisions among its five permanent members, particularly the
United States, China, and Russia. Yet what is commonly overlooked is that the ICC’s
strongest backers on the Council, Britain and France, have also been ambivalent
about strongly supporting the ICC’s struggle with Sudan. Even as London, Paris, and
other European capitals have been at the forefront of the effort to establish the ICC,
their lack of forceful and sustained pressure on Khartoum has disappointed ICC offi-
cials and Court advocates.125 Still, the ICC’s more fundamental problem has been
with the United States, China, and Russia. All three states have not ratified the
Rome Statute and have generally not been eager to embolden the ICC. However,
the nature of their views toward the ICC and their role in Sudan have differed in key
respects.
Despite its leadership role in establishing the contemporary ad hoc tribunals, the
United States under the Bush administration vehemently opposed the ICC, which it
accused of being unaccountable and a danger to American interests. Particularly in
the early years of the Bush administration, this opposition translated into a diplo-
matic assault on the Court and a coercive campaign to press states to sign bilateral
agreements with Washington promising not to send any American war crimes sus-
pects to the ICC.126 Thus, the United States was initially loath to take any action
that could legitimize the fledgling court.127 Toward that end, US officials made it clear
in early 2005 that the US opposed the nascent plan for the Security Council to refer the
Darfur situation to the ICC.128 Instead, the Bush administration floated a plan for an
ad hoc tribunal for Sudan jointly run by the UN and the African Union. Washington’s
ad hoc tribunal plan did not gain political traction and was effectively criticized by other
states, ICC supporters, and American Darfur activists as a costly and unnecessary al-
ternative.129 In time, the threat of a US veto of the Security Council’s proposed Darfur
referral became untenable because of the likely political damage of blocking interna-
tional prosecutions for atrocities the Bush administration had itself labeled genocide
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only a half a year earlier.130 Not wanting to publicly endorse the ICC, Washington de-
cided to abstain on the vote to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC.
In time, Washington came to regard the ICC’s work in Darfur in a favorable
light, perhaps in no small part due to the high-profile status of the Darfur issue
in the United States and the formidable pressure exerted by the American-based
Save Darfur movement to stand against impunity in Sudan.131 Moreover, just as
the ad hoc ICTY had been a useful tool for the United States and its allies to isolate
the rogue leader of Serbia, there was no reason why the ICC, at least in the context
of the Darfur situation, could not serve a similar purpose for the United States.
Indeed, the Security Council referral could serve American interests because the
Council’s action had, in effect, deputized the global court to serve as an ad hoc tribunal
for Darfur. Late in the Bush years, US officials reached out to the Court, indicating
they would actually cooperate with the ICC in its Darfur investigations if so re-
quested.132 Yet the strongest form of US support came in the second half of 2008
when the Bush administration announced its opposition to any Security Council at-
tempt to invoke Article 16 to suspend the al-Bashir case. Even as France and Britain
explored a possible deal to suspend the case, Washington, in sharp contrast to its
earlier position on the ICC, claimed the moral high ground. ‘‘There is no compromise
on the issue of justice,’’ said Alejandro Wolff, the deputy US representative to the UN,
in early August.133 Remarkably, in only the span of a few years, the United States has
gone from being the ICC’s arch-nemesis to its most reliable ally, at least when it per-
ceived that providing backing for the Court in Darfur advanced American interests.
Yet finding common cause with the ICC did not mean that the United States govern-
ment, under Republican George W. Bush or Democrat Barack Obama, would fully em-
brace the Court by becoming a State Party to the Rome Statute.
American opposition to an Article 16 suspension, at least in the run-up to the pre-
trial chamber’s decision on the al-Bashir arrest warrant, greatly diminished the pros-
pects of such a suspension since an opposing vote of only one permanent Council mem-
ber can block a suspension. Anticipating failure may have thus dissuaded China and
Russia from mounting a vigorous public campaign. Such a campaign was not only likely
to fail but also could incur a blow to their global standing by closely linking Beijing and
Moscow in the effort to immunize President al-Bashir from prosecution.
As Sudan’s most important political patron, China has reaped concrete benefits
from its relationship with Khartoum, not least of which has been substantial crude oil
imports—Sudan is China’s largest foreign supplier134—and the extension of Chinese
influence in a strategic part of Africa. Sudan, too, has enjoyed the benefits of its rela-
tionship with China, given Beijing’s role as a major supplier of arms135 and China’s
significant investment in Sudanese industry.136 Beyond that, China’s political backing
during the Darfur crisis has proven indispensable for Sudan. China’s support has
helped to soften the blow of international condemnation and to avoid some punitive
measures from the international community, such as a maritime blockade of its
ports,137 which might have forced Khartoum to alter its policy in Darfur. Significantly,
however, the political protection China has offered Sudan did not extend to a Chinese
veto of the Security Council referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC.
China is no friend of the ICC. Since the Rome Conference of 1998, it has been
strongly opposed to key provisions of the Court’s Statute. Yet, when it came time to
the vote on the Darfur referral, Chinese leaders preferred to avoid risking the condem-
nation that may have come from scuttling any possibility of international justice for
Darfur. Instead, Beijing, like Washington, abstained. China ‘‘could not vote no since
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the crimes in question are unjustifiable,’’ observed Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a French ex-
pert on China. ‘‘It often finds itself in this neutral position since it does not want to
have the finger of blame pointed at it.’’138
As the Darfur crisis has worn on, China has found itself increasingly subject to
international censure, especially from human rights activists in the West, who have
criticized Beijing for complicity in atrocities by enabling and arming the Khartoum
regime. As international scrutiny of Chinese human rights practices at home and
abroad intensified during the long run-up to the 2008 August Olympics in Beijing,
China sought to enhance its international image by being seen to play a constructive,
diplomatic role in Darfur.139 Thus, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s request for an
arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, less than a month before the Olympics, came
at a particularly sensitive time for the Chinese government. In this context, China
risked a deep, self-inflicted wound if it had lead or strongly supported efforts to sus-
pend the case against a potential genocide suspect.
To be sure, China did express opposition to Moreno-Ocampo’s bid to prosecute
al-Bashir, criticizing the move as ‘‘an inappropriate decision taken at an inappropriate
time’’140 that could make it more difficult to resolve the Darfur crisis. Beyond that,
an arrest warrant would obviously complicate Chinese diplomacy in Sudan. As Liu
Guijin, China’s envoy for Darfur, asked rhetorically, ‘‘How can you rely on a criminal
suspect to be a responsible partner for the Darfur political process?’’141
Not long after the chief prosecutor’s mid-July 2008 request for an arrest warrant,
China signaled support for ‘‘the reasonable request’’142 of Sudan’s African and Arab
allies for an Article 16 resolution at the Security Council. Yet Beijing was careful not
to go beyond these measured statements of support for Sudan and its African and
Arab backers. However, as the global spotlight on China faded several months after
the Olympics and the announcement of the ICC’s pre-trial chamber’s decision ap-
peared imminent, Beijing in early January 2009 signaled stronger support for halting
the al-Bashir case, arguing that an ICC indictment would lead to ‘‘disastrous’’ con-
sequences for Darfur.143 Still, China indicated that it preferred to have one of the
Security Council’s three African members take the lead by introducing an Article 16
resolution.
For the most part, Russia has followed China’s lead when it has come to the ICC
and the al-Bashir question. However, in contrast to both China and the United States,
Russia voted to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC. While Russia has supplied the
Sudanese military with arms—including airplanes and helicopter gunships linked to
Sudanese bombing attacks in Darfur144—its relationship with Khartoum is not as
close as China’s. Still, like Beijing, Moscow has criticized Moreno-Ocampo’s bid to pro-
secute al-Bashir, indicated support for the African and Arab campaign for a suspension
of the case, and credited Sudan’s role in working toward a diplomatic resolution of the
Darfur conflict.145
VI. Conclusion
In Sudan, the ICC faces a government as defiant as any that the other contemporary
international war crimes tribunals have confronted. When it comes to the prosecution
of members of their own national, political, or ethnic group, states employ a range of
strategies to withhold cooperation and to limit the political cost of doing so. But with
its statements of contempt and intimidation—and its expulsion of more than a dozen
humanitarian aid groups from Darfur after the issuance of the arrest warrant for
President al-Bashir—Khartoum has taken such defiance to a new level.
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In June 2008, the Security Council’s statement calling for Sudanese compliance
with the ICC appeared to demonstrate a new resolve to press the government and
defend the integrity of the Council’s authority. After more than a year of allowing
Sudan’s resistance to go unchallenged, the Council’s statement indicated there may
be a limit to its passivity. But then a month later in July, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo’s request for an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir seemed to weaken
the Council’s new backing of the ICC. The question then shifted from whether the
Security Council would act as a ‘‘surrogate enforcer’’ on behalf of the ICC to whether
it would instead intervene on Sudan’s behalf by bringing the wheels of international
justice to a halt. As the ICC pre-trial chamber quietly considered Moreno-Ocampo’s
request for an arrest warrant, Sudan and its regional advocates—the African Union
and the Arab League—called on the Security Council, the court of last resort, for an
Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case.
Sudan’s bid for an Article 16 suspension has proven difficult, given the power of
any of the five permanent members of the Security Council to block such a move.
Moreover, for the Council to suspend the case could be interpreted as a repudiation of
its original justification for referring the Darfur situation to the Court. The Council’s
referral was premised upon the assumption that international justice would help
counter the threat to international peace and security posed by the inhuman violence
in Darfur. But a decision to suspend the al-Bashir case would require the Council, in
effect, to find that the ICC’s case vis-a`-vis Darfur posed a threat to peace and security.
For the ICC’s predecessors, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, such direct Security Council intervention is disallowed
because it would be viewed as blatant obstruction of international justice. But the
ICC operates under different ground rules and a different conception of the proper
relationship between the Security Council and the prosecutorial and judicial wings of
the Court. In a compromise agreed to in the final days of the founding Rome con-
ference, states adopted Article 16,146 the provision in the Statute that permits the
Security Council to suspend for renewable one-year periods any ICC case it deems a
threat to international peace and security. That the Security Council is required to
make such a finding regarding peace and security provides the incentive for targeted
states as well as rebel groups to frame their assault against the ICC on the claim that
international justice endangers peace.
As the ICC pre-trial chamber deliberated over the legal merits of the prosecutor’s
application for an arrest warrant in the second half of 2008, Sudan called on the Secu-
rity Council to heed the alleged disastrous consequences of allowing the ICC to pro-
ceed. However, by the end of 2008, there were signs of growing support among key
Council members to refrain from suspending the al-Bashir case.147 There were also in-
dications that some of Sudan’s African and Arab allies had grown wary of Khartoum’s
truculence, particularly its refusal to engage the Court by not seriously pursuing credi-
ble domestic war crimes prosecutions as an alternative to ICC trials.148 Instead,
the al-Bashir government maintained its campaign of fear, telegraphing to the world
how much it stands to lose by not intervening to stop the ICC’s judicial interven-
tion in Sudan. In this campaign, Khartoum has skillfully played the ‘‘instability
card,’’149 painting grim scenarios in which an unaccountable and remote ICC would
reignite the Darfur crisis and perhaps even the dissolution of Sudan itself. The pros-
pect that the ICC could trigger a deterioration of the Darfur crisis—even if the vio-
lence was cynically driven by Khartoum to substantiate its claims that justice under-
mines peace—has been Sudan’s most potent weapon in its fight with the ICC. While
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Sudan has not won an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case, it has nevertheless
undermined the standing of the Court. This is punctuated by the African Union state-
ment of early July 2009 that calls on African states not to cooperate in arresting the
Sudanese president. The backlash against the ICC—which some ICC supporters have
feared could lead African State Parties to withdraw from the Court—points to the
inherent risks in targeting an African head of state.
Even as Moreno-Ocampo’s announced intention to prosecute al-Bashir greatly
increased the ICC’s profile and thrust the tarnished Sudanese president on the defen-
sive, the chief prosecutor has found himself facing accusations of spoiling the pros-
pects of peace in Darfur. It is in this highly politicized context that Moreno-Ocampo
and his advocates in the international human rights community have sought to gain
the upper hand by reframing the peace versus justice debate in their own favor. The
struggle with Khartoum is not only about fulfilling the Court’s central mission of
prosecutions in its most high-profile situation. Also at stake is the ICC’s legitimacy
and viability as a permanent court of global justice. Whether or not the Security Coun-
cil invokes Article 16, the al-Bashir case will be closely watched by present and future
targeted states and rebel groups looking to win reprieves from international justice.
Central to the chief prosecutor’s campaign for cooperation in Sudan has been to argue
for the indispensable role that the ICC can play, in conjunction with a resolute inter-
national community, in ameliorating the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
Giving no ground to his critics, Moreno-Ocampo has argued that it is a pragmatic
imperative for the world to press for the arrest of Sudanese suspects most responsible
for atrocities—atrocities that pose an enduring threat to stability in the region and to
the survival of entire communities in Darfur.150
In his quest for Sudan’s cooperation and Security Council backing, Moreno-
Ocampo has presented himself as a determined, uncompromising prosecutor willing
to challenge state sovereignty. In this respect, the chief prosecutor we see in the Dar-
fur situation stands in marked contrast to the same chief prosecutor who has been
careful to avoid targeting state authorities in Uganda, Congo, and the Central African
Republic. When it comes to Darfur, Moreno-Ocampo has warned the Security Council
that ‘‘inaction and business as usual’’151 are acts that help perpetuate the crimes. But
even as he stands apart from the Security Council—going as far as to cast himself as
its moral conscience—the prosecutor has emphasized that targeting Sudanese sus-
pects and campaigning for state cooperation is not the work of a rogue prosecutor,
but a responsibility mandated to him by the Council itself. ‘‘The Security Council
requested judicial intervention,’’ Moreno-Ocampo reminded the Council in December
2008, as a prelude to calling for decisive action in seeking al-Bashir’s arrest. It
remains to be seen whether the Security Council heeds or abandons its own request
for international justice.
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Should President Omar al-Bashir of
Sudan Be Charged and Arrested by
the International Criminal Court?
An Exchange of Views
Alex de Waal
Social Science Research Council
Gregory H. Stanton
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason
University, Arlington, VA
The recent activity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague con-
cerning the case of President Omar al-Bashir and the crisis in Darfur has set off a
firestorm of commentary amongst international lawyers, human rights activists,
genocide scholars, experts on Sudan, and journalists, among others. Some argue
that the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, was correct in charging al-Bashir
with genocide and crimes against humanity; others believe that he had little to no
grounds for doing so. Furthermore, while some see the prosecutor’s charges of geno-
cide as questionable, at best, and highly counterproductive, if not dangerous, at
worst, others see the genocide charge as positive and a move toward ending impu-
nity for genocide. The same is largely true of the arrest warrant that the ICC has
issued for President al-Bashir’s arrest. Dr. Alex de Waal, an Oxford-trained social
anthropologist, a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University, and
the director of Justice Africa in London; and Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, a Yale Uni-
versity-educated lawyer and University of Chicago-trained cultural anthropologist,
professor of Genocide Studies and Prevention at George Mason University, presi-
dent of Genocide Watch, and immediate past president of the International Asso-
ciation of Genocide Scholars, kindly accepted GSP editor Samuel Totten’s invita-
tion to debate the merits and demerits of the prosecutor’s charges and the ICC’s
issuance of the warrant.
Key words: al-Bashir, International Criminal Court, Darfur, Sudan, justice, peace
The Case against Prosecution of Omar al-Bashir
by the International Criminal Court
Alex de Waal
The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, is
making a misjudgment in demanding an arrest warrant against Sudan’s President
Omar al-Bashir. The arrest warrant is an immense gamble, which has the potential
to set back the cause of peace and democracy in Sudan and is unlikely to advance the
cause of justice and human rights. As I write this (in January 2009), I hope that the
outcome will not be adverse, but my judgment is that the risks of contributing to a
further disaster in a volatile country and unraveling its tentative steps toward democ-
racy are greater than the opportunities for striking a blow against impunity.
Alex de Waal and Gregory H. Stanton, ‘‘Should President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan Be Charged
and Arrested by the International Criminal Court?’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, 3
(December 2009): 329–353. 6 2009 Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.4.3.329
Heinous crimes have been committed during the last two decades in Sudan as a
whole and during the last five years in Darfur. In fact, I have devoted much of my
adult life to documenting human rights violations in Sudan. I have no doubt that
President al-Bashir carries much responsibility for counterinsurgency campaigns
that have involved countless abuses against civilians, for the repression of Sudan’s
civil society and dismantling of its democratic institutions, and for the infliction of
famine, displacement, and other forms of misery on millions of Sudanese citizens. He
carries responsibility, not only in his capacities as head of state and commander in
chief of the armed forces, but also in a more personal capacity in the specific actions
he has taken to incite, encourage, and organize excessive violence in war and against
the political opponents of his government. It is precisely because such grievous viola-
tions of human rights have been perpetrated, and because a ruthless government
which is ready to disregard human rights remains in power, that it is important to be
especially careful in framing any charges against senior members of that government
and in ensuring that a strategy for pursuing justice is fully aligned with strategies for
securing peace, defending human rights, and promoting democracy.
I will not provide here a critique of the substance of the 14 July 2008 Public Appli-
cation and especially the genocide charges it contains. It is important, though, to
stress that the Application is a substandard piece of work, riddled with ethnographic
and other factual errors as well as copyediting mistakes.1 The genocide charges are
breathtakingly ambitious, based upon extremely contentious lines of argument which
run contrary to the case put forward by the most sophisticated academic advocates of
the point of view that genocide occurred in Darfur.2 If Luis Moreno-Ocampo were to
try to prosecute President Omar al-Bashir for genocide using the arguments outlined
in the Public Application, he would face huge challenges in obtaining a conviction. An
acquittal of al-Bashir following a trial on genocide charges would not be a triumph for
the ICC and international justice.
The main thrust of my argument is that the arrest warrant is a gamble with the
future of Sudan.
In 2001, the international community, led by the neighboring countries of north-
east Africa plus the United States, Britain, and Norway, resolved that the best
way to deal with the war in south Sudan, its disastrous domestic humanitarian con-
sequences, and its destabilizing impact on the region, was to support negotiations
toward a peace agreement. After three years of talks, the Sudanese government and
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)—the largest, though not
the only, armed opposition group—signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA). The CPA promises a referendum for southern Sudanese on the right of self-
determination (scheduled for January 2011) and, prior to that, national elections and
a host of processes designed to reform the laws, promote human rights, and redis-
tribute wealth and power in favor of historically marginalized groups.
The CPA was heralded as ‘‘Sudan’s second independence.’’ Implementing it was
always going to be a challenge, demanding hard political work, common understand-
ing and cooperation between two mutually suspicious formerly belligerent countries,
and international guidance and support. The two exercises of democratization and
self-determination are inextricably linked, because unless the government that pre-
sides over a southern decision for independence or unity is truly legitimate, the result
will surely be contested. The price of CPA failure is as high as it can be. Another
north–south war, this time a contested partition of the country, would be a truly
disastrous outcome.
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While the talks were ongoing in a Kenyan resort, a new war exploded in Darfur.
While major hostilities in Darfur ended in January 2005, the same month that the
CPA was signed, the legacy of the killing and displacement in Darfur continues to fes-
ter. The hope and anticipation for the CPA was that it would provide the framework
whereby Darfuris and other discontented northern Sudanese groups could participate
in this process of democratic transformation. That did not happen—in part because of
the untimely death of John Garang, the SPLM leader whose political vision of a ‘‘New
Sudan’’ of racial and religious equality had inspired the leaders of the Darfuri rebel-
lion. Today, Darfur is a lawless place, most of it beyond the control of either govern-
ment or rebels, in which one third of the population is displaced and largely depen-
dent on one of the world’s largest humanitarian operations. Perhaps 150 people are
killed each month in violence, about two-thirds of them by government forces and
their proxies. There seems little prospect of this misery ending soon.
The CPA remains the keystone of Sudan’s hopes for democratization and peace.3
In Sudanese national politics, the relationship between north and south is the fun-
damental question. The two north–south civil wars since independence have been
longer, bloodier, and costlier than the Darfur war of 2003–2004. Resolving the
north–south war was a signal triumph. Achieving peace in Darfur is more tactically
difficult because of the fragmentation and political immaturity of the Darfuri rebel
groups and because the post-CPA Government of National Unity (which includes
both the dominant northern National Congress Party and the SPLM) are unwilling
to revisit the central tenets of the CPA. There can be no progress on peace in Darfur
if the CPA does not remain intact.
Two-thirds of the way through the CPA’s six-year interim period, less than half
of the political work of democratization and preparation for the southern vote on self-
determination has been done.4 An immense political task lies ahead, involving
complex legislation, the technical tasks of preparing for elections and demarcating
borders, and building confidence among the parties in the broad-based government.
Into this stressed and volatile situation, the chief prosecutor of the ICC has demanded
that the head of state surrender himself for arrest and trial in The Hague.
The optimists see two possible positive outcomes. One is that Sudan decides to rid
itself of al-Bashir and his henchmen, either by a democratic uprising or an internal
coup in which NCP moderates decide that the president is such a liability that they
are better off without him and his henchmen. There is a Sudanese tradition of peace-
ful popular protest—known as intifada—to bring down military dictatorships, and for
this reason the security apparatus systematically dismantled the civil society organi-
zations that had led previous intifadas. Security surveillance and repression of human
rights groups and the media has intensified in recent months. The popular uprising
scenario is most improbable. An internal coup cannot be ruled out—but the most
likely putchists are the senior security chiefs who have good reason to fear that the
ICC would be after them, too, especially as the ICC prosecutor insists that the entire
Sudanese government is a criminal apparatus. The most probable outcome is that
al-Bashir and the other leading members of the NCP and security apparatus will con-
clude that their safest place is in power. Rather than considering stepping down at the
next election, they will want the protection bestowed on them by an electoral man-
date. Rather than sharing power, they will ensure they keep the levers of sovereignty
in their own hands.
A second optimistic outcome is that the ICC arrest warrant becomes a bargaining
chip to be used by Western nations, which would offer a twelve-month deferral under
Article 16 of the Rome Statute as an incentive for political concessions, either in
An Exchange of Views by Alex de Waal and Gregory H. Stanton
331
Darfur or regarding the CPA. This may occur. But it faces three difficulties. First,
there is no international consensus on what concessions to look for. Second, it is only
a year-long suspension, and the Sudanese government expects that another set of
concessions will be demanded as the precondition for a renewal, and so on, leading
ultimately to regime change. Khartoum’s incentives for compliance are low. And
thirdly, the ICC is not designed to be used as a political lever in this way. It is a court
whose creation has taken away any power of granting amnesty.
The darkest pessimists fear that the ICC arrest warrant will lead to pre-emptive
military action in Darfur, a reversal of the recent gains for civil and political rights,
further restrictions on the UN and humanitarian operations, and an end to the
CPA.5 They fear emboldened rebels, who took their war to the national capital in
May 2008. There are certainly ominous signs on all these fronts, and the president
of south Sudan, Salva Kiir, has warned that the CPA would be endangered if
its northern signatory—President al-Bashir—becomes a wanted man.6 Some of the
damage could be self-inflicted by supporters of the ICC, for example if the UN were
to debar its senior representatives from meeting with al-Bashir or his ministers and
officials, or if states parties to the ICC were unable to dispatch ambassadors to Sudan,
or if international agencies were to evacuate all nonessential personnel fearing vio-
lence against them.
While these scenarios are all credible and consistent with the habitual reactions of
security chiefs in Khartoum, none have yet come to pass. The record of the last six
months is one of limited political opening—the ‘‘Sudan People’s Initiative’’ whereby
for the first time the NCP admitted errors in Darfur and involved other parties in dis-
cussing its Darfur policies—along with clear threats of repression.
An intermediate scenario is equally plausible. This is that the ICC arrest warrant
becomes the dominant and defining issue in Sudanese politics, until such time as the
Sudanese government learns to adapt to the pariah status it thought it had escaped
four years ago or there is dramatic political change. Under this scenario, the SPLM
struggles with the question of how to deal with being part of an internationally illegi-
timate government, while the Darfur rebels wait it out. The result is paralysis or slow-
motion business as usual. But in the fifth year of the CPA’s Interim Period, business
as usual at stalling velocity is not a viable option. If the essential political business—
formal and informal—is not transacted during this year, then the referendum in south-
ern Sudan will be held with a host of unresolved political issues and no political bargain
between the northern and southern elites on how their interests will be catered for in
its aftermath. Given that most southerners are likely to vote for secession, this entails
a southern attempt to separate without the preconditions for an orderly, consensual,
and legitimate partition of the country. That, I fear, spells war.
African leaders are terrified of this scenario because they know that a meltdown
of Sudan or a new war will bring in neighboring countries and paralyze the African
Union. This fear underpins their anger against the ICC. Africa’s leaders have little re-
spect or patience for President al-Bashir, but they are more alarmed at the prospect of
an ungovernable Sudan. In the early days of the court, African countries were among
its most enthusiastic backers. During 2008, they became its critics. Coming on the
heels of the arrest of the Congolese opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba while visit-
ing Brussels, and arrest warrants by French and Spanish magistrates against Rwan-
dan government officials,7 the al-Bashir application unleashed the prospect of the
political fate of the continent being decided by judicial activists in Europe. It is incon-
ceivable that another African state will refer a case to the ICC in the foreseeable
future, and most unlikely that any will cooperate with the ICC in executing arrest
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warrants. Africa may become a jurisdiction-free zone as a result, scarcely a victory for
human rights.
With faint prospect of getting Sudan’s leader in the dock, Luis Moreno-Ocampo
has chosen a strategy that seeks to have President al-Bashir tried in the court of
world opinion. It is a gamble with serious perils, especially for the people of Sudan.
The Case for Prosecution of Omar al-Bashir by the
International Criminal Court
Gregory H. Stanton
The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has
charged President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan with three counts of genocide, five counts
of crimes against humanity, and two counts of murder as a war crime committed in
Darfur since 2002. The ICC’s pre-trial chamber I has now issued a warrant for his
arrest on the charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, but not for geno-
cide. It has left open the possibility that the prosecutor could produce additional evi-
dence to justify amendment of the arrest warrant to include genocide.8
I. Is the ICC prosecutor right to charge Omar al-Bashir and
seek an arrest warrant against him?
Mr. Moreno-Ocampo is justified in his charges and in seeking an arrest warrant for
President Bashir. Mr. Moreno-Ocampo is fulfilling his mandate as the ICC’s prosecu-
tor. The situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security
Council in UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005).9 The Security Council’s refer-
ral was based on strong evidence gathered by a UN Commission of Inquiry of crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed against specific ethnic and racial groups
in Darfur: the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa. The Commission concluded that the Gov-
ernment of Sudan armed and otherwise aided and abetted Janjaweed militias who
have committed crimes against those groups.10 The UN Commission of Inquiry’s
report on atrocities in Darfur, while not concluding that the Sudanese government
had the intent to commit genocide, nevertheless noted that ‘‘single individuals, includ-
ing government officials’’ might be determined to have such genocidal intent. The UN
Commission recommended referral of the situation to the International Criminal
Court, and furnished the ICC with names of specific individuals to investigate. After
a thorough investigation, the ICC prosecutor has amassed evidence of crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed by Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmed
Haroun, by Janjaweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd al-Rahman, also called Ali
Kushayb, and by President Omar al-Bashir. He has also found genocidal intent by
Bashir. Arrest warrants were issued in 2007 for Haroun and Kushayb.11 The ICC
pre-trial chamber has now issued an arrest warrant for Bashir for crimes against
humanity and war crimes, but found insufficient evidence to include genocide in the
arrest warrant.12
Evidence of Sudanese government planning, complicity, and aiding and abetting
systematic crimes against humanity, including genocide, in Darfur is strong. Use of
Sudanese government aircraft to bomb and strafe Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa
villages in Darfur has been documented by numerous investigators. Such bombing
has been coordinated with Janjaweed militia attacks on the same villages, in which
significant proportions of the male populations have been killed, women have been
systematically raped, and villages have been pillaged and burnt to the ground.13
When the U.S. State Department sent its Atrocities Documentation Team to the
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Chad/Darfur border in 2004, its own estimates of the death toll stood at over 50,000.
By April 2008, the UN’s Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs said that 300,000
people had died above the normal mortality rate.14 Over 2.5 million people are now in
camps for refugees and internally displaced persons.
Sudan expert Alex de Waal does not disagree with the U.S. State Department’s
2004 finding of genocide. He has written, ‘‘Powell is correct in law. According to the
facts as known and the law as laid down in the 1948 Genocide Convention, the kill-
ings, displacement and rape in Darfur are rightly characterised as ‘‘genocide.’’15 He
has called Sudan’s policies ‘‘genocide by force of habit’’ and ‘‘famine that kills.’’ The
Bashir regime’s twenty-year record of serial genocide against the Nuba, the Dinka,
Nuer, and other groups in southern Sudan, and now in Darfur, lends weight to the
prosecutor’s charge.
As Sudanese head of state and commander in chief, President Bashir has sole re-
sponsibility for the atrocities he knows are being committed in Darfur by the Suda-
nese armed forces and the Janjaweed militias, many of whom Bashir has incorporated
into the Sudanese government’s reserve forces.16 He has coordinated Sudan’s policies
that are intended to destroy a substantial part of the targeted ethnic groups and to
drive them off their land.
It is clear that Bashir has direct responsibility for war crimes. The prosecutor has
evidence that Bashir has directly ordered Sudanese troops to adopt a ‘‘scorched earth’’
policy and to ‘‘take no prisoners.’’17 These are war crimes under the Geneva Conventions.
Under the Rome Statute, the prosecutor’s mandate is to analyze the seriousness of
the information he has received on crimes within the jurisdiction of the court, and if
he concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed, he shall submit the case to
the pre-trial chamber.18
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court specifically excludes any
political office from providing immunity from prosecution. ‘‘This Statute shall apply
equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular,
official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or par-
liament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a
person from criminal responsibility under this Statute.’’19
If the prosecutor were not to charge President Bashir, he would be ignoring the
evidence against Bashir and contributing to the impunity that Sudan’s leaders now
brazenly anticipate they will carry out. He would fail to do his duty as prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court.
II. Who has the authority to decide whether charging Bashir in the ICC would
constitute a threat to international peace warranting a Chapter VII deferral
of the case under Article 16 of the Rome Statute?
The wisdom of bringing charges against Bashir is both a legal and a political question.
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo rightly believes that the political decision must be made
by a political body, the UN Security Council. There is good reason why the UN Security
Council, not the ICC, is the proper body to make this political decision. The Security
Council, under the UN Charter, has ‘‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.’’20 Such responsibility is not conferred on the Inter-
national Criminal Court by the Rome Statute. The ICC is a judicial body, and lacks
the diplomatic and political means to make judgments about whether it is appropriate
or not to proceed with a case that has been referred to it by the UN Security Council.
By referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the Security Council made that
decision. It could decide to defer prosecution of the case against Bashir by a vote of
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nine members of the Security Council21 under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.22 But
the Security Council supports the case against Bashir.23 Nine members of the UN
Security Council have not voted to defer the case, and both France and the U.S. have
declared their intention to veto any Chapter VII resolution requiring such deferral.24
Is the UN Security Council right to allow the case against Bashir to proceed?
To answer that question, we must try to answer a difficult question about probable
consequences.
III. Would charging Bashir in the ICC and arresting him have political
consequences that would make the situation in Darfur and in Sudan
more unstable and potentially more deadly than if Bashir were granted
immunity, at least on a temporary basis? Will issuing an arrest warrant
for Bashir result in intensified attacks by the Government of Sudan and
cause it to become more recalcitrant?
Alex de Waal rests his argument against charging President Bashir largely on his
judgment that such charges could undo the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that
has brought the twenty-year civil war in southern Sudan to an end. President Bashir
has obliquely threatened to undo that agreement, and has even threatened the safety
of UN and other relief workers who currently feed and provide shelter and health care
to more than 2 million internally displaced persons in Darfur.
Since the ICC prosecutor brought charges against Bashir in July 2008, the Suda-
nese government bombed Kutum in November 2008, immediately violating a cease-
fire it had promised to maintain, and has carried out other attacks in Darfur. UN offi-
cials met in September 2008 to discuss the ‘‘worsening situation’’ in Darfur. At that
time Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo said, ‘‘The evidence shows that crimes against Dar-
furis continue today. Al-Bashir has complete control of his forces, and they are raping
women today, they are promoting conditions in the camps to destroy complete com-
munities and they are still bombing schools.’’25 But the Sudanese government attacks
have been no more intense than they were before the charges were brought in July
2008. Khartoum’s veiled threats against aid workers have not been carried out,
though several have been murdered by militias. Relief assistance has continued to
flow.
On 4 March 2009, immediately after the ICC issued its arrest warrant for Bashir,
the Sudanese government revoked the licenses of ten major relief organizations that
feed and care for displaced persons in the Darfur IDP camps. The cynicism of this
move only underlines the long-term genocidal intent of the Bashir regime toward the
ethnic groups in the camps.
IV. Will the Government of Sudan actually be more active in restraining its
Army and Air Force and Janjaweed militias from committing further
crimes against humanity in Darfur as a result of the charges?
Although the ICC’s arrest warrant for Bashir is its first against a sitting head of state,
other sitting heads of state have been indicted by other international tribunals.
Although situations are never completely congruent, one indicator of what effect
charges against a head of state might have on his behavior may be gauged from the
effects of similar charges of genocide and crimes against humanity brought against
Slobodan Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and against Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone while they
were still in office and conflicts were still underway. In both cases, the charges in-
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creased pressure on those leaders to negotiate peace. In both cases, the charges helped
opponents displace them from power. And in both cases, the accused wound up in the
dock.
When they were indicted, many of the same countries that now oppose the charges
against an arrest of Bashir opposed the indictment of Milosevic and Taylor. The pro-
secutors in both courts were roundly criticized for ‘‘upsetting the peace process.’’ But
the charges turned out to advance the peace process by putting each of the leaders on
the defensive both from outside and within their countries. Peace agreements were
reached after, not before, the indictments.
V. Although many predicted Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor would
escape arrest, both were eventually handed over to international courts
and put on trial. Does the same fate await Bashir? Or will he escape
arrest and justice?
The best predictor of the future is the study of the past and the understanding of the
forces that drive the present. Forces in Sudan are only partially similar to the forces
that resulted in the overthrow of Milosevic and Taylor.
In Yugoslavia, a youth movement trained in nonviolent resistance organized a
united opposition to Milosevic. The dictator’s own miscalculation that he would win
an election against a united opposition, followed by his transparent attempt to steal
the election after losing, led to his downfall. The new government handed Milosevic
over for trial as a condition of cooperation with the European community.
In Liberia, an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force led
by Nigeria had intervened in the civil war in Sierra Leone and had largely defeated
forces backed by President Charles Taylor of neighboring Liberia. On the first day of
negotiations for peace in Liberia, the Sierra Leone Special Court prosecutor David
Crane issued an indictment and arrest warrant for Taylor. The negotiations proceeded
without Taylor, and one of the key provisions of the agreement was that Taylor would
resign the Liberian presidency and be granted temporary asylum in Calabar, Nigeria.
A condition of his exile was that Taylor stay out of Liberian politics, a condition he
never honored.26 Finally, fed up with Taylor and learning that he was planning to go
back to Liberia to mount a coup d’e´tat, the Nigerian government ordered police to
arrest him for extradition to the Sierra Leone Special Court. They caught him as he
was trying to escape across the border into Cameroon. The Special Court arranged
for this habitual escape artist (years before, he had even escaped from the Charles
Street Jail in Boston) to The Hague, where he currently is on trial. Elections in 2005
put Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf into the presidency, and Liberia is making a strong return
to democracy. Again, indictment and an arrest warrant for a murderous dictator pre-
ceded peace, rather than obstructing it.
In the cases of both Milosevic and Taylor, their apprehension and trial required
that they relinquish power, submit to arrest by a new government, and be handed
over for trial by an international court. Is such a scenario likely in Sudan?
Sudan has different circumstances, but such a scenario might occur. Sudan has
practically no tradition of democracy like Liberia’s (however imperfect) and has no
united opposition like Liberia’s and Yugoslavia’s. But there are almost certainly peo-
ple within the Sudanese military government who would like to overthrow Bashir.
International criminal charges against him are an embarrassment to Sudan, despite
Bashir’s loud denials. They are likely to hasten his downfall. Members of his govern-
ment will realize that they, too, could be charged. If the atrocities in Darfur continue
after they take over, they will also face the ICC, unless the UN Security Council
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revokes its referral to the ICC. So, it is entirely possible that Bashir will eventually be
tried by the ICC.
VI. Will the charges against Bashir make the Government of Sudan more
likely to work toward a peace agreement that is acceptable to the many
sides in Sudan’s conflicts and that will return Darfur’s displaced persons
to their homes?
With over 2 million people displaced in Darfur and another half million refugees in
neighboring countries, the Darfur genocide is again proof that every genocide is a
threat to international peace and security. The conflict in Darfur has spilled over into
Chad and the Central African Republic, and the Sudanese government provides
support to the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and genocidal killers in eastern
Congo. Yet Sudan claims that international intervention is a violation of Sudanese
sovereignty, when Sudan has not only failed in its responsibility to protect its own
citizens—the first duty of sovereignty—but also has been the perpetrator of atrocities
against them. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN has authorized
a 26,000-person peacekeeping force for Darfur,27 exercising, however weakly, the
emerging norm called ‘‘the responsibility to protect’’ adopted in the World Summit
Outcome Resolution.28 The UN declared its intention to send the peacekeeping mis-
sion its authorized 26,000 personnel by the summer of 2009, but has failed to do so
because UN member states have not volunteered enough forces.
The problem is that there is no peace to keep. For a peacekeeping mission to
succeed, three elements are necessary: a peace to keep; a robust mandate to protect
civilians with rules of engagement to match; and financial, military, and logistical re-
sources to carry out the mandate. The Darfur peacekeeping operation has none of the
three.
The vital first step toward peace in Darfur is a peace agreement that can be imple-
mented. Yet the Sudanese government has few incentives to reach such an agreement. It
has successfully driven millions of Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa out of their villages into
camps controlled by Sudanese troops. It can bomb and strafe Darfur’s villages at will.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which is comprehensive in name only be-
cause it completely leaves out Darfur, has returned millions of southerners to their
homelands and suspended the civil war there. Having thus pacified the south and its
oil fields, the Government of Sudan reaps billions of dollars from petroleum exports
per year, creating an economic boom in the Arab-controlled north. It has cemented
its alliance with China, which is dependent on Sudanese oil.
To arrive at a peace agreement that will include Darfur, this strategic imbalance
must be changed. Multilateral diplomacy should be strengthened that involves
Sudan’s Arab neighbors. But the military imbalance must be changed as well. The
Government of Sudan must be prevented from more bombing of Darfur’s villages
through imposition of an ‘‘after-bombing’’ No Fly Zone that is enforced by French and
other NATO aircraft that will destroy Sudanese Air Force planes on the ground if they
are used to bomb villages. If the government continues to fund and permit murderous
raids into Darfur’s villages, the Port of Sudan should be subjected to a blockade of
petroleum shipments both out (crude) and in (refined) imposed by the U.S., British,
and French navies. No permission for these measures should be sought from the UN,
because China will undoubtedly veto them. The UN has proven incapable of prevent-
ing genocide largely because the Security Council is so often paralyzed by the veto.
Although most international lawyers might argue that UN Charter Article 2(4) may
render such actions illegal, others can argue that such actions are ‘‘consistent with
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the purposes of the United Nations.’’ Like the Kosovo bombing that ended Serbian
aggression there and helped bring down Milosevic, the aim of an ‘‘after bombing’’ No
Fly Zone and a petroleum blockade is not to use force against the territorial integrity
or independence of Sudan or to kill any Sudanese people, but rather to drive the
Sudanese government to the negotiating table.
Omar al-Bashir has proven himself to be a serial genocidist. He has inflicted
genocides in the Nuba Mountains, southern Sudan, and now Darfur. He must be
overthrown from within before any meaningful negotiations can result in a peace
agreement.
VII. Will the charges of genocide against Bashir clarify international
criminal law?
The UN’s International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur29 left the law of genocide in
a muddle. Citing my friend and colleague, Professor William Schabas, the UN Com-
mission of Inquiry reasoned that Sudan’s IDP camps are proof that the Sudanese gov-
ernment lacks genocidal intent. They gave examples of massacres in which some of
the men were allowed to live, although many were killed, concluding that such exam-
ples proved absence of genocidal ‘‘specific intent.’’ They failed to perceive a systematic
plan in the killings against certain groups, even though by the time of their report
over 100,000 people from three ethnic groups had been murdered or died of starvation
and disease during forced displacement from their villages. They even claimed that
ethnic groups in Darfur are not ‘‘objectively’’ distinguishable because ‘‘they all speak
Arabic,’’ ignoring the fact that the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups speak
their own languages in addition to Arabic. The commission treated the ethnic groups
as protected groups only because they were distinguished ‘‘subjectively’’ by their
Janjaweed killers. But they found that the Government of Sudan had no genocidal
‘‘specific intent’’ because the government’s intent seemed to be forced displacement,
not destruction of the groups. They left it up to a later court to determine whether cer-
tain individuals had such genocidal intent, ignoring the preventive purpose of the UN
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
The problem with the commission’s reasoning is that forced displacement into IDP
camps is not an alternative to genocide. It often accompanies genocide. Legal scholars
such as William Schabas who claim that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ (a euphemism for forced
displacement that should be erased from the legal lexicon) and ‘‘genocide’’ are mutually
exclusive crimes30 are wrong. As any prosecutor knows, the same act may have two
intents, one providing the mens rea for the crime of forced displacement, and the other
the specific intent for genocide, the intentional destruction of a substantial part of an
ethnic group.
The Commission of Inquiry also ignored the genocide convention’s specific lan-
guage that defines genocide as the intentional destruction of a substantial part of a
racial or ethnic group. Its observations that millions of people remain in camps for dis-
placed persons misses the point that hundreds of thousands of other Fur, Massalit,
and Zaghawa have died simply because of their racial and ethnic identity. That is
called genocide.
The ICC pre-trial chamber’s refusal to issue an arrest warrant against Bashir for
genocide may mean that the prosecutor’s charges against Omar al-Bashir for genocide
will not be adjudicated by the ICC pre-trial chamber unless it allows amendment of
the charges. That would be a pity. It will not permit the prosecutor to prove at trial
that the Government of Sudan did indeed have the intent to commit genocide and
that it committed the crimes of both genocide and forced displacement. The interna-
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tional law of genocide will remain muddled, and the Genocide Convention will remain
toothless as a deterrent while genocide is underway.
VIII. Will the ICC’s charges against Omar al-Bashir for crimes against
humanity and war crimes have a sobering effect on other heads of
state and their minions who are planning such crimes in the future?
The charges against Omar al-Bashir should remind heads of state that even if their
states do not ratify the Rome Statute and grant jurisdiction over such crimes to the
ICC, the UN Security Council has the authority to subject them to ICC jurisdiction.
A new era of international law has dawned in which national leaders can no
longer be sure that they can get away with mass murder. It is about time. The long
dark age when war lords and dictators could commit atrocities with impunity is
coming to an end. As Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has said, al-Bashir must be tried for his
crimes.
The Case against Prosecution of President Bashir, Part 2
Alex de Waal
Writing on 15 February 2009, on the eve of a week that is widely expected to see the
pre-trial chamber of the ICC issue an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir, I
shall respond to the main points raised by Greg Stanton. My comments are organized
in response to the questions that he raises.
I. Is the ICC prosecutor right to charge President al-Bashir?
The ICC prosecutor is undoubtedly within his rights to charge the most senior officials
and commanders, including heads of state, with grave crimes and to demand their
arrest. Should the prosecutor obtain evidence such that he has reasonable grounds to
believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the court, he is
obliged to submit an application for an arrest warrant. He operates under an assump-
tion that it is in the interests of justice and the interests of the victim to mount a pro-
secution. There may be grounds such as the age or infirmity of the accused that might
militate against prosecution (not relevant in this case) and issues of victim and
witness protection that might counsel against pursuing a case (which are relevant in
this case, but which I shall not discuss here).
I harbor considerable doubts as to whether the investigation into President al-
Bashir counts as ‘‘thorough.’’ I am not privy to the redacted text in the Public Applica-
tion presented on 14 July, but the empirics that were made public raise a number of
serious doubts about the quality of the case that has been constructed. A strong case
for superior responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity could be made,
based on an elaboration of the indictments against Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb.
An argument can also be made for a genocide charge, but I would be very sur-
prised if this could be made to stick. An argument that genocide was committed in
Darfur is not the same as an argument that President al-Bashir possessed genocidal
intent. In this regard, let me explain the import of my phrase ‘‘genocide by force of
habit.’’ This phrase intended to contrast the atrocities in Darfur with prior campaigns
mounted by the Sudanese government, especially in the Nuba Mountains in the early
1990s (driven by ideology) and in the oilfields in the late 1990s (driven by economic
motives). The phrase was coined in an article entitled ‘‘Counterinsurgency on the
Cheap,’’31 and the principal argument therein was that the means for counterinsur-
gency adopted by the Sudanese government—principally the use of proxy militia—
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routinely (and hence predictably) led to mass killing, forced displacement, pillage, and
rape that amounted to acts of genocide. The Sudanese government did nothing to stop
these atrocities and, indeed, its own forces participated willingly in them. But these
acts were confined in space and time to the conduct of the counterinsurgency—mem-
bers of the same ethnic groups residing elsewhere (e.g., in the national capital) were
not harmed and the atrocities largely ceased when the military objectives had been
achieved (in early 2005). In this respect I agree with Antonio Cassese and the Com-
mission of Inquiry he led. Lawyers do not agree on the question of whether, in such
circumstances, it is possible to impute specific genocidal intent to the architects of
the campaign.32 My position would be that the acti rei of genocide (probably) occurred
during that terrible period but the specific mens rea cannot be demonstrated for the
president.
This brings me to a response to Stanton’s point VI: will the charges help clarify
international criminal law? I suspect that a genocide charge (as opposed to charges of
crimes against humanity) will muddy international criminal law, by trying to develop
the argument that genocide can be committed through common purpose of a group,
without every individual in that group possessing specifically genocidal intent.
Moreover, I would strongly disagree with the ICC prosecutor that there was either
the actus reus of genocide or the mens rea after January 2005 up to the present day.
Speaking about the contemporary period, it seems to me that the prosecutor has sim-
ply got his facts wrong. He says, ‘‘Five thousand are dying each month, and we are
presenting that as a humanitarian crisis. It’s not; it’s a crime . . . these are the facts.’’33
I have searched every available source and I cannot find any data that back up these
claims. If he is referring to general mortality due to hunger and disease, the best data
indicate that these levels returned to near-normal during 2005–2006 and have not
risen subsequently.34 If he is referring to violent deaths, then the ICC’s own data
point to 35,000 violent fatalities in 2003 and 2004, and a fraction of that number
since. United Nations monitoring data, which probably underestimate the number
of fatalities (but not by a large amount) include 2,070 incidents and 1,449 violent
deaths in Darfur during 2008, including intertribal fighting among Arab groups (the
largest quotient at more than 550), battles between the army and rebels and among
pro-government forces (the second largest number), bandit attacks and carjackings,
attacks on displaced persons (58, including 38 in a single incident in Kalma camp
on 25 August), and aerial bombardment (39) and attacks on villagers by soldiers and
militia (37). The rebels and former rebels killed more civilians than government forces
and pro-government militia—220 compared to 2,000. In popular usage, if not in law,
there is a gravity threshold for defining genocide, and I think it is doubtful if this level
of violence meets that (ill-defined) criterion. The pattern of violence gives little sup-
port to the prosecutor’s inference of genocidal intent. This is important because,
among other things, it takes the sting out of the charge that things could not get
worse. They could get much worse.
II. Who should decide on whether a prosecution is in the interests of peace?
Greg Stanton argues in this section that it is the job of the UN Security Council to
assess such consequences, not the task of the prosecutor. I agree. Despite the possibil-
ity of interpreting Article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Statute to imply that the prosecutor
should not pursue a case if it endangers the life of the nation and risks further crimes,
I do not see how the office of the prosecutor could be competent to make such a politi-
cal judgment, nor how it would navigate its conflict of interest were it to try to do so.
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I would add that a deferral of prosecution under Article 16 of the Rome Statute is
a poor instrument. It is made poorer by the reflex of the member states of the Security
Council, especially the three permanent members (the United States, France, and
Britain), to see a deferral as a lever to obtain political concessions. I think this would
be the wrong road to take. The ICC is not an instrument of political leverage, and once
it has become entangled in political conditions and the monitoring of such conditions,
it falls into danger of losing its independence as a court. If the UN Security Council
were to decide that a deferral is in the interests of peace and security, it would be
better to make that decision unconditionally. This not only preserves the indepen-
dence of the court but also leaves open the option of lifting the deferral uncondi-
tionally, avoiding any obligation of negotiating over whether political conditions have
been met.
III. Will the Sudanese government be active in restraining its forces?
The pattern of violence in Darfur bears out the hypothesis that the Commission of
Inquiry report and ICC referral had a deterrent effect. The major violence subsided
in January 2005, at the time when Cassese presented his report and recommended
referral to the ICC. There are anecdotal reports that field commanders said that they
had received instructions not to kill. Ironically, Moreno-Ocampo could have held this
up as an example of the success of the court.
Since the prosecutor made his Public Application in July 2008, the pattern
of violence in Darfur has not changed substantially. The majority of fatalities are
due to interethnic conflict among Arab tribes and criminality (see above). Army and
air force attacks are principally in response to rebel offensives. There has been no
ceasefire.
However, there are also ominous signs that the government is preparing for the
worst. It has intensified its security surveillance of opposition parties and human
rights organizations. It has mobilized its army. It has refused to reform the security
laws, as required by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It seems near-certain
that the elections scheduled for this year, rather than being an exercise in democratic
transformation, will be a tactical and cynical exercise in hanging on to power.
IV. The Taylor and Milosevic precedents give reason for optimism
Stanton cites the encouraging examples of Charles Taylor, who was president of Libe-
ria when the prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, David Crane, demanded
his arrest, and of Slobodan Milosevic, who was president of Yugoslavia when Carla
Del Ponte of the ICTY demanded his arrest. In both these cases, fears that the arrest
warrants would lead to escalated or intractable conflicts did not materialize.
I think it is important to examine the political contexts of these cases. Taylor was
already in the process of being eased out of power by the combined efforts of African
and international governments. Some Liberia specialists argue that the indictment
delayed rather than hastened his departure, as he sought to negotiate an amnesty,
and that it contributed to a round of violence in Monrovia. They believe that it was
only the implicit offer of safe exile in Nigeria that allowed Taylor to leave, and had
he known that this would not translate into a permanent asylum but rather into his
deportation to face trial, he would have done his utmost to remain in power in Liberia.
As I am not sufficiently familiar with the details of this case, I would not want to com-
ment on this interpretation of events. However, it is clear that the indictment was in
line with international policy toward Liberia, which was to remove Taylor.
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In the Milosevic case, Del Ponte announced the indictment during the middle of a
war in which NATO was bombing Serb positions in Kosovo and targets in Belgrade. In
the calculus of coercion, the military weight of NATO surely counted for more than the
arrest warrant of the ICTY.
By contrast, the international strategy for Sudan has, since 2001, focused upon a
negotiated transition. This includes two peace agreements signed under international
auspices, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005, and the
Darfur Peace Agreement, signed in May 2006. The key provisions of the CPA, includ-
ing the setting up of a Government of National Unity with senior positions provided
for the former southern rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army,
the withdrawal of the northern army from the south to be replaced by the SPLA,
and the allocation of a substantial share of the nation’s oil revenue to the autonomous
Government of South Sudan, have been honored. Southern Sudan has enjoyed peace
for the first time in more than twenty years. The government has agreed to elections
scheduled for 2010 and to a referendum on self-determination in the south in 2011. It
has agreed to two international peacekeeping missions, one for the CPA and one for
Darfur. In short, the approach to Sudan has been one of negotiation, not coercion.
Some believe that this approach is mistaken, and the ICC prosecutor and Stanton
appear to be among them. It is correct that it will be extraordinarily difficult to nego-
tiate in good faith with an individual under an ICC arrest warrant. While the only
negotiations that were needed with Taylor and Milosevic were the terms of their
respective surrenders, this is not the case with al-Bashir.
More relevant is the precedent of Joseph Kony’s arrest warrant in the case of
the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda. When the ICC first announced the warrant
for Kony and his lieutenants, it galvanized the peace process. Kony believed that
the indictment was a form of political pressure and that it was intended to compel
him to make concessions in the negotiations, which he duly made. But as the talks
neared their conclusion, the issue of the arrest warrant could not be resolved and
became the sticking point. Finally, Kony withdrew from the peace talks and instead
launched a new military campaign in south Sudan and the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
Sudan has moved more rapidly from the initial moment of political traction to the
point of paralysis. As I outlined in my first contribution, I fear that paralysis spells
disaster.
V. Will the Sudanese government be more likely to work toward peace?
The ICC has put immense pressure on the Sudanese government, and there is no
doubt that this is one contributory factor that led it to sign a ‘‘declaration of intent’’
with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Doha, Qatar, on 17 February
2009. This did not mark the beginning of a real peace process, as JEM repudiated
the agreement after the warrant was issued. Even if the government negotiates in
good faith, it faces a divided set of negotiating partners, which are unable to agree on
a peace agreement for the foreseeable future.
In military terms, the government is in reactive mode in Darfur. It has limited
capacity to inflict gross harm on the population, because its army is demoralized and
the Arab militia is selective in the orders it prefers to obey. The government will re-
spond to rebel offensives, as they did when JEM attacked and occupied the town of
Muhajiriya in January. Its aerial and ground attacks caused thirty deaths, including
ten or so civilians. It is only if JEM is sufficiently emboldened by an arrest warrant to
escalate the war, by taking control of a major city, by widening the war to next-door
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Kordofan, or by again attacking the national capital, that we will see major repercus-
sions in Darfur.
The key implications of an arrest warrant will most probably play out in the Suda-
nese national political arena. The stakes here are much higher: the survival of the
Government of National Unity and, with it, the CPA and the possibility of democrati-
zation and a peaceful and legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination by the
people of south Sudan. The CPA processes are all imperfect, but they are far prefera-
ble to the alternative of an attempted overthrow of the current government, either by
external or internal forces. Stanton argues that al-Bashir ‘‘must be overthrown from
within before any meaningful negotiations can result in a peace agreement.’’ I believe
that this is a recipe for a new war between north and south, or of all against all, which
will kill far more than the 1,500 to 2,000 Darfuris who are being killed on all sides
each year. One of the reasons why the president of south Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit,
criticizes the arrest warrant is that he trusts al-Bashir to implement the commitment
to self-determination in southern Sudan more than he trusts any successor, who
would surely want to revisit that provision in the CPA. Should that happen, then
many southerners would argue for a unilateral declaration of independence for the
south. Contested partitions such as this do not have a good record in terms of human
rights and welfare.
Twice before, in 1964 and 1985, a peaceable popular uprising overthrew a military
ruler in Sudan. Along with others, I dream of this happening again, but I fear that any
attempt at regime change by anything other than the electoral process will spell disas-
ter. The dangers are sufficiently real that they need to be taken very seriously, and it
would be unwise to bank on a best-case scenario.
VII. Will the ICC’s charges have a sobering effect on other heads of state?
On this issue, I have no doubt that the prosecutor’s charge has had a very salutary
effect on heads of state and senior officials who are contemplating heinous crimes.
Even if they escape justice for a while, the fear of ending up in the dock sooner or later
will certainly galvanize their thinking. The immediate fear among many Sudanese is
that their president will be found guilty in the court of world public opinion and sen-
tenced to life in the Republican Palace. But it seems most unlikely that al-Bashir
would be able to sustain such a position indefinitely, and over the years the wider
international norm of no impunity will surely become entrenched. These are real
benefits, a genuine sign of secular moral progress, but I think that the medium-term
risks to the Sudanese people of the arrest warrant are greater.
The Case for Prosecution of Omar al-Bashir, Part 2
Gregory H. Stanton
Alex de Waal has responded to my opening argument for the prosecution of President
Omar al-Bashir and I shall first answer his responses. Then I will consider the politi-
cal risk that Dr. de Waal says President al-Bashir’s prosecution will create for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for southern Sudan.
Did Bashir possess the specific intent required to convict him of genocide?
Although Alex de Waal concedes that Bashir might be convicted of command respon-
sibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur, he doubts that the ICC
prosecutor can prove the specific intent required to convict him of the crime of geno-
cide. The specific intent required is the deliberate destruction of a substantial part
of a national, ethnic, religious, or racial group, as such.35 Dr. de Waal argues that
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Bashir’s purpose in Darfur is counterinsurgency, not genocide. The problem with
that argument is that counterinsurgency may be one motive for mass killing, but
that motive does not negate the intent of genocide. Motive and intent should not be
confused. One of a regime’s motives may be economic—to drive southern Sudanese
off their oilfields, for example. But the regime’s intent remains genocidal if it also
has the purpose of deliberately destroying a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group,
in whole or in part. Counterinsurgency and genocide are not mutually exclusive. In
Darfur, they are congruent.
Will the prosecutor be able to prove that Bashir has such genocidal intent?
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Akayesu36 stated the
following: ‘‘. . . the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims
on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members
of other groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular
act.’’
The Cassese Commission and Dr. de Waal note that all members of the targeted
ethnic groups were not targeted everywhere in Sudan. But that fact does not diminish
the specific intent to destroy these groups, in substantial part, in Darfur.
Dr. de Waal argues that the genocide charge ‘‘will muddy international law, by
trying to develop the argument that genocide can be committed through the common
purpose of a group, without every individual in that group possessing genocidal
intent.’’ This argument confuses the specific intent required to prove genocide and
how an individual can be convicted of intentionally participating in the crime.
Genocide is a group crime, which by its nature, involves what common law
calls conspiracy and the civil law calls ‘‘joint criminal enterprise.’’ To quote Professor
William Schabas, who generally takes a narrow view of the definition of the crime of
genocide, ‘‘Genocide is, by nature, a collective crime, committed with the co-operation
of many participants. It is, moreover, an offence generally directed by the State. The
organizers and planners must necessarily have a racist or discriminatory motive, that
is a genocidal motive . . . At the same time, individual participants may be motivated
by a range of factors, including financial gain, jealousy, and political ambition.’’37
To prove specific intent for an individual, the prosecutor needs to demonstrate
that the perpetrator was aware of a plan or policy to destroy at least part of a group.
Such intent can be proven by evidence of direct orders, but may also be proven by con-
scious participation in a pattern of criminal activity that can only have arisen out of a
plan or policy. The ICC prosecutor contends that the president of Sudan was aware
of his own government’s policy to destroy a substantial part of the Fur, Massalit, and
Zaghawa ethnic groups in Darfur.
Dr. de Waal argues that most of the killing occurred in 2003 and 2004, and that
there has been no genocide since. The prosecutor, on the other hand, contends that
the genocide continues, and remains part of an overall plan to destroy these groups.
Dr. de Waal points out that the number of ‘‘incidents’’ in 2008 was 2,070, resulting in
1,551 violent deaths. What he leaves out are the continuing deaths from starvation,
disease, and rape in Darfur, even around the camps for displaced persons that are
supposedly under the protection of the Sudanese government. Sociologist John Hagen
and demographer Alberto Palloni estimated a total of 200,000 deaths by 2006,38 and
Eric Reeves has estimated the number of such deaths since April 2003 to be over
450,000.39 The UN’s Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs places the overall
death toll since April 2003 at 300,000 deaths.40 This is evidence of a policy of what
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Helen Fein has called ‘‘genocide by attrition.’’41 The Bashir regime has applied this
policy not only in Darfur but also in the Nuba Mountains and in southern Sudan.
What drives Bashir’s genocidal policies?
Alex de Waal’s own work offers some answers about the origins of the Bashir regime’s
motives and its genocidal intent. In two of Dr. de Waal’s works,42 there are examina-
tions of the ‘‘Arab Gathering,’’ a loose alliance of Arab supremacists and Islamic
extremists, who have throughout Bashir’s rule advanced a policy of Arab domination
of Sudan. In War in Darfur, Ahmad Kamal el-Din’s chapter ‘‘Islam and Islamism in
Darfur’’ describes the development of this semi-secret group that is openly racist and
intends to ‘‘change the demography of Darfur.’’43 Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, in
their Darfur: A New History of a Long War, cite a directive from Musa Hilal dated Au-
gust 2004 to ‘‘change the demography of Darfur and empty it of its African tribes.’’44
In their place, the Sudanese government has promoted instant citizenship and grants
of land to Arab immigrants from Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Egypt. With such a policy,
can there be any hope for resettlement of the 2.5 million Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa
who have been driven out of their ancestral homes and off their land?
Will ICC charges and an arrest warrant against Bashir scuttle the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement for southern Sudan?
Dr. de Waal states that the prosecutor and I favor a policy of coercion rather than
negotiation with the Government of Sudan. On the contrary, I favor both. In fact, I
believe that without coercion, negotiation will fail. The main reason that the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement was reached between the SPLA and the government of
Sudan is that the SPLA had fought the Sudanese army to a draw. It was in the inter-
ests of both sides to negotiate peace so they could divide the wealth that would flow
from the vast oil reserves of southern Sudan.
These fundamental interests have not changed. The Government of Sudan will
bluster and threaten renewed war in the south if an arrest warrant is issued for
Bashir. It will ignore the arrest warrant, and Bashir will travel only to countries not
party to the Rome Statute of the ICC or those that promise not to arrest him. If there
are skirmishes in southern Sudan, the Sudanese army will soon learn that the SPLA
remains a potent military force. Far more likely, the Government of Sudan will abide
by the CPA, maintain a government of National Unity, and continue to divide the oil
revenues. It will try to postpone elections as long as possible to remain in power, will
try to steal elections if they are held, and it will never allow the referendum on self-
determination for the south, which is scheduled for 2011. The Sudan central govern-
ment’s main interest is to continue to earn oil revenues from the south.
So what is likely to happen to Omar al-Bashir? Gradually, those who support him
now will see him as a liability in international relations, just as Yugoslav leaders con-
cluded Milosevic was. They will find ways to ease him out of power. Milosevic’s loss in
the Yugoslav elections was the result of a unified nationalist opposition led by non-
violent resistance, not NATO bombing.
Eventually Bashir will be handed over for trial by the ICC. The Sudanese leaders
who replace Bashir will realize that if they do not stop the crimes against humanity
and war crimes in Darfur, they could be next in the dock. The UN Security Council’s
referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC remains in effect.
Alex de Waal is right that this positive scenario is not a certainty. Things could
get worse, much worse. War could resume in the south and aid could be cut off to the
IDP camps in Darfur. If that scenario begins to unfold, the great powers in the UN
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will need to take strong military action, action they should have taken in 2004. With
or without Security Council authorization, a No-Fly Zone should be imposed over
Darfur and southern Sudan. A blockade of Port Sudan should keep crude oil from
flowing out and refined petroleum products from flowing in. There is a much better
chance in 2009 that with new administrations in the US, the UK, and France, such
action is possible.
If these measures, coupled with increased diplomatic pressure on Sudan from its
neighbors, do not reopen assistance to displaced persons in the IDP camps in Darfur,
the humanitarian crisis predicted by Dr. de Waal, may indeed unfold. At that point,
the US, UK, France, and other powers in the international ‘‘community’’—if only
such a community actually existed — must decide if they are going to back their brave
words about ‘‘the responsibility to protect’’ with action to get humanitarian aid to the
people of Darfur.
The Case against Prosecution of President al-Bashir, Part 3
Alex de Waal
The judges of the ICC pre-trial chamber (PTC) made public their decision on the pro-
secutor’s application for an arrest warrant against President al-Bashir on 4 March
2009. As expected, they issued an arrest warrant. They caused some controversy by
refusing (by a majority of two to one) to charge President al-Bashir with the three
counts of genocide, leading the prosecutor to seek leave to appeal on 10 March. Within
an hour of the decision being announced, the Sudan government began to expel inter-
national humanitarian agencies working in Darfur and gave clear signals that more
steps against international presence in Sudan might be taken. In this final contribu-
tion, I examine two issues: the genocide decision by the PTC, and the immediate after-
math of the arrest warrant, before returning to the fundamental question of weighing
competing ethical demands.
The Genocide Decision
The majority decision not to charge President al-Bashir with genocide was, in my
opinion, the correct one. A case for genocide could have been made with respect to
the events of 2003–2004, although there are important controversies surrounding
the nature of genocidal intent and the mode of liability. John Hagan and Wenona
Rymond-Richmond have constructed a more credible case with respect to those years
(though I would still argue that it falls short of establishing genocidal intent by
the head of state).45 Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo chose not to make that case.
The judges observed that the prosecutor presented no direct evidence for al-Bashir’s
genocidal intent and sought to infer it from the facts of the case.
This decision reveals an important fact about the Public Application, namely, that
the redacted sections did not in fact contain any ‘‘smoking-gun’’ evidence that pointed
straight to President al-Bashir. In deciding not to proceed with the genocide charges,
the judges of course did not rule out that additional evidence might later be adduced
that might reinstate the charge at a later stage. Nor did they assert that genocide had
not been committed by al-Bashir or anyone else. The judges made their decision solely
on what was put before them by the prosecutor. Unfortunately, because the prosecu-
tor’s evidence and argument were less substantial than those presented in some of the
public debates on Darfur, this does not provide us with an opportunity to advance the
scholarly discussion on whether Darfur constitutes genocide and what should be done
about it.
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The judges’ rejection of the genocide charge has an important implication for
how we weigh the consequences. If it were the case that there is ongoing genocide in
Darfur and President al-Bashir is personally responsible, then it would certainly alter
the calculus of risks and outcomes in favor of dramatic action to remove him from
power or isolate, stigmatize, and humiliate him. However, if the violations in question
occurred four or more years ago and the current situation is relatively stable and
there is no ongoing genocide, then the balance of risks and outcomes is more in favor
of maintaining the status quo with its ongoing negotiations.
The Consequences
Immediately after the ICC decision was announced, the Sudan government expelled a
dozen international agencies. This should have come as no surprise as the chief of the
National Intelligence and Security Service, General Salah Abdalla Gosh, had made
his intentions clear just a few weeks previously. He said, ‘‘Our message to those
who stand behind the ICC is that we were Islamic fundamentalists but have become
moderate and civilized and this continues to be our conviction. If they press us to re-
turn to our past position, we will no doubt return. And if they want us to return into
hard-liners anew, that is a simple thing to do. And we are capable of doing it.’’46
This should serve as a reminder that Sudan was isolated, stigmatized, and humili-
ated before, during the 1990s, as a sponsor of jihadist terrorism. That was not only an
atrocious situation for the Sudanese people but also led to some extremely adverse
outcomes internationally. The international experience with handling Sudan during
the decade was that isolating its leaders was counterproductive and that humiliating
them only enraged them. The basic rule of diplomacy is that an adversary should be
given a ladder to climb down. It is possible that an international strategy of isolating
and stigmatizing the Sudanese leadership will succeed in the coming years, but it is
salutary to reflect on the earlier failure of this approach.
Gosh’s use of ‘‘we’’ also reminds us that the Sudanese government is a collective
and that for almost all of its twenty years in power, President al-Bashir has been re-
garded as the front man for a cabal of security officers and civilian ideologues who
wielded more real power than he did. Removing the head of state, and most probably
replacing him with another member of the same Islamist-security clique, would not
represent an improvement.
In the same interview, Gosh continued by saying that Sudan would protect civil-
ians and the staff of international organizations as long as they did not stray beyond
roles defined in country agreements: ‘‘But whoever contradicts this or tries to trespass
the marked boundaries, they have only themselves to blame.’’47 Looking back at the
1990s, when the Sudanese government (in its militant Islamist phase) prevented any
humanitarian assistance from reaching millions of people affected by war and famine
in southern Sudan, one need harbor no doubts about the reality of Gosh’s threat and
the implications should he carry it out.
The stated reason for the expulsion was that the agencies in question had provided
information to the ICC. Several other agencies were not expelled, without reasons given.
United Nations agencies remain. While some national human rights organizations
were closed down and their staff harassed, no national service-providing agencies
have yet been closed. A key part of the infrastructure for distributing food rations
and providing medical and water and sanitation services to the in-need Darfuri popu-
lation was removed at a stroke. Fortunately, the nutritional and health situation in
the region is well short of emergency thresholds (with the important exception of a
meningitis outbreak). But the expulsions leaves the Darfuri population vulnerable to
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deteriorations in the humanitarian situation as well as removing important witnesses
whose presence had undoubtedly helped to deter violence in some of the displaced
camps.
In my first section above, I argued that the prosecutor’s duty did not extend to
making political judgments. However, having stated that there are about 3 million
victims of violations in Darfur, it is concerning to note that the section in his Decem-
ber report to the UN Security Council on the Darfur case contained just four lines on
the ‘‘interests of victims’’ and made no reference to any risks to the humanitarian pro-
vision to millions of Darfuris.
The law on ‘‘famine crimes’’ is underdeveloped. The Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions and the customary laws of war clearly prohibit the use of starva-
tion as a method of warfare under certain circumstances.48 The most recent attention
to the subject has been focused on preserving the access of external humanitarian
actors to populations in need rather than the right of victims of conflict to obtain
essential assistance, or indeed the more basic question of whether actions that create
humanitarian crises should be considered criminal. Regrettably, it is therefore not
self-evident in law that an action that exposes a large civilian population to a signifi-
cant risk of hunger, infectious disease and intolerable living conditions, constitutes a
crime under international law. Given that such an action meets the basic requirement
of a crime against humanity—it affronts the conscience of humankind—I hope that
this shortcoming will be remedied.
I fear that the adverse consequences of the arrest warrant have yet to play them-
selves out. If the situation deteriorates, for example with more restrictions or expulsions
of humanitarians, a crackdown on Sudanese civil society organizations, or stepped-up
rebel offensives, then any criminal responsibility for these actions will lie with those in
positions of power in Sudan who took the relevant actions. However, if it transpires that
the situation in Sudan, including Darfur, was significantly better during the three or
four years preceding the arrest warrant than it is over the coming years, and that the
arrest warrant was at the minimum the pretext for the deterioration, then I believe
the arrest warrant will be shown to have been an imprudent step.
Weighing the Outcomes
Achieving justice in a court of law is both a right for victims of heinous crimes and good
for national and international society. There are other rights and goods to be weighed
as well. Among them are negotiated peace, the implementation of a national constitu-
tion that includes commitments to human rights, civil society, a free media, elections
and the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan, negotiated human-
itarian access to more than 3 million Darfuri people in need, the presence of interna-
tional peacekeepers, ongoing dialogue and consultation among Darfuri communities
leading to local outcomes in terms of reconciliation and restorative justice (though not
yet compensation), and a level of international diplomatic engagement with the Suda-
nese government that, while frustrating, has nonetheless delivered substantial im-
provements in well-being and security for millions of Sudanese citizens.
I would like to believe that all these other outcomes are fully compatible with
judicial accountability for the most heinous crimes. However, I fear that there are
short-term clashes between them, and that we will see some of these contradictions
play out in the next year or two.
My last point is about timing. There is no certainty that President al-Bashir will
be arrested soon and he may remain at liberty, and indeed at the helm of Sudan, for
some years. For the victims of the crimes for which he has been charged, the sense of
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vindication may begin to wear thin. A year ago, there was serious talk among very
well-informed people that President al-Bashir would step aside at the 2010 elections,
marking his twenty years in power with retirement to his newly completed family
house. Even had he not done so, the new Government of National Unity formed after
the elections would have shared power more widely and cemented key elements of the
democratic transition. Surely, it would have been better to have allowed the elections
to proceed before proceeding with the demand for an arrest warrant. With al-Bashir
either out of office or reduced in power, the risks of a backlash would have been com-
mensurately reduced.
The Case for Prosecution of Omar al-Bashir, Part 3
Gregory H. Stanton
The Barrest warrant issued by the ICC has already had a positive effect
on the safety of Darfuris in IDP camps in Sudan.
One of the main goals of law is deterrence from criminal acts. There is evidence
already that orders have gone out from Khartoum to minimize attacks on Darfuri
villages and on people in IDP camps in Darfur.
Since the arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir was approved by the ICC pre-trial
chamber, the number of violent deaths in Darfur has decreased substantially. Despite
veiled threats from Khartoum that it could not be responsible for the safety of IDP’s
if Bashir was indicted, and its expulsion of a dozen NGO relief groups from Sudan,
ostensibly for providing information to the ICC, the death rate in Darfur has dropped,
rather than increased. In 2008, UNAMID reported a total of 1,550 violent deaths. Less
than 500 were civilians. More than 400 were combatants of various rebel groups and
about 640 died in intertribal fighting.49 On 17 June 2009, US Special Envoy to Sudan,
Major General Jonathan S. Gration, declared that the situation in Darfur was now
one of ‘‘remnants of genocide.’’ His comments were quickly disowned by the State
Department and US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, but there is evidence in this
useful exchange of views that, as Alex de Waal has argued, the active genocide in
Darfur may now be over. We should not celebrate yet, however, because the lives of
the 2.7 million Darfuris still in IDP and refugee camps are still at grave risk.
Even if the active genocide is now over, Omar al-Bashir can still be tried for
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed under his command in 2003 and
2004. He should be. The ICC is, after all, a criminal court that sits in judgement on
past crimes. If the prosecutor wins his appeal to the pre-trial chamber, Bashir may
yet be tried for genocide. I have argued in earlier sections of this exchange that there
is plenty of evidence that he should be.
Omar al-Bashir has been so embarrassed by the arrest warrant that he has under-
taken a major diplomatic offensive to blunt its force. He has made numerous trips to
neighboring countries to shore up his diplomatic support, the first to Ethiopia, which
is now conducting brutal forced displacement of Somali populations in the Ogaden
where large gas reserves have been discovered, and others to Eritrea, Egypt, and
Qatar. But Bashir decided not to travel to Uganda when President Museveni said
Bashir would be arrested and sent to the ICC in The Hague if he came there. Bashir’s
regime provides funds and arms to the maniacal Lord’s Resistance Army that has
abducted thousands of Ugandan children.
We may conclude that the arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir has led to providing
much more and not less protection for Darfuris, as his henchmen once threatened
would happen and as many critics of the arrest warrant feared.
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The Bashir arrest warrant has not undermined the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) for southern Sudan
Alex de Waal’s strongest argument against the arrest warrant is that it would upset
an already delicate peace process between the south and north, and could derail both
the elections scheduled for February 2010 and the southern referendum on autonomy
or independence scheduled for February 2011. There are two problems with this argu-
ment: (1) The CPA will stand or fall on the will of the Government of Sudan and the
SPLM, not on the situation in Darfur, which was intentionally excluded from the CPA.
If the CPA breaks down, it will be because either the Government of Sudan or the
SPLM want it to fail, not because of failure to resolve the conflict in Darfur or because
of an arrest warrant for Bashir. (2) The arrest warrant is unlikely to be enforced until
after the elections and referendum. International diplomats can usually walk and
chew gum at the same time, even though they are reluctant to impose forceful mea-
sures against genocide. They are well aware of the complexity of the situation in
Sudan, and are unlikely to press for actual arrest of Bashir until the CPA is imple-
mented. A parallel may be drawn with the arrest warrant of Slobodan Milosevic,
which was not executed until after the Dayton Peace Accords ended the war in Bosnia
and Milosevic had been defeated in Yugoslav elections.
The US Special Envoy to Sudan, Major General Jonathan S. Gration, has clearly
stated that resolution of the conflict in Darfur is now only one of the four major US
policy objectives for Sudan.50 The others are implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between the south and north, creation of a stable Sudanese govern-
ment, and cooperation against terrorism. US and EU foreign policies strongly support
implementation of the CPA. Chinese and French interests also favor its implementa-
tion because they want continued access to Sudanese oil reserves. Russia remains on
good terms with the regime in Khartoum and favors deferral of Bashir’s arrest.
Eric Reeves has criticized Major General Gration’s testimony as ‘‘phony optimism’’
that includes no plan for the resettlement of the 2.7 million Darfuris driven from their
homes and now in IDP and refugee camps, with Janjaweed militias continuing to con-
trol Darfur.51 Reeves also comments:
Most disturbingly, Gration gives no evidence in any of his public comments of under-
standing the ruthless nature of the security cabal that rules Sudan and is determined
to retain its stranglehold on national wealth and power; like many before him, he is
convinced that the National Islamic Front is controlled by men who can be reasoned
with, cajoled, rewarded, made to do ‘‘the right thing.’’ He ignores the basic truth about
these men: during their twenty years in power they have never abided by any agree-
ment with any Sudanese party—not one, not ever.52
Reeves has also detailed the lateness of preparations for the national elections in
February 2010 and the referendum on independence for southern Sudan in February
2011. He warns that foot-dragging by the Sudanese government is the greatest ob-
stacle to implementing the CPA.53
The arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir should remain as a deterrent to
further crimes against humanity by him and his regime
Field research by the International Crisis Group, the Enough Project, Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, Genocide Watch, the Aegis Trust, and other anti-
genocide groups provides plenty of evidence for Eric Reeves’ concern that there could
be another outbreak of civil war in southern Sudan. But the reason is not the arrest
warrant for Bashir. It is because neither the Government of Sudan nor the SPLM
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have withdrawn or disarmed troops in the south. Unemployed young men with
Kalashnikovs are waiting for war, and several recent tribal conflicts have been exacer-
bated by the plethora of deadly weapons. The Government of Sudan’s brutal destruc-
tion of the town of Abyei in May 2008, witnessed by Roger Winter, rendered the recent
judgement of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague over a year too late.54
It was further evidence of a racist general policy of Khartoum to change the demogra-
phy of Sudan and drive non-Arab Africans off Sudan’s rich oilfields.
Darfur is but the latest instance of that racist policy, documented by Alex de Waal
and Julie Flint in Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. As mentioned above, they
cite a ‘‘directive from Musa Hilal’s headquarters’’ that calls for the
execution of all directives from the President of the Republic . . . [to] change the demog-
raphy of Darfur and make it void of African tribes . . . [through] killing, burning villages
and farms, terrorizing people, confiscating property from members of African tribes
and forcing them from Darfur.55
I am perplexed that Alex de Waal, in Part 2 of his careful argument, states that ‘‘if the
UN Security Council were to decide that a deferral [of the case against Bashir] is in
the interests of peace and security, it would be better to make that decision uncondi-
tionally. This not only preserves the independence of the court but also leaves open
the option of lifting the deferral unconditionally, avoiding any obligation of negotiat-
ing over whether political conditions have been met.’’ de Waal probably means that if
the Security Council were to defer the case under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, it
should do so for twelve months unconditionally. But Article 16 actually provides that
renewal of a deferral may be made ‘‘under the same conditions.’’
The important point, and I am sure that Alex de Waal would agree, is that there
should be no impunity for the terrible crimes committed by Omar al-Bashir and his
regime in Darfur. Eventually, to quote Luis Moreno-Ocampo, al-Bashir and his hench-
men must ‘‘end up in the dock.’’
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The UN International Commission
of Inquiry on Darfur: New and
Disturbing Findings
Samuel Totten
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Following a US referral of the Darfur crisis to the United Nations, the UN under-
took the UN Commission of Inquiry into Darfur. In late January 2005, following
an analysis of the data collected by the UN’s COI team, the UN declared that while
it found crimes against humanity had been committed by the government of Sudan
(GoS) and the Janjaweed (Arab militia), it did not find evidence that the GoS had
perpetrated genocide. Herein, Samuel Totten, argues that a correct analysis of the
data collected by the COI team would have been genocide. In addition to offering a
critique of the COI’s analysis, Totten is critical of the hurried, unsystematic, and
underfunded investigation.
Key words: crimes against humanity, Darfur, genocide, government of Sudan, Janja-
weed, UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Introduction
This article presents a critical analysis of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry
(COI) into the conflict in Darfur—a conflict in which government of Sudan (GoS)
troops and Janjaweed (Arab militia) carried out a scorched-earth policy that resulted
in the deaths of tens of thousands of people and the displacement of well over two and
a half million people from their villages and homes. Following the delineation of key
background information vis-a`-vis the inquiry, the major finding of the COI is dis-
cussed: that crimes against humanity had been perpetrated in Darfur but not geno-
cide. Arguing from the position that genocide had, in fact, been perpetrated, I analyze
three possibilities as to why the COI did not come to a finding of genocide: politics, a
sloppy and incomplete investigation, and an inadequate analysis of the facts.
Background to the Commission of Inquiry into Darfur
Following a US State Department-sponsored investigation in which over 1,100 black
African refugees from Darfur were interviewed in refugee camps along the Chad/
Darfur border, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared, on 9 September 2004,
that ‘‘based on a consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities—killings, rapes,
burning of villages—committed by the Janjaweed and government [of Sudan] forces
against non-Arab villagers’’ [Massaleit, Zaghawa and Fur], the State Department
had concluded that ‘‘genocide has been committed—and genocide may still be occur-
ring.’’1 Subsequently, the US referred the matter to the United Nations and called on
it to undertake ‘‘a full-blown and unfettered investigation.’’2
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Coun-
cil, on 18 September 2004, adopted Resolution 1564 which called on UN Secretary
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General Kofi Annan ‘‘to rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in
order to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of
genocide have occurred.’’3
In October 2004, Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed the Commission of
Inquiry, naming as chairperson Antonio Cassese, the former president of the UN’s
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Annan asked that
the members of the COI provide him with a report of their findings within three
months’ time.
The COI’s team comprised thirteen members: a chief investigator, four additional
investigators; two female investigators ‘‘with a specialty in gender violence’’;4 four
forensic experts; and two military analysts. Various commission members and com-
mission staff were also involved in visits to Sudan, Chad, and other parts of the
region. Ultimately, the data collected by the COI team were analyzed by the COI
Commission members, with the assistance of five legal researchers and one political
affairs officer.
Unlike the United States Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP), which was
limited to conducting its investigation in refugee camps in Chad, the COI conducted
a far broader investigation that included the three states of Darfur (including towns,
villages, and internally displaced persons camps); Khartoum, the capital of Sudan;
refugee camps in Chad; Eritrea (in order to meet with representatives of two rebel
groups—the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army [SLM/A] and the Justice and
Equality Movement [JEM]); and Addis Ababa (in order to meet with officials of the
African Union).
The COI team carried out its investigation in November and December 2004 and
January 2005. Over and above determining whether or not acts of genocide had been
perpetrated, the Commission’s mandate included three other major tasks: ‘‘to investi-
gate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in
Darfur by all parties; to identity the perpetrators of violations of international human-
itarian law and human rights law; and to suggest means of ensuring that those re-
sponsible for such violations are held accountable.’’5
Major UN COI Finding—Crimes against Humanity, Not Genocide
Based on its investigation and analysis of the data collected, the COI came to the
determination that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for
carrying out a scorched earth policy in Darfur. In doing so, the COI concluded that
GoS forces and the Janjaweed
conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced dis-
appearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging
and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a wide-
spread adsystematic basis, and therefore amount to crimes against humanity. The ex-
tensive destruction and displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of
survival for countless women, men and children. The vast majority of the victims of all
of these violations have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Masaslit, Jebel, Aranga, and
other so-called African tribes.6
In its report, the COI delineated a battery of criminal acts perpetrated by the GoS and
the Janjaweed, including but not limited to the following:
e ‘‘According to some estimates over 700 villages in all three states of Darfur
have been completely or partially destroyed. The Commission further received
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information that the [local] police had made an assessment of the destruction
and recorded the number of destroyed villages at over 2000.’’7e ‘‘Many villages are said to have been attacked more than once, until they were
completely destroyed.’’8e Unlike the black African tribes, most of the other tribes in the area—the Arab
tribes—‘‘have not been targeted, if targeted at all.’’9e Attacks involved air bombardments and the use of Mi-8 helicopters, Mi-24
helicopters, and Antonov aircraft.10e ‘‘The large number of killings, the apparent pattern of killing . . . including
the targeting of persons belonging to African tribes and the participation of
officials or authorities are amongst the factors that led the Commission to the
conclusion that killings were conducted in both a widespread and systematic
manner.’’11e Many of the attacks involved the killing of civilians, including women and
children.12e There was widespread rape and other serious forms of violence committed
against women and girls in all three states of Darfur.13e ‘‘In addition to homes, all essential structures and implements for the survival
of the population were also destroyed. Oil presses, flour mills, water sources
such as wells and pumps, crops and vegetation and almost all household
utensils were found scorched or smashed at the sites inspected.’’14e ‘‘The Janjaweed took everything [the Black Africans] owned, involving all goods
necessary to sustain life in the difficult conditions in Darfur, including . . .
livestock, representing the key source of income of the affected people.’’15e ‘‘[T]he Commission finds that pillaging, being conducted on a systematic as well
as a widespread basis mainly against African tribes, was discriminatory and
calculated to bring about the destruction of livelihoods and the means of
survival of the affected populations.’’16e Black African females were forced to ‘‘take off their maxi (large piece of cloth-
ing covering the entire body), and if they [the perpetrators] found that they
were holding their young sons under them, they would kill the boys.’’17
(UNCOI, 2005, paragraph 272)e In certain instances, the GoS and Janjaweed carried out large scale massacres
of men (reportedly ‘‘mainly intellectuals and leaders’’).18e Black African civilians were killed after they reached IDP camps.19
In light of the fact that it seems apparent that the the GoS and Janjaweed carried
out such atrocities with the intent, at least to a certain extent, to destroy the black
Africans of Darfur in whole or in part, numerous scholars and human rights acti-
vists20 have questioned why and how the COI concluded, based on the evidence it
collected, that the GoS did not ‘‘pursue a policy of genocide.’’21 That is not to say that
the COI neglected to provide a rationale for its determination, for it did (see below);
rather, for many, the rationale was not convincing and thus questions have been
raised about the logic of (and/or politics and/or bias behind) the rationale vis-a`-vis the
final determination.
A Determination That Was Possibly Politically Influenced and/or Biased
Some scholars suspect that Egypt might have been, at least in part, behind the COI’s
determination that the GoS had not perpetrated genocide in Darfur.22 First, they
note, Egypt vigorously defended Sudan’s sovereignty despite the atrocities perpe-
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trated by GoS troops and the Janjaweed in Darfur; and second, a powerful and
influential Egyptian, Mr. Mohammed Fayek, was one of the five COI Commissioners.
Eric Reeves spelled out some of the main concerns that have been voiced about
Egypt and its relationship with Sudan as it relates to the crisis in Darfur:
Few countries have provided more diplomatic or political cover for the NIF regime
[than Egypt], particularly in its efforts to forestall humanitarian intervention. Cairo
has offered an unqualified defense of Sudan’s claim to national sovereignty (Egyptian
Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit insisted last month that Khartoum would have
to approve the dispatch of U.N. troops to Darfur). And so long as Khartoum can count
on Egyptian support, it can count on support from the Arab League as a whole. The
group has served mainly as an extension of Egyptian foreign policy (it was no surprise
last week when former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa was named to a second
five-year term as secretary general).23
Whether or not Egypt or Fayek actually influenced the COI determination is hardly
conclusive, but that is not to say that it didn’t happen. Additional digging among re-
searchers is needed before such a conclusion can be made.
On a different note, at least one major figure with the COI, Antonio Cassese,
seemingly had a preconceived notion as to what the data collected by the COI would
add up to in the end. Whether it was a politically motivated opinion or a quick and
dirty analysis on his part is hard to tell. More specifically, Debb Bodkin, a police
officer based in Canada and the only person who served as an investigator with the
US Atrocities Documentation Project and the UN’s COI, told this author that while
the COI team was in Geneva for its initial briefing prior to flying to Darfur, Antonio
Cassese seemingly suggested that the COI would not result in a finding of genocide.
In regard to this matter, Bodkin reported the following:
Commissioner Antonio Cassese, who had traveled to Khartoum and some parts of
Darfur for a few days and had conducted some interviews, stated that he felt that we
would find that there were two elements of genocide missing: (A) target group (assert-
ing that the victims were from mixed tribes, not a single one) and (B) mens rea (the
actual intent to destroy in whole or in part). He talked for a while and my personal
opinion was that he was telling us that the outcome of the investigation would show
that it was not genocide, which was occurring. He did not specify how long he had
visited or how many interviews he had conducted but I don’t believe either was
extensive. I felt it was very inappropriate for him to plant this opinion in the investiga-
tors’ minds prior to starting the investigation and other investigators felt uncomfort-
able about it as well.24
It is possible, of course, that Cassese was simply offering a casual hypothesis with
no intention of swaying the investigators’ thoughts and actions. Whether or not that
was the case, it was not a wise way to begin an investigation in which objectivity
should have been paramount. No matter what, it raises a red flag in regard to how
the data were ultimately analyzed and whether the COI (or at least certain members
of the team responsible for conducting an analysis of the data) was, in one way or
another, biased against a determination of genocide. If such a bias existed, then the
investigation was compromised from the start.
A Rushed and Seemingly Unsystematic Investigation
Based on a careful reading of the COI report and a first-person report by one of the
COI investigators there is no doubt that the investigation was understaffed, hurried,
and rather unsystematic.
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At the outset of the COI report, the authors comment on the constraints faced by
the investigatory team:
There is no denying that while the various task assigned to the Commission are com-
plex and unique, the Commission was called upon to discharge them under difficult
conditions. First of all, it operated under serious time constraints. [Second,] given
that the Security Council had decided that the Commission must act urgently, the
Secretary-General requested that the Commission report to him within three months
of its establishment. The fulfillment of its complex tasks, in particular those concerning
the findings of serious violations and the identification of perpetrators, required the
Commission to work intensely and under heavy time pressure.25
This statement raises a host of critical issues that not only call into question the seri-
ousness with which the UN undertook its investigation and its commitment to truly
discovering the full extent of the nature of the crimes committed by the GoS and the
Janjaweed, but, ultimately, the validity of the Commission’s findings. In light of the
seriousness of the investigation (ascertaining whether genocide had been perpetrated
or not), it is unfathomable why the investigatory team would be forced to work under
‘‘serious time constraints’’ and under ‘‘heavy time pressure.’’26 From the very outset,
both Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Commissioners had to know that a rushed
investigation would result in an incomplete study. As cynical as it sounds, one has to
question whether that was the intent.
A key question that arises is: Why was there was such a rush to complete the
investigation?27 This is a major concern, particularly in light of the fact that the UN
ostensibly did not perceive a need to undertake the investigation until prodded to do
so by the United States (in other words, the UN was hardly proactive in this regard).28
If such an investigation was so critical to conduct—and in such a timely fashion—
then why wasn’t it undertaken a lot sooner? Indeed, why did the UN wait until until
two years into the crisis, by which time an estimated 180,000 plus people had already
been killed and over 1 million people had been forced from their villages into IDP or
refugee camps?29
Furthermore, it is a fact that once the investigation was completed, the UN did
not show a real sense of urgency in prodding the GoS to halt the killing, and
ongoing rape. Yes, it passed one resolution after another, but it could not seem to
find the political will to force the GoS to comply with key UN requests and demands
inherent in the resolutions.30 And while some sanctions were issued, they were rela-
tively soft sanctions and hardly implemented in a way that spoke to their seriousness.
The UN also did not display a sense of urgency in attempting to find a way to provide
real protection for the black Africans of Darfur—not for those still residing in villages
or for those eking out a mean existence in IDP camps, both of which continued to be
viciously attacked by the GoS and the Janjaweed over the years.31
On a related note, the COI report states that ‘‘both [the COI’s] fact-finding mission
and its task of identifying perpetrators would have benefited from the assistance of a
great number32 of investigators, lawyers, military analysts, and forensic experts. The
Commission’s budget, [however,] did not allow for more than thirteen such experts.’’33
It is not a little perplexing as to why such a significant undertaking was underfunded
to the point that it could not hire the full complement of experts needed to carry out
the most comprehensive investigation possible. Such a lack of funding calls into ques-
tion the seriousness of UN officials vis-a`-vis their commitment to protect people facing
potential and actual death and rape at the hands of those who commit crimes against
humanity and genocide. For all of the promises of ‘‘never again!’’; all of the UN-issued
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reports and statements on the need to prevent genocide and protect people from be-
coming victims of genocide;34 all the meetings, conferences, and summits by UN offi-
cials in Khartoum, Darfur, Addis Ababa, and Abuja over the years (and all of the costs
incurred for such), it seems as if the UN could have come up with enough funding
to conduct a comprehensive investigation with enough experts to do the job right.
Instead, what the UN ended up doing was conducting an investigation on the cheap,
thus neglecting to collect all the data it could or should have due to self-imposed time
constraints that were exacerbated by an inadequate number of personnel and funding
dedicated to the effort. Seemingly, it was a classic case of ‘‘fiddling while Rome—read
Darfur—burns,’’ literally!35
Ultimately, the lack of funding also calls into question just how serious the UN
was in regard to not only carrying out a thorough investigation but meeting its stated
goal of ascertaining whether or not genocide had been perpetrated against the black
Africans. Everyone is well aware of the huge UN expenditures to keep its bureaucrats
well paid, situated in nice offices in beautiful cities, housed in nice and costly abodes,
and chauffered in comfortable and expensive vehicles. Surely, for an investigation
whose focus was to ascertain whether genocide was taking place, adequate funding
could have been found if there was the will to do so.
Another concern is how the actual investigation was undertaken—that is, how the
investigators were prepared to undertake the interviews, whether the investigators
were expected to ask the same questions of all like actors (meaning, using one set
of questions for internally displaced persons, another set for Sudanese officials, and
still another for members of the rebel groups). Again, Debb Bodkin provides valuable
insights into such concerns:
During our briefing [about the COI] in Geneva, we were given no format or indication
as to how the investigation and interviews were to be conducted. As a result, every
investigator conducted his/her investigation and interviews in whatever fashion he/
she preferred. I cannot believe that with the vast difference in expertise of each in-
vestigator there would be any semblance of consistency in regard to the gathering of
evidence . . . The UN investigation did not provide any parameters whatsoever and an
untrained interviewer could easily have asked questions in a manner that would have
elicited whatever response he or she hoped to obtain.36
Again, it is unfathomable as to why a single questionnaire was not developed and
printed by the COI so that each investigator had the same set(s) of questions to ask
specific members of a group throughout the investigation.37 Having a single set of
questions for each group of interviewees would not, of course, have precluded investi-
gators from asking interviewees follow-up questions. Allowing each investigator, how-
ever, to ask his/her own questions, as the COI did, is likely to have resulted in a mish-
mash of information (whether this was the result or not is unknown for the COI report
does not comment on this matter), possibly resulting in a situation in which the full
range of human rights violations were not reported, and critical information about
ethnic slurs and threats issued by the perpetrators during the attacks possibly under-
reported and/or not even collected by certain investigators.
As for the directives provided the COI investigators, Bodkin reports that
Because I had never been involved in a UN investigation before I truly didn’t know
what was going on. We were never instructed to be anywhere at certain times so when
briefings did occur, some investigators were there and some were not . . . A few of us
took notes during the briefings, but many did not. So, as far as everyone being on the
same page about everything, impossible.38
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According to Bodkin, the briefings did not address the need to collect information
about any epithets made by the GOS troops and/or the Janjaweed during their attacks
on the black Africans. The collection of such information is, however, critical in help-
ing to establish what the perpetrators’ thoughts, purposes, and animus were toward
specific groups under attack—all of which could help to establish whether such
attacks were being perpetrated against a group as a result of their ethnicity, race,
and so on. In regard to the issue of racial epithets, Bodkin commented as follows:
I do not recall anything about the need to collect information regarding racial epithets.
But I believe that it definitely should have been. I noted [such information] in a num-
ber of my interviews because I realized the importance due to the CIJ [Coalition of
International Justice, which organized and carried out the U.S. State Department’s
ADP in Chad in July and August of 2004] questionnaire. However, I presume many of
the investigators did not know to ask a question about such matters.39
Bodkin also pointed out that once in the field, each investigator was open to choose
who they interviewed and how.40 That included asking any questions that they
thought particularly pertinent, but not asking the same set of questions.
Finally, a problem arose in regard to the background of some of the interpreters
the COI hired for the investigation. The UN reportedly hired interpreters from Arab
tribes, so the investigators had to convince the victims whom they were interviewing
that it was safe for them to speak in front of the interpreters.41 This matter, alone,
could have greatly influenced the information (or lack thereof ) collected by the COI
investigators. It is very possible that, out of fear of being reported to the GoS author-
ities, the victims were not as forthcoming about various matters as they might have
been had they had more trust that their words would not be used against them at
some future point in time. Knowing full well that the victims were being attacked by
a government that favored the Arab population and that there was a distinct possibil-
ity that some interpreters could be in the pocket of the GoS, it makes no sense at all
for the UN to have hired Arabs as interpreters.
A Shoddy or Skewed Analysis?
Since the express purpose of the UN’s Commission of Inquiry in Darfur was to ascertain
whether or not the government of Sudan had perpetrated genocide against the black
Africans of Darfur, this section focuses on the evidence collected by the COI, the analy-
sis of the evidence, and the rationale used in making the determination that crimes
against humanity, not genocide, had been perpetrated in Darfur.42 Under the heading
entitled ‘‘Have Acts of Genocide Occurred?’’ the authors of the report state the following:
The Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy
of genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced from the gross viola-
tions of human rights perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their
control. These two elements are, first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing
serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring
about physical destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard, the exis-
tence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal conduct. However,
the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the cen-
tral government authorities are concerned. Generally speaking the policy of attacking,
killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent
to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or
religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks
on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes primarily for the
purpose of counter-insurgency warfare.43
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Prior to addressing the issue of intent, there is a need to address the problematic
nature of the following assertion in the above statement: ‘‘the crucial element of geno-
cidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central government authorities
are concerned.’’44 The problem is that the COI was not given the sole task of determin-
ing whether or not the GoS committed genocide. It was responsible for investigating
‘‘reports of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur
by all parties, [and] to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred.’’45
What, then, about the Janjaweed and their actions? Did their actions amount to geno-
cide? The way in which the language is couched, it sounds as if the Commissioners are
suggesting that that is a distinct possibility. If the Commissioners believed that the
Janjaweed were responsible for genocidal actions, if not outright genocide, then that
should have been boldly and clearly stated in the report.46
Furthermore, if the Janjaweed did commit genocide then the GoS is still culpable
because the Janjaweed were recruited, outfitted, and paid by the GOS to help carry
out the attacks.47 This goes directly to the issue of command responsibility.48
Concomitantly, since the Janjaweed and GoS worked hand-in-hand in carrying
out a vast majority of the attacks, there is no way—without outright lying—that the
government can claim it did not know what the Janjaweed were doing throughout
2003 to early 2005. Concomitantly, the GoS cannot—at least not legitimately—blame
the attacks on the Janjaweed alone. Not only were the hundreds of attacks largely
carried out in the same fashion, but Janjaweed frequently rode on GoS vehicles
(Land-Cruisers) during the attacks. So, it must be asked, did the COI purposely avoid
accusing the Janjaweed of genocide in order to avoid casting aspersions on the GoS? If
so, that constitutes simply one more flaw in the COI’s determination that genocide
had not been perpetrated in Darfur.
Now for the issue of intent. Again, the key question is this: Was there the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such?
There is no doubt that the issue of intent is, generally, the stickiest issue in determin-
ing whether or not genocide has been perpetrated.49
Most ge´nocidaires are wily enough not to leave a written or oral record of their in-
tentions. Indeed, most know better than to record their genocidal intentions in formal
government records or statements, issue their genocidal directives via written orders,
broadcast directives over radio and television (unless they simply do not care and/or
are intent on calling on all actors to take part in the killing, as was the case in
Rwanda in 1994 when Radio-Television Mille Collines urged all Hutu to kill all Tutsi).
But, it is also true that intent can be ascertained from the events unfolding on the
ground. For example, the ICC Elements of Crimes states that ‘‘existence of intent
and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.’’50
After asserting that ‘‘the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing mem-
bers of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a
group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds,’’ the COI goes on
to argue that the main purpose of the GoS was to drive the black Africans from their
homes and villages ‘‘primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.’’51 As part
and parcel of explaining its determination, the COI report goes into great detail as to
what could constitute proof of genocidal intent. In doing so, it cites various cases at
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). For example, it states that ‘‘whenever
direct evidence of genocidal intent is lacking, as is mostly the case, this intent can be
inferred from many acts and manifestations or factual circumstances.’’52 Further-
more, in the Jelisic case at the ICTY, the appeals chamber noted that
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as to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of direct explicit evidence, be
inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general context, the
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group,
the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory
acts.53
The report goes on to say,
A number of factors from which intent may be inferred were mentioned in Akayesu
523–4: ‘‘the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group where . . . committed by the same offender or by
others’’; ‘‘the scale of atrocities committed’’; the ‘‘general nature’’ of the atrocities com-
mitted ‘‘in a region or a country’’; ‘‘the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting
victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the mem-
bers of other groups’’; ‘‘the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts’’; ‘‘the
repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts’’ or ‘‘the perpetration of acts which
violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate, the very foundations
of the group—acts which are not in themselves covered by the list . . . but which are com-
mitted as part of the same pattern of conduct, in Musema (166) as well as Kayishema
and Ruzindana (93 and 527): ‘‘the number of group members affected’’; ‘‘the physical
targeting of the group or their property’’; ‘‘the use of derogatory language toward mem-
bers of the targeted group’’; ‘‘the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury’’;
‘‘the methodical way of planning’’; ‘‘the systematic manner of killing’’ and the propor-
tionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of a group.’’54
A number of these factors were evident during the course of events involving the GoS
troops and the Janjaweed in Darfur between 2003 and January 2005, which I outline
here:
1. The perpetration of culpable acts systematically directed against the same
group committed by the same offender or by others
Over and above the systematic bombings and shootings of the black Africans by the
perpetrators, the perpetrators committed the following acts time and again in a fairly
systematic manner between early 2003 and early 2005: (1) poisoned wells by throwing
dead human bodies and/or the carcasses of animals into them, which, in certain areas
of Darfur that reach 90 to 130 degrees Farenheit, constitutes an effort to deprive the
people of a basic source of sustenance; (2) blocked humanitarian aid from entering
internally displaced persons camps, thus preventing desperately needed food, water,
and medical supplies from reaching those in dire need; and (3) raped an untold num-
ber of girls and women.55
2. Scale of atrocities committed
The estmate of the number of those killed as a result of bombings, shootings, or stab-
bings and as a result of a lack of water or medical treatment after having been
wounded ranged from a low of 120,000 to a high of 400,000.56 The UN largely settled
on the number of 200,000.57 Since the government of Sudan continually blocked
efforts by researchers to enter Darfur, it was (and continues to be) impossible to
make an exact determination of the number who perished as a result of the attacks.
While the number of black Africans who had been killed by the time of the COI inves-
tigation was certainly much, much lower than those who died in the Holocaust, Cam-
bodia, or Rwanda, close to a quarter of a million dead is not insignificant.
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3. The systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a
particular group
It is irrefutable that the GOS and the Janjaweed targeted, specifically and solely, the
black Africans of Darfur (particularly the Massaleit, Zaghawa, and the Fur). Hun-
dreds upon hundreds of their villages were attacked, looted, and burned to the ground
and their crops and orchards were destroyed. Black African villagers reported seeing
and hearing attacks on villages miles away, knowing that it was only a matter of time
before their own village would be attacked in much the same way (and that is exactly
what happened). Month after month throughout 2003, 2004, and early 2005, attacks
were carried out on a regular basis against black African villages, while their non-
black African neighbors were largely unscathed.58
Concomitantly, in one attack after another, black African females (some as young
as eight years old) were raped and gang-raped by the Janjaweed and the GoS troops,
thus constituting another aspect of ‘‘the systematic targeting of victims on account of
their membership of a particular group.’’
4. The general political doctrine that gave rise to the acts
It is well known that the government of Sudan is an adherent of so-called Arab
supremacism and supportive of the Arab Gathering. More specifically,
In Darfur, the first signs of an Arab racist ideology emerged in the early 1980s . . .
Around this time, leaflets and cassette recordings purporting to come from a group call-
ing itself the Arab Gathering began to be distributed anonymously, proclaiming that
the zurga [a derogatory term equivalent to the word ‘‘nigger’’ that is used by some to
debase black Africans] had ruled Darfur long enough and it was time for Arabs to
have their turn. The speakers claimed that Arabs constituted a majority in Darfur
and should therefore prepare themselves to take over the regional government—by
force if necessary . . . The notion of Arab superiority had been a feature of northern
Sudanese society for centuries, but this was something new. This was militant and
inflammatory.59
5. The perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves
consider to violate, the very foundations of the group [and] which are
committed as part of the same pattern of conduct
Three main acts perpetrated by GoS troops and the Janjaweed are germane to this
issue: the mass rape of black African females, the poisoning of the wells, and the effort
to block humanitarian goods from reaching those in internally displaced persons
camps. Individual rape, mass rape, and other types of sexual violence by GOS forces
and the Janjaweed against black African females, both during the attacks on villages
and on females venturing outside of IDP camps, were regular occurrences.60
Furthermore, a great amount of testimony collected by the ADP, various human
rights groups, and the press attest to the fact that comments made by the rapists sug-
gest that the rape was perpetrated, at least in part, as a direct attack on the racial
and ethnic identities of the black African females. More specifically, various black
African survivors have reported the following:
It happened last August [2004] when we were in our farms outside the village [in West
Darfur]. We [three black African women, ages 25, 30, and 40] saw five Arab men who
came to us . . . [They] told us that we should have sex with them. We said no. So they
beat and raped us. After they abused us, they told us that now we would have Arab
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babies; and if they would find any Fur woman, they would rape them, [too,] to change
the colour of their children.61 In the town of Mukjara, two men separately described
women being brought into a prison where they were being held and raped for hours by
Janjaweed. They said the assailants said that they were ‘‘planting tomatoes’’—the
reference to skin red’’ because they are slightly lighter-skinned than ethnic Africans.62
A Fur male reported that in December 2003, a few months before his village in West
Darfur (near El Geneina) was attacked, Janjaweed raped his daughter and two other
girls (ages 14, 15, 16) and said, ‘‘We will take your women and make them ours. We
will change the race.’’63 During a ground attack in western Darfur (near Seleya) in
November 2003, a Eregnan man reported hearing, ‘‘We will kill all men and rape
women. We want to change the color. Every woman will deliver red. Arabs [will be]
the husbands of those women.’’64
The perpetrators knew that by raping female black Africans they were creating
pariahs who would be shunned by their families and fellow villagers; that young girls
and women who were not married would be hard pressed to find husbands as a result
of having been defiled; and that any babies born of the rapes would result in ‘‘red’’ or
‘‘lighter’’ babies who would not be considered black African but Arab and that they,
too, would be considered pariahs within the larger community.65
In discussing the the ostensible reasons or purposes for the perpetration of the
mass and gang rapes, the COI concluded: ‘‘The patterns appear to indicate that rape
and sexual violence have been used by the Janjaweed and Government soldiers (or at
least with their complicity) as a delibrate strategy with a view to achieve certain
objectives including terrorizing the population, ensuring control over the movement
of the IDP population and perpetuating its displacement. [Certain cases] demonstrate
that rape was used as a means to demoralize and humiliate the population.’’66 It is
astonishing that the Commissioners limited the possible purposes of the mass and
gang rape of the black African females to the above. More specifically, issuing racial
slurs (and threats to make ‘‘lighter’’ and ‘‘red babies’’) during the mass rape of the
black African females, making threats to exterminate all of the black Africans as
they raped the black African females, and perpetrating mass rape knowing full well
the stigma attached to a female who has been raped in a Muslim society all suggest
that the perpetrators did, in fact, have the intent, to destroy, at least in part, a specific
group of people.
Furthermore, in all likelihood, girls and women who have been raped by a GoS
soldier or a Janjaweed, if not a horde of rapists, suffer each and every day of their lives
as a result of being raped. Indeed, one has to wonder how they even manage to go on
with daily life having both been raped (not once, which is horrific enough, but often
gang raped many times over for days and weeks on end) and forced to witness the
rape of other girls and women (including their mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts).
The COI, itself, provides information about a victim who was raped ‘‘14 times over the
period of one week.’’67 If the latter situation (and others like it) is not likely to ‘‘caus[e]
serious . . . mental harm to members of the group,’’68 then what is?
In regard to the GoS’s response to the mass rape in Darfur, the Commissioners state
that ‘‘on their part, the [GoS] authorities failed to address the allegations of rape ade-
quately or effectively.’’69 Unfortunately, and ironically, the very same accusation can,
and should, be made of the COI. This is true because the Commissioners certainly had
to be cognizant of all of the above information (i.e, the racial slurs, the threats to make
different color babies, the threats to exterminate the black African people, the stimga
attached to rape in such a culture, and the killing of the babies), and at least be some-
what aware of how the trauma of being raped never subsides in a victim’s mind and
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heart (e.g., those who suffer rape may relive the horror of the attack[s], which can result
in crying jags, a sense of violation that never ends, severe and prolonged depression,
the very questioning of the worth of life itself, suicical thoughts, attempts at suicide,
and a fear of being alone and/or around males they do not know).
Tellingly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found Jean-
Paul Akayesu guilty of genocide for overseeing the rape of Tutsi females during the
1994 Rwandan genocide. More specifically, he was convicted on the following grounds:
The rape of Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women
and solely against them. A Tutsi woman, married to a Hutu, testified before the Cham-
ber that she was not raped because her ethnic background was unknown . . . The Inter-
ahamwe who raped Alexia said, as he threw her on the ground and got on top of her,
‘‘let us now see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman tastes like.’’ Akayesu himself, speak-
ing to the Interahamwe who were committing the rapes, said to them: ‘‘don’t ever ask
again what a Tutsi woman tastes like.’’ This sexualized representation of ethnic identity
graphically illustrates that Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they
were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group—
destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself. 70
By substituting the words ‘‘black Africans’’ or ‘‘Massaliet, Zaghawa or Fur’’ for Tutsi
and ‘‘Janjaweed’’ for ‘‘Interahamwe,’’ the explanation aptly describes the intent of the
rapists in Darfur and the resultant horrors experienced by their female victims.71
Ultimately, though, the COI concluded the following:
It is apparent from the information collected and verified by the Commission that rape
or other forms of sexual violence committed by the Janjaweed and Government soldiers
in Darfur was widespread and systematic and may thus well amount to a crime against
humanity . . . It further finds that . . . in some instances the crimes committed in Darfur
may amount to the crime of sexual slavery as a crime against humanity. Futhermore,
the Commission finds that the fact that rape and others forms of sexual violence were
conducted mainly against three ‘‘African’’ tribes is indicative of the discriminatory in-
tent of the perpetrators. The Commission therefore finds that the elements of persecu-
tion as a crime against humanity may also be present.72
When all is said and done, and as delineated above, both the context (e.g., the racial
slurs, the intent to make different color babies, the threats of extermination) and
ramifications of the rapes (the potential and severe ostracism faced by those girls and
women who have been raped at the hands of the GOS troops and Janjaweed, for exam-
ple, outright rejection of the victims by family and community members) are largely
ignored by the COI. Oddly, the very real possibility of contracting and spreading the
AIDS/HIV virus is also ignored. Granted, a final determination by a court as to what
all of this constitutes is needed, but the COI’s stance still leads one to wonder if there
was a purposeful disregard of such contextual issues and their ramifications—as well
as the skirting the fact that, in one way or another, such acts might constitute genocide.
Over and above the mass rape of black African females, there was another
attempt by the GoS troops and Janjaweed to destroy the black Africans in whole or
in part and that was stealing and destroying most of the essentials black Africans
needed for sustaining their lives. The COI report actually comments on this issue:
A particular pattern recorded by the Commission was the fact that the IDPs and refu-
gees interviewed would place great emphasis on the crime of looting, and explain that
the Janjaweed had taken everything these persons had owned, involving all goods
necessary to sustain life in the difficult conditions in Darfur, including pans, cups,
and clothes, as well as livestock, representing the key source of income of the affected
people.73
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The COI report goes on to assert that ‘‘the Commission found that the majority of
cases involving looting were carried out by the Janjaweed and in a few cases by the
Government forces. Looting was mainly carried out against African tribes and usually
targeted property necessary for the survival and livelihood of these tribes.’’74 Thus, even
the COI readily acknowledges that the survival of the black Africans was left in the
balance as a result of such thievery. Such actions seemingly fall under Article 2c of
the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNCG): ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part.’’ Again, though, the COI does not
comment on such actions as they relate or do not relate to the issue of genocide.
Rather, the COI calls the actions ‘‘war crimes’’ and asserts that they possibly consti-
tute ‘‘a form of persecution as a crime against humanity.’’75 It just does not seem
that the concept/crime of genocide was within the worldview of the COI.76
6. The methodical planning of the attacks and atrocities
There are numerous indications that the planning by the GoS and Janjaweed was
methodical. First, time and again, the attacks were generally carried out in the same
manner against hundreds of villages all over Darfur.77 Someone had to plan the flight
patterns and arrivals of the Antonovs and helicopter gunships and synchronize the
arrival of the Antonovs and gunships with that of the Janjaweed on horseback and
camels and the GoS and Janjaweed on land cruisers. Furthermore, in some cases,
villagers reported being tricked into toting all of their worldly goods to a central loca-
tion purportedly to be taxed only to be attacked by the GoS and Janjaweed, which
allowed for quick and easy theft of all the black African’s goods. This happened to
one village and town after another on designated days.78 Finally, there is ample evi-
dence that the GoS has whitewashed planes and affixed UN insignias on such planes
in order to offload both men and materiel in Darfur. Again, such flights take coordina-
tion and planning.
7. Systematic manner of killing
Ample documentation exists that shows the killings took place day after day, week
after week, and month after month in the three states of Darfur.79 Furthermore, a
vast majority of the attacks generally followed the same pattern with Antonovs bomb-
ing the fields and villages of black Africans early in the morning, which were followed
up by hundreds of Janjaweed racing into villages on camels and horses and then GoS
soldiers (often accompanied by Janjaweed) on four wheel vehicles and dushkas (four
wheel vehicles with mounted automatic weapons). During the initial part of the
attacks, men and older boys were often the target of killing while women and girls
were often raped. Almost at once, the villages were ransacked and then torched as
the black Africans were chased out into the forbidding hinterland. Before leaving the
villages, the perpetrators often tossed the carcasses of dead animals and the bodies
of dead black Africans into the wells in order to poison the water. In certain cases,
black African men were rounded up and killed en masse in various areas such as in
Mukjar.80
So, those are the hard facts. In light of the hurried nature of the COI investigation, it
is natural to wonder about how much time, care and depth of thought went into the
analysis of the data collected by the COI team and how much care and thought went
into wrestling with what the findings added up to in the end. No one but those who
conducted the analysis knows for sure, but this is what Bodkin had to say:
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First, there is absolutely no way that there was any sort of consistent body of informa-
tion submitted to the Commissioners. Also, in my humble opinion, unless they stayed
awake 24 hours a day from Jan. 19–31 to read all the reports that we submitted, I do
not see how the five Commissioners actually went through all of the information. It
angered me so much when I read the report that I can honestly say I have never gotten
through it in its entirety. Is HOGWASH a known legal term?81
Ultimately, in light of so much evidence that suggests the GoS and the Janjaweed
were intent on destroying in whole or in part the black Africans, the major question
that remains is: Exactly what sort of policy, evidence, and actions would evince—for
the COI Commissioners—a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group dis-
tinguished on racial, ethnic, national, or religious grounds? More deaths? More racial
and ethnic slurs? More wells poisoned? More humanitarian goods stolen or prevented
from reaching those who are destitute, dying, and internally displaced? A smoking
gun? The COI does not say.
The COI’s Skewed Rationale for Not Coming to a
Determination of Genocide
In a section entitled ‘‘Do the Crimes Perpetrated in Darfur Constitute Acts of Geno-
cide,’’ the COI report provides a rationale for its determination that the GOS troops
and Janjaweed had not committed genocide. It opens with the following:
There is no doubt that some of the objective elements of genocide materialized in Darfur.
. . . The Commission has collected substantial and reliable materials which tends to
show the occurrence of systematic killing of civilians belonging to particular tribes, of
large-scale causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the population
belonging to certain tribes, and of massive and deliberate infliction on those tribes of
conditions of life bringing about their physical destruction in whole or in part (for exam-
ple by systematically destroying their villages and crops, by expelling them from their
homes, and by looting their cattle).82
However, it then goes on to assert the following:
Some elements emerging from the facts including the scale of atrocities and the system-
atic nature of the attacks, killing, displacement and rape, as well as racially motivated
statements by perpetrators that have targeted members of the African tribes only, could
be indicative of the genocidal intent. However, there are other more indicative elements
that show the lack of genocidal intent.83
Ironically, while the evidence produced by the COI indicating genocidal intent is
strong and convincing, the ‘‘evidence’’ it produces to question genocidal intent verges
on the absurd. More specifically, the COI notes and argues: ‘‘[It is a] fact that in a
number of villages attacked and burned by both militias and Government forces the
attackers refrained from exterminating the whole population that had not fled, but
instead selectively killed groups of young men . . .’’84 This line of thinking makes it
seem as if the COI is totally ignorant of the UNCG definition of genocide and its word-
ing, which states: ‘‘In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such.’’85 No genocide in modern times has resulted in extermi-
nating the whole population—not the Armenian genocide, not the Holocaust, not the
Cambodian genocide, not the Rwandan genocide. The COI also infers that the only
individuals targeted for death were rebels or potential rebels, but there is ample
evidence that everyone from infants to 100-plus-year-old men (and everyone in
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between—girls, women, young boys) were killed; and individuals who were black
Africans were targeted and killed as well.86
Continuing its argument, the COI next provides what it perceives as an example
of the GoS’s lack of intent to commit genocide against a group (in this case an ethnic
group) protected under the UNCG. More specifically, it cites an attack in January
2004 in which the perpetrators rounded up all those black Africans who had survived
the attack and not escaped into the mountains and desert. Scanning a list with nu-
merous names, the perpetrators selected fifteen individuals, including seven omdas,87
and killed them outright. Later, the perpetrators killed another 205 villagers who
they asserted were rebels. Reportedly, they allowed some 800 others to remain alive.
Subsequently, the COI argues that ‘‘[t]his case clearly shows that the intent of the
attack was not to destroy an ethnic group as such, or part of the group. Instead, the
intention was to murder all those men they considered as rebels, as well as forcibly
expel the whole population so as to vacate the villages and prevent rebels from hiding
among, or getting support from, the local population.’’88 This line of thinking is faulty
on several counts. First, the COI seems to take at face value the assertion by the GoS
that those who were murdered were rebels. Time and again, the GoS has shown its
true colors by lying to the international community, its own people, representatives
of different states, and the press, among others. It has, for example, repeatedly denied
its responsibility for the ongoing crisis in Darfur;89 denied that it carried out ethnic
cleansing or atrocities approaching extermination;90 and denied that it backs the
Arab militias.91 It has also repeatedly and drastically minimized the number of dead
in Darfur. So, why anyone, let alone an investigatory group attempting to ascertain
whether the GoS had perpetrated genocide or not, would rely on assertions by GoS
personnel is baffling.
Furthermore, as Fowler cogently argues, ‘‘The Commission’s reference to the fact
that the perpetrators did not ‘exterminat[e] the whole population’ is puzzling . . . The
Commission itself had explained in a previous paragraph that international case law
establishes that ‘the intent to destroy a group in part’ requires the intention to destroy
a ‘considerable number or individuals’ or ‘a substantial part . . .’92 The Commis-
sion failed to offer any reason why two hundred twenty-seven out of twelve hundred
[actually, it was out of just over 1,000] is neither a ‘considerable number of indivi-
duals’ (in relation to that sample) nor ‘a substantial part’ of that sample, especially
when the community leadership was particularly targeted.’’93
Fowler also addresses the COI’s assertion that the GOS’s primary objective was to
kill rebels and force those who were suspected of harboring rebels out of the area:
[T]he Commission . . . distinguished[ed] between ‘‘the intent to destroy an ethnic group
as such’’ and ‘‘the intention to murder all those men they considered to be rebels . . . ,’’
[y]et, on just the previous page, the Commission had included a number of quotes in
which the perpetrators used ethnic identity, racial epithets, and terms like Torabora
(slang for rebels) interchangeably. The whole point of the government’s campaign
against the civilian population of the the non-Arab ethnic groups was equating ethnic-
ity with rebellion, rendering it nonsensical to distinguish an intent to destroy those
ethnic groups from an intent to murder rebels. The targets were, by the Government’s
apparent definition, one and the same.94
According to the COI, the second element that demonstrates the GOS’s lack of
genocidal intent was that after the black Africans’ villages were destroyed the black
African survivors were ‘‘collected in IDP camps’’: ‘‘In other words, the population sur-
viving attacks on villages are not killed outright, so as to eradicate the group; they are
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rather forced to abandon their homes and live together in areas selected by the Gov-
ernment.’’95 There are numerous problems with this line of thinking as well. First,
many of the black Africans ended up in makeshift camps in barren desert that they
‘‘selected’’ and erected. Second, hundreds of thousands of black Africans, out of sheer
fear, fled to Chad. Third, if the the COI had existed between 1915 and 1919, would it
have argued that the Ottoman Turks had not commited genocide due to the fact that
‘‘the [Armenian] population surviving attacks . . . [were] not killed outright, so as to
eradicate the group; [rather, they were] forced to abandon their homes and live
together in areas (e.g., the vast wasteland of Deir et Zor) selected by the Govern-
ment’’? Or, in the case of the deportation of the Jews to ghettos, concentration camps,
and death camps, would the COI have offered the same argument about the tens of
thousands of Jewish survivors who ended up in displaced persons camps at the end
of World War II? As Fowler argues: ‘‘This element begs the question of whether the
direct violence (i.e., murdering and raping) was of sufficient scale to evince the intent
to destroy the targeted groups ‘in part,’ even though there are survivors who are not
murdered outright. And the Commission offers no rationale why this element would
be more indicative of intent than the scale and systematic nature of direct violence.’’96
Eric Reeves, a scholar at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, who has
written extensively on the crisis in Darfur, is also highly critical of the COI’s assertion
about the internally displaced:
This is an incomplete, finally deeply inaccurate characterization of the realities of
internal displacement in Darfur (and into Chad). First, . . . mortality is exceedingly
high following violent displacement . . . Of note here is a singularly important study of
traumatic and early post-traumatic mortality resulting from violent displacement,
published in The Lancet by authors from Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans
Frontieres and others97 . . . Secondly, a very large percentage of the displaced popula-
tion . . . have been forced to flee into inaccessible rural areas presently beyond the reach
of any humanitarian relief efforts. They are dying in great numbers . . . Moreover, to
claim that ‘‘Government of Sudan generally allows humanitarian organizations to
help the population in camps by providing food, clean water, medicines and logistical
assistance’’ is a shocking distortion of the truth, if we look back as far as November/
December 2003 (certainly a period of time within the purview of the Commission’s
investigation). At the time, Tom Vraalsen, UN special envoy for humanitarian affairs
in Sudan, declared in a memo to the UN humanitarian coordinator for Sudan (Mukesh
Kapila) that Khartoum was ‘‘systematically’’ denying access to areas in which non-
Arab/African tribal populations were concentrated.98
Continuing its argument that the establishment of the IDP camps was proof that
the GoS did not intend to commit genocide, the COI claims, ‘‘This is all the more true
because the living conditions in those camps, although open to strong criticism on
many grounds, do not seem to be calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic
group to which the IDPs belong.’’99 Once again, the COI seems to believe that deter-
mination of genocide can only be made when it involves the total eradication of the
group or, as it says, its extinction. The aforementioned statement by the COI blatantly
disregards the fact that many thousands of internally displaced peoples were bereft
when it came to food, water, shelter, and medicine. It also blatantly ignores the fact
that the GoS repeatedly and aggressively interfered with the work of humanitarian
groups, including the creation of administrative delays; harassing, threatening
and intimidating humanitarian personnel; arresting humanitarian personnel;100 and
blocking entrance to camps thus preventing humanitarian aid from reaching the
refugees.101
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Finally, the COI report relates an incident in which the Janjaweed attacked a
village and shot and killed a man who resisted their attempt to steal his camel but
didn’t kill the man’s brother during their theft of his 200 camels. Based on this single
instance involving two black Africans, the COI authors wildly and absurdly surmise
the following: ‘‘Clearly, in this instance the special intent to kill a member of a group
to destroy the group as such was lacking, the murder being only motivated by the
desire to appropriate cattle belonging to the inhabitants of the village. Irrespective of
the motive, had the attackers’ intent been to annihilate the group, they would not
have spared one of the brothers.’’102 The use of an example involving two men out of
literally millions affected by the attacks is not only ludicrous but irresponsible.
Indeed, this argument by the COI exemplifies the shoddy thinking inherent in its
ultimate determination.103
What Standard of Evidence Was Needed for a COI
Finding of Genocide?
In an attempt to explain its final determination that the GoS and the Janjaweed per-
petrated crimes against humanity but not genocide, the COI asserted, ‘‘Courts and
other bodies charged with establishing whether genocide has occurred must be very
careful in the determination of subjective intent . . . Convictions for genocide can be
entered only where intent has been unequivocally established.’’104 Fowler, who is a
Stanford University educated lawyer, raises an important issue that calls into ques-
tion, once again, the logic used by the authors of the COI report:
[T]his standard [beyond a reasonable doubt] is clearly wrong under these circumstan-
ces. The Commission was not a court of law, nor was it adjudicating the fate of indivi-
dual defendants. The liberty of an accused defendant did not turn on its decision. Quite
to the contrary, the Commission was only called upon to make a threshold finding on
the basis of which the UN Security Council would decide whether to take additional
action, including referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for
a full-fledged criminal investigation.
A review of the ICC Statute makes clear the Commission’s error in applying the
‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ standard. The Statute contemplates several stages through
which a case proceeds, each stage requiring that a separate weight of evidence be met.
When a situation is referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor is required to initiate an inves-
tigation unless ‘‘there is no reasonable basis to proceed’’ (Art. 51.1). Having conducted
an investigation, the Prosecutor may seek an arrest warrant if he/she can establish
‘‘reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court’’ (Art. 58). The Court next is called upon to confirm the charges,
which it will do if the Prosecutor offers ‘‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial
grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged’’ (Art. 61) [emphasis
added]. Finally, at trial, an individual can only be convicted if the Court is ‘‘convinced
of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt’’ (Art. 66.3) [emphasis in original].
Between ‘‘no reasonable basis to proceed’’ and beyond reasonable doubt’’ lies a con-
tinuum in which the required weight of evidence steadily, and appropriately, mounts
as the process moves forward. To eliminate that continuum and require a Prosecutor to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a condition of launching an investigation
would be nonsensical. Yet that is the standard of proof apparently applied by the Com-
mission, in spite of the fact that its investigation was prefatory to any judicial action
[emphasis added]. The Commission’s application of this standard is all the more erro-
neous in light of the constraints placed upon it by the amount of time available as well
as the continued commission of the very crimes it was supposed to investigate. It was
not in any conceivable position to reach a conclusion ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ on an
issue as complex and problematic as genocidal intent.105
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It is hard to believe that Cassesse and his team, along with the bevy of lawyers
that could have provided advice to the Commission, were not cognizant of the various
points that Fowler makes. If they were, then why did they settle on the ‘‘beyond a rea-
sonable doubt’’ argument? Was it a case of planned subterfuge? If they weren’t cogni-
zant of the various points Fowler makes then that calls into question their very level
of expertise, which subsequently calls into question the validity of their analysis of the
data collected by their investigators.
Conclusion
Following its determination that the atrocities committed by the GoS and the Janja-
weed amounted to crimes against humanity but not genocide, the COI recommended
that the UN Security Council refer the crisis in Darfur to the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Subsequently, on 31 March 2005, the Security Council, in a vote of 11–0,
referred the matter to the ICC. Four countries abstained from voting, including China
and the United States. It was the first time the Security Council had, as a result of
a vote, referred a matter to the ICC. The ICC then began its own investigation into
the Darfur crisis. On 14 July 2008, the ICC filed charges against President Omar al-
Bashir for having perpetrated crimes against humanity and genocide. Subsequently,
Bashir asserted that the ICC did not have the jurisdiction to charge him, decried the
charges as ‘‘sheer lies,’’ and swore that he would not allow himself to be tried by the
ICC. Time will tell.
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Book Review
Alex de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the Search for Peace.
Cambridge, MA: Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University Press,
2007. Pp. 431, paper. $24.95 US.
Reviewed by John H. Weiss, Department of History, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, edited by Alex de Waal, offers an enlightening
tour of the contested intellectual terrain encountered by those who have concerned
themselves with the fate of Sudan’s westernmost region since the escalation of the
conflict there at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The fact that one is contri-
buting to a journal dedicated to preventing the radical diminishing of peoples and cul-
tures, aka genocide, guides the selection of parts of the volume under review that will
receive special attention here. That it is an attempt to understand the failure of nego-
tiations between the Sudanese government and the opposing ‘‘movements’’ rather
than the entire course of the genocidal conflict makes this work command attention.
When a general history of Sudan is written in years to come, this failure may come to
be viewed as an especially tragic defining episode in a period of time when the de-
struction of the Darfuri people and their culture might have been stopped.
The first item presented in the attempt to explain the failure of peace is de Waal’s
analysis of the nature of the Sudanese regime in Khartoum. In an essay introducing
the volume, ‘‘Sudan: The Turbulent State,’’ he describes a crucially important tech-
nique whereby the current National Congress Party regime headed by General Omar
al-Bashir maintains its power. Although many other empires have used the principle
of ‘‘divide and rule’’ to maintain the dominance of the central authority, few have ever
come close to the skill with which the regime that came to power in 1989 has com-
bined the use of land and air units against armed opponents, land and air units
against civilians, and the enlistment of tribally based militias (the core of the Jan-
jaweed formations) to create a state of continuing chaos and uncertainty on its peri-
phery in Darfur, just as it did in the southern provinces and the Nuba Mountains in
its first decade in power.
It is this set of armed actions that de Waal offers as the principal element of the
turbulence-creation that serves to perpetuate the power of what he labels the ‘‘hyper-
dominant,’’ predatory regime in Khartoum. Such is the nature of the government in
the Sudanese capital, with its offices and the subordinate institutions and ideologi-
cally and organizationally connected individuals occupying them. This set of offices
was also the structure that John Garang wished to use as the base for a unified, secu-
lar, democratic, and decentralized country. As the al-Bashir regime’s triumph over
Garang’s vision of a new Sudan suggests, Sudan is probably best characterized not as
a nation-state in the manner of Italy, Argentina, or Malawi, but as an empire-state,
ruling over its internal colonies (in the south, the east, the Nuba Mountains, and Dar-
fur), with an especially effective combination of violence, manipulation, and the coop-
tation of possible opponents.
As presented in the volume’s opening essay, de Waal’s list of devices used to stir
the periphery’s political brew into a chaotic, deadly pottage appears incomplete. Else-
John H. Weiss, review of War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. Alex de Waal. Genocide
Studies and Prevention 4, 3 (December 2009): 379–387. 6 2009 Genocide Studies and Preven-
tion. doi:10.3138/gsp.4.3.379
where in the work, however, and in other writings about Sudan, one may find ample
additional evidence revealing the government of Sudan’s (GoS) catalogue of the
weapons of disorder: selective neglect in delivering to the region vital services and
equipment; comprehensive administrative warfare entailing such techniques as limi-
tation of access to the region by journalists and officials, permit proliferation, and the
routine imposition of deliberately extended delay; use of terror and torture in the
‘‘ghost houses’’ of the Khartoum area; manipulation of aid organizations into near-
total dependence on Khartoum’s transportation facilities as well as collusion in the
limitation of investigators’ access to camp residents; encapsulation and cat-and-mouse
censorship of the opposition press; energetic, opportunity-sensitive international me-
dia and diplomatic operations; and superbly calibrated, scruple-free, and impressively
deceptive international and intranational negotiations.
Rather than cataloguing such tactics, however, de Waal’s opening essay continues
with a description of what he calls ‘‘the second most persistent fact in Sudanese polit-
ical history . . . the inability of any one elite faction to establish unchallenged political
dominance over the state’’ (4). In his view, the special resources of Khartoum enable
it, alone of all Sudan’s cities, to support multiple elite groups. None has established
‘‘unchallenged political dominance’’ over the other, producing a situation of chronic
instability. The 1989 military coup that brought al-Bashir and his fellow Islamist
revolutionaries to power merely masked the ‘‘multiple competing power centers in
Khartoum and the frequent reconfigurations within the ruling group’’ (5). This frag-
mentation, de Waal argues, prevents the pursuit of any long-term political strategy,
forcing the regime to resort to an ad hoc style, with short-term crisis management in
all areas of operation, including both counterinsurgency, administrative reform, and
foreign relations. The resulting instability has been ‘‘projected into the provinces,’’
making it impossible to govern them. Thus the chaos that prevents opponents of the
regime from organizing themselves either to defeat the regime or to make a successful
common plan for a negotiated settlement results both from the conscious creation of
disorder the GoS has enlisted in the cause of rule and from the inexorable transmis-
sion of practices of near-term-focused and regulation-undermining tactical decision-
making from the empire to its areas of colonial contestation.
Most grievous, however, is the injury done by this Khartoum-spawned instability
and fragmentation to the possibility that the radical diminishing of Darfur and Dar-
furis will come to an end and that the victims’ will ever have a chance to reconstruct
their lives in relatively secure circumstances and to receive compensation for their
losses. De Waal’s formulation of this process is that the GoS’s internal instability and
churning factional struggles produce a situation where ‘‘it is almost impossible to
make peace’’ (23). At the same time, the delivery of any sort of justice based upon the
trial of individuals will make no contribution to a solution. Structural factors, not
identifiable individuals, drive events: ‘‘ literally, nobody is in control’’ (23).
At times, however, this argument seems to conflate the constant sectarian strug-
gles within the Khartoum area political class as a whole with factional disputes within
the ruling NCP government descended from the Revolutionary Command Council,
which was set up after the coup of 1989. As de Waal tells us, the GoS itself, whatever
its internal rivalries, has been able to maintain long-term consistency and coherence
in the policies producing domination of the periphery. It is thus unclear why figures
such as al-Bashir, Nafi Ali Nafie, Sala Abdalla Gosh, and Ali Osman Taha, powerful
managers of GoS policies since well before the current crisis in Darfur, could not
arrange a settlement if their fundamental goals were thus secured.
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If the failure of the long-running attempt at a negotiated peace at Abuja can be
attributed to the internal instability of the GoS, can the structural weaknesses of the
regime’s opponents, the ‘‘movements’’ (as they are referred to in official accounts) be
said to have rendered the collapse overdetermined? Accounts of the fragmentation of
the rebel groups, shown by the activist experts of the Enough Project to be substan-
tially exaggerated, continue to command first place in the situation reports of diplo-
mats and international officials, despite current efforts of the government of South
Sudan (GOSS) to unite the groups. This fragmentation can be said to be in large mea-
sure the result of the GoS’s deliberate creation of chaos. It regularly attempts to trans-
form negotiations into meetings where individual leaders bargain individually for
personal goals (a process well described by de Waal) and it bombs coordination and
unification meetings of leaders of different rebel groups whenever it can locate them.
As the volume’s contribution on Islamism by Ahmed Kamal el-Din indicates, however,
ideological divisions may be just as important as such structural explanations. The
article on the armed movements by Julie Flint makes clear, moreover, that conflict-
ing tribal loyalties have played a role in rebel divisions, undermining at key points
the cooperation between JEM and SLA and the cross-tribal composition of leadership
groups.
Whatever the structural instabilities and internal conflicts burdening the two
sides at Abuja, however, the essays in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace by
Dawit Toga, Laurie Nathan, and de Waal himself show that their negotiating posi-
tions remained strikingly consistent. At certain brief moments both Mahzoub al Kha-
lifa, the head of the GoS team, and Abdel Wahid al Nur, leader of the largest rebel
group, appeared to compromise on a point or two, but such momentary lapses can be
found in most extended negotiations. Demands on crucially important issues other-
wise changed little from statements about key objectives made by both JEM and SLA
in the early rounds:
1. The reunification of the Darfur region, split into three provinces by Khartoum
in a transparent effort to render the population more easily dominated from
the center.
2. Autonomy for the unified region, with the implication that Sudan would
become a federal state.
3. Justice rendered to the perpetrators.
4. Compensation to victims. (Granting compensation, as opposed to reconstruc-
tion grants, would have implied that the GoS had a measure of responsibility
for the destruction, something it did not want to admit openly, despite the
tacit admission that it had control over the Janjaweed contained in its agree-
ment to arrange for their appearance at disarmament areas and to cooperate
in other ways.)
5. Security. This demand entailed the creation of a credible mechanism that
would guarantee the enforcement of any agreed arrangements to control and
limit the activities of armed groups on either side. As stated above, for exam-
ple, in the final draft of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the government under-
took to assemble the Janjaweed militias at designated control areas, where
they would be disarmed, by the second week of July 2006. The document
specified no measures to be taken, however, if this deadline were not met,
which, to no one’s surprise, it was not. The government made little effort to
disguise its unqualified opposition to these demands.
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Some other issues may have afforded space for negotiation and compromise.
Power-sharing, in the form of the allocation to the movements of high offices in the
Government of National Unity, a structure some considered a kind of administrative
Potemkin village since no real decision-making power ever left the inner circles of the
National Congress Party, was also one of the rebels’ desiderata. A precedent for such
an arrangement appeared in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January
2005 by the GoS and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement. It promised the south
regional self-administration in the form of a government of South Sudan with a capi-
tal city at Juba and a referendum on separation from the rest of the country to be held
in 2011. There were reasons why Khartoum made this particular concession, however,
which did not apply to Darfur. In a generation of constant war with Khartoum, the
south, with diplomatic and material support from Western countries, had developed
a formidable guarantor of its own security, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, a dis-
ciplined, professional, reasonably well equipped army that had fought the north and
its militia allies to a standstill. Nor did the CPA give a welcome to some of the Darfur
rebels’ other goals. The document contained no mention of the justice issue or the pay-
ment of individual compensation, a strong indication that no clauses addressing these
demands would appear in the Darfur Peace Agreement.
The clearest indication that the GoS was foreign to the practice of negotiating in
good faith was probably its long record of deceptive and devious diplomatic tactics
ranging from bribery to document-rigging to carefully timed rejection of previously
signed agreements, evidence for all of which can be found in the volume under review
and in many other places. de Waal, moreover, limns the near-impossibility of making
peace when he points to the GoS’s governing structure at the roots of this devious diplo-
macy, stressing its instability, Darwinian factional behavior, and general volatility.
The most puzzling questions raised by War in Darfur and the Search for Peace,
then, may be why the Abuja talks were held at all, why some people took them seri-
ously, and why the editor of the volume spent so much time and effort as a mediator/
advisor, trying to bring them to a successful conclusion. Perhaps the international
mediators were willing to take up their Sisyphean task because they were convinced
that the rebels’ preferred solution, a robust intervention by NATO or some similar
coalition, had no prospect of realization.
In any case, the result was that the peace talks at the Nigerian capital tended to
dominate the agenda of would-be peacemakers and conflict resolution experts. Abuja
became a sinkhole into which stumbled the hopes of those who accepted the premise
that only a UN-backed comprehensive peace agreement between armed rebel groups
and the Sudanese government could end the destruction of peoples and cultures.
Alternative solutions based on different premises were pushed to the sidelines. The
United Nations thus retained its position as the Great Alibi of the Great Powers, its
egregiously understaffed and underfinanced deployments somehow providing the
larger industrialized nations with an excuse not to take political or military risks
themselves: blue helmets were already at the scene. The UN’s subcontractor, the
African Union, eager to establish its legitimacy and its distance from its discredited
predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, let ambition overcome caution in the
name of a repeatedly proclaimed political maturity: ‘‘African solutions for African
problems.’’
War in Darfur and the Search for Peace shows how tragic was this narrowing of
the field of action options. The structure of the negotiations pitted the young leaders
of the rebel movements against the representatives of the GoS, led by the highly ex-
perienced Dr. Majzoub al-Khalifa. Most important among the many Darfuri groups
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absent from the bargaining sessions were the Arab populations of Darfur themselves,
neither the Janjaweed militias, recruited in substantial numbers from the landless
Arab camel herders of the Abbala Rizeigat, nor the more numerous, cattle-herding
Baggara Rizeigat from southern Darfur, most (but not all) of whom stayed neutral in
the conflict between GoS and the rebels. Yet whatever other changes in the power
relations and alleviation of grievances may be needed to accomplish it, any reversal
of the radical diminishing of peoples and cultures that has occurred in Darfur depends
on some kind of restoration of the pre-2002 relations among the region’s Arab and
non-Arab groups.
During four months in 2006 following the end of the Abuja negotiations in May,
Abdul-Jabbar Fadul, a Darfuri professor at the University of El Fashir, and Victor
Tanner, a researcher at Johns Hopkins University, conducted interviews with 120
inhabitants of the region ‘‘from many walks of life, including local inhabitants, dis-
placed people, traditional leaders, and educated professionals’’ (284). In their chapter,
‘‘Darfur after Abuja: A View from the Ground,’’ they note that among both Arabs
and non-Arabs, attitudes had changed significantly since the two researchers con-
ducted their first surveys in 2004. Fadul and Tanner encountered a judgement that
the ‘‘manifest lack of goodwill on the part of the government’’ and the failure of two
of the three rebel factions to sign the DPA left the region expecting a future marked
by continued conflict and insecurity. Nor did the interviewees consider any longer
that negotiations with the government could bring an end to the region’s suffering.
The DPA’s failure and the weeks of violence following the disappointing signing cere-
mony had convinced them that there could be no peace ‘‘unless it was forced on the
government militarily’’ (287).
This hardening of attitudes toward the government was not surprising. What is of
equal or greater significance is the fact that all sides, Arab and non-Arab, had come to
recognize the Sudanese state as principal perpetrator. Among the Fur and Masalit
victims interviewed, bitterness against the Janjaweed militias ran deep, but the final
responsibility for the damage was now laid at the door of Khartoum. A Fur omda told
Fadul and Turner that ‘‘it was not a tribe fighting us, it was the National Islamic
Front government.’’ They had ‘‘fanned the flames, using the Arabs against the Afri-
cans.’’ A displaced victim in south Darfur told them, ‘‘Even if the Arabs did take part,
they are just poor people like us. The government is behind it.’’ The investigators
found that reconciliation had become a possibility. The non-Arab peoples of the region
had suffered from the raids in which their Abbala Arab neighbors participated, but
‘‘they knew them, and they knew they would have to live with them in the future’’
(294).
On the side of the perpetrators, the results of Fadul and Tanner’s 2006 survey
pointed in the same direction. Arab leaders assessed the situation using language
‘‘far more conciliatory’’ than they had used in 2004. If they admitted that some of their
tribesmen had participated in the attacks, the scale of which they no longer mini-
mized, they pointed out at the same time that these men had done so as individuals,
not as representatives of the tribe. The investigators’ striking account of the remarks
of an Arab nazir from the Kebkabiya area, the site of heavy destruction, compels the
reader immediately to mark the page. This high-ranking traditional leader believed
that the displaced had a right to return to their land and to demand compensation
from the government for their losses. He was convinced that had there been ‘‘better
coordination between the tribes,’’ the rebellion could have united all Darfuris, Arabs
and non-Arabs, in making the justified claims that the rebels made. In the case
of the Tama, a non-Arab tribe who had allied with those Arabs carrying out attacks
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on villages, an omda who had formerly taken a bellicose stance now showed his
visitors a directive to his local leaders instructing them to forbid local Tama from
cultivating the land of displaced farmers unless they could obtain the farmers’ explicit
permission.
Their research indicated to Fadul and Tanner the possible re-emergence of the
‘‘historic Darfur consensus,’’ a ‘‘central majority bloc’’ that brings together the main
ethnic groups of the region, both Arab and non-Arab, in a loyalty to the region that
has been ‘‘the historic bedrock of Darfur society’’ and the foundation of its stability.
They found that, in contrast to the highly contested ‘‘Sudanese consensus,’’ a concept
serving more as the focus of certain Sudanese intellectuals’ hopes than as a opera-
tional social reality, the Darfur consensus was a functioning traditional political order
that made Darfur viable, first as a Fur-dominated yet multi-ethnic sultanate, then as
a region that, ‘‘while prone to local conflict over resources, remained quite stable until
the late 1980s.’’ For most of the Darfuris to whom the two talked, the conflict there
clearly constituted an assault on this Darfur consensus.
Fadul and Tanner thus discovered a space of opportunity in the Darfuris’ mental
terrain, a chance for Darfur’s inhabitants to come together themselves to end the
destruction and displacement. The conceptual map of Sudan’s history, as well as the
organization of remedial action, could shift from its exclusive concentration upon the
Nilo-centric north–south axis to the east–west axis. Alex de Waal’s writing has been
asking for this change for many years. The survival of the memory of the Darfur con-
sensus prompted recognition that the Darfur region had a claim to integrity and cul-
tural autonomy that was rooted in history and required consideration in the present’s
policy arguments.
The regime controlling the center of the Sudanese empire-state has long worked to
break up that consensus, of course, by enlisting northern Rizeigat groups, and what-
ever other tribes it finds willing, in its campaigns of destruction directed at non-Arab
groups. In a development adumbrated in War in Darfur, however, the men who joined
the Janjaweed have become increasingly alienated from Khartoum. Julie Flint has
written elsewhere about a ‘‘sea change’’ in the configuration of political alliances in
Darfur.1 Arabs, unpaid, betrayed in battle, and realizing they have been manipulated,
have formed their own groups to combat GoS forces, and have even entered into alli-
ances with non-Arab armed units.
To evaluate fully the chances that a moment for reconciliation and self-determina-
tion had arrived by the summer of 2006, however, would require answers to questions
to which War in Darfur gives incomplete and analytically unsatisfactory answers.
Chief among these is the importance, trajectory, and endurance of Arab supremacism
as a theme motivating the perpetrators’ attacks and expulsions. The volume’s article
by Ali Haggar locates one source of what Julie Flint calls this ‘‘openly racist’’ ideology
in the Arab Legions promoted by Libya in the 1980s and 1990s. Haggar then describes
the development of a semi-secret group who worked out the details of an overall strat-
egy and action program to ‘‘change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African
tribes’’: 2 the Arab Gathering. One of the functions of this latter group was to motivate
and guide the Janjawed, the militias recruited from six categories of armed Arab
groups in Darfur and their tribal cousins among Chadian immigrants. According
to Haggar, because the militias adhere to this ideology of Arab supremacy and are
willing to commit murders and carry out wide-scale destruction in its name, they
earn the support of the government in Khartoum. Many observers have concluded
that government and militias are thus collaborating in genocide as defined by the
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
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The timing, intensity, and specific channels of communication whereby the NIF/
NCP-dominated government carried out this support, however, remain unspecified.
Nor is it clear that it was the Arab Gathering’s eliminationist version of Arab
supremacism that inspired the ethnically targeted initiatives from the GoS that
shaped the events in Darfur. Further information needed to link together the racist
ideology and the mechanics of enacting the genocidal project, or to distinguish
between genocidal projects, which may have enlisted only a segment of the NCP elite,
and ‘‘counterinsurgency on the cheap,’’ which probably enlisted all of them, must be
gathered from sources outside War in Darfur and the Search for Peace. For example,
in Darfur: A New History of a Long War, de Waal and his co-author Julie Flint point
out in their account of the Arab Gathering that the ‘‘crux of the ideology’’ of this group,
which may ‘‘never have existed as a coherent organization,’’ was a blend of Arab
supremacy and Islamic extremism holding that only those who trace their lineage to
the Prophet Mohammed are the true custodians of Islam and therefore entitled to rule
Muslim lands. The ‘‘only true Arabs’’ are the Juhayna, the descendants of Moham-
med’s own Qoreishi clan who crossed to Darfur and Kordofan in the Middle Ages. In
this view, Sudan’s riverine elite were ‘‘half-caste’’ Nubian-Egyptians.3 If this riverine
elite, who compose a large majority of the current Sudanese NCP government, were
angered by this attack on their legitimacy, it is not clear how they acted upon this
anger. Abdalla Ali Masar, one of the first to articulate an extreme version of the Arab
Gathering’s ideology, later became an advisor to President al-Bashir for Darfur
affairs.4
Other aspects of the GoS-Arab Gathering nexus remain unclear as well. A Novem-
ber 2007 International Crisis Group (ICG) report, while giving many confirming
details about the ‘‘sea change’’ in alignments and alliances in Darfur, affirms that
certain high-ranking generals of the regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) were sym-
pathetic to the Arab Gathering ideology. At the same time, however, it points out
that at the time of the SAF operations in Darfur in the fall of 2007 the Arab Gathering
was considered to have ceased to exercise adequate control of fighting among Arabs
themselves.5
War in Darfur also fails to examine fully the relationship between the ‘‘war in
Darfur’’ and those Arabization policies of the GoS that do not involve violence, such
as the favored treatment of Arab immigrants from Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Egypt, and
other African countries (instant citizenship and voting rights, preference in employ-
ment, grants of land), imposition of the Arabic language, and discrimination in gov-
ernment positions against those who cannot prove Arab blood.
In short, the reports and analytic essays in the volume under review fail to give
the African Union, the United Nations, other mediators, or unofficial readers a full
understanding of the objectives of the parties to the conflict. Can one argue that
whether or not the GoS’s goal was to put down an insurgency with a minimal use of
resources or to carry out some kind of radical diminishing of targeted, non-Arab
peoples, through mass killings and expulsion—that is, a project to which many would
apply the term genocide, or some combination of these two goals—should make no dif-
ference in the way one handles the attempt to mediate conflicts between the two
sides? Is it not important to equip peacemakers with a detailed evaluation of the im-
portance and negotiability the rebel movements attribute to various stated demands
such as a unified region, the identity and credibility of the bodies charged with enforc-
ing security arrangements, compensation for the victims, the delivery of justice to the
perpetrators, or the attribution of high offices in a ‘‘National Unity’’ government
in which office-holders not from the NCP would actually have power? The sad but
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enlightening history of federal arrangements in the Sudan—vital information, it
would seem, to anyone trying to reach a convincing settlement at Abuja—receives
little attention in the volume, yet many analysts argue that it will be only the arrival
of a true federalism, backed by regional institutions more resistant to subversion than
those in the north–south Comprehensive Peace Agreement, that brings an end to the
wars and atrocities in the Sudanese empire-state.
The limitations of War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, which nevertheless re-
mains the most valuable single volume for anyone seeking to understand the Darfur
genocide in its international and local political and social context, point the reader to a
crucially important obstacle to the prevention and elimination of atrocity crimes: the
continual and pervasive restriction of the resources allocated to the gathering and
analysis of information pertinent to the planning and execution of the full range of
possible actions which could stop the destruction and restore the culture of the victim
populations.
The volume contains the papers sponsored by the Conflict Prevention and Peace
Forum, established in 2000 as cooperative arrangement between the UN and the
Social Science Research Council, where the volume’s editor is a program director.
The latter institution, an American coordinating and grant-making body, provides
the UN with a systematic channel to outside experts in order to deepen the analysis
upon which the UN bases its work on conflict. Justice Africa, a research and advocacy
organization based in London and founded by Alex de Waal and others in 1999, also
commissioned certain of the papers. The first set of papers were delivered to the Afri-
can Union, presumably passed along by the UN, in ‘‘early 2005’’ in order to provide
‘‘background analysis of Darfur for the African Union mediation.’’ It is not specified
whether the volume includes all the papers submitted at that time.
The volume does, however, include a list of subjects that constitute ‘‘gaps’’ that
could not be filled because of ‘‘constraints of space and time’’: sexual violence during
the conflict, the government’s conduct of the war to date, attempts at local conflict res-
olution, the impact of the war on livelihoods, the emergence of a war economy, and the
humanitarian crisis and assistance efforts. ‘‘These must wait for another occasion’’
(xiv). One may presume, therefore, that on such critical subjects the AU did not
receive, and probably did not request, any ‘‘background analysis’’ from the CPPF or
Justice Africa. To the list of subjects given in de Waal’s preface that would have been
addressed but for the ‘‘constraints of space and time’’ one could add many more of
equal or greater importance: a thorough survey of the political attitudes of the victim
populations, including support for individual leaders (e.g., is the volatile Abdel Wahid
still ‘‘our guy’’ to the majority of camp residents?); a comprehensive survey of recent
developments in the technology of aerial surveillance, interdiction, and neutralization;
and a complete investigation of the international sources of combatants’ logistical sup-
port and an analysis of such supporting governments’ vulnerability to various kinds of
pressure.
In dealing with atrocity crimes, moreover, one must think big and plan big. It is
just possible, for example, that Fadul and Tanner’s remarkable survey of changes in
Darfuri attitudes after July 2006, which discovered the Darfuris’ conviction that
‘‘peace depended on one of two things—a non-consensual deployment of Western
troops or a rebel military victory, or both’’ (287)—would have prompted urgent and
effective action if it had been stated with the authority of a thousand systematically
randomized interviews, rather than 120 rather aleatory ones. In short, neither geno-
cide nor counterinsurgency on the cheap can be countered by research and analysis on
the cheap.
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Book Review
Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, eds., Genocide in Darfur:
Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Pp. 334, paper. $37.95 US.
Reviewed by Justyna Klaczany, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; Silesian
University, Katowice, Poland
Edited by the two prominent genocide scholars Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen,
Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan is an outstanding collec-
tion of essays that describes in great detail the genesis, design, implementation, re-
sults, and ramifications of the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP). What
makes this work significant is the fact that the essays are written not only by many
noted scholars, US government and non-governmental organization officials, but also
by the ADP designers and investigators. The perspectives of the latter is extremely
valuable, since they were the people who conducted the interviews with the Darfur
refugees in the internally displaced camps (IDP) in Chad and who listened to the vic-
tims’ first-hand accounts of the horrific experiences they suffered at the hands of the
Government of Sudan (GoS) troops and the Janjaweed (Arab militia).
The book consists of fourteen chapters grouped into five parts: (1) ‘‘The Back-
ground on Darfur,’’ (2) ‘‘The Investigation,’’ (3) ‘‘The Genocide Determination,’’ (4)
‘‘The Significance of the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project: A Precedent for
the Future? The Perspective of ‘Outsiders,’ ’’ and (5) ‘‘Analysis of the Rationale and
Reasoning Behind the U.S. ADP and Genocide Determination.’’ In addition, the edi-
tors have included a very useful chronology of the Darfur crisis and five noteworthy
appendices: ‘‘The Darfur Refugee Questionnaire,’’ which is very informative, espe-
cially for those interested in the research tools used in the project; the summary of
the ADP final report; US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell’s testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which he announced that ‘‘genocide has
occurred in Darfur and may still be occurring’’; the United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and a list of the personnel
involved in the ADP.
The book begins with a historical overview of Darfur that begins with the estab-
lishment of the Fur sultanate in 1650 and concludes in 2004 when the efforts of the
international community to address the ‘‘worst humanitarian crisis’’ started. Robert
O. Collins, a noted expert on the history of Sudan and the author of many widely ac-
claimed books including Africa’s Thirty Years War: Chad, Libya and the Sudan, 1963–
1993, focuses on the complex root causes of the conflict such as marginalization of
the region, the tribes’ struggles for resources, and the ethnic tensions between dif-
ferent tribes exacerbated by the ‘‘cynical and dysfunctional Islamist government
of the Sudan.’’ Although this chapter demands a lot of concentration on the part of
the reader as the text is full of historical data, it enables non-experts to understand
the complexity of the crisis.
Part 1 also includes a chapter by Andrew S. Natsios, who, at the time of the inves-
tigation, was the chief administrator of the US Agency for International Development
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(USAID). After briefly presenting the reasons for American involvement in the Sudan,
the context of the crisis in Darfur and the atrocities committed by the Janjaweed and
GoS military, he focuses on the actions taken by USAID to address the crisis, which
included providing humanitarian aid, conducting research and providing data such
as satellite imagery of the situation in Darfur to high level members of the US govern-
ment and to the members of the UN Security Council. Finally, Natsios explains the
genesis and significance of the ADP.
Part 2 is entirely devoted to a description of the Darfur ADP. Each of its chapters
focuses on a different aspect of the investigation. In chapter 3, Nina Bang-Jensen and
Stefanie Frease, leaders of the Coalition of International Justice, the latter of which
was selected by the State Department to plan and implement the ADP, describe the
stages of the project from its creation after the meeting of NGOs at the US State De-
partment in Washington in late June 2004, through assembling the team of investiga-
tors, dispatching the assessment team and the field investigators to Chad, to their
safe return home at the end of August. They make the reader aware of the fact that
the ADP was a logistical challenge, as well as a dangerous enterprise fraught with in-
numerable difficulties. In conclusion, they state, ‘‘For those who heard firsthand from
over twelve hundred refugees about their similarly harrowing accounts of attacks,
murder, rape, racial epithets, and destruction of their way of life, it was gratifying to
know their voices had been heard, at least by some’’ (57).
In turn, Jonathan P. Howard, a research analyst with the US State Department,
provides an in-depth report of the development of the research methodology. The
importance of this research and its purpose forced the methodologists to design it in
such a way that it would ultimately provide statistically significant and reliable data
obtained from a representative sample. Although the detailed description of the ques-
tionnaire design, data entry, and analysis may not be interesting for non-experts, it is
worthwhile reading for those who have any doubts concerning the validity and relia-
bility of the project. The author presents, in a very clear way, the quantitative findings
that shed light on the scale and nature of human suffering in Darfur.
The chapter written by Helge Niska, an expert on community interpreting ser-
vices and interpreter training, provides an insight into the essential role of inter-
preters, a role which is unfortunately very often underestimated. He addresses a
host of issues such as the recruitment, testing, and training of the interpreters. This
chapter is a very important contribution to the volume because Niska points out the
essential role interpreters have in international research and that the lack of proper
training can lead to serious distortions in the results.
In contrast to the earlier chapters in this part, which to a large extent deal with
technical details of the preparation of the ADP, Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen’s
chapter provides a detailed account of the interviewers’ work on the ground. It
includes detailed and moving reflections and stories by members of the ADP team.
As far as this reviewer is concerned, this is one of the most important essays in the
entire volume. It is here that the reader learns about the horrific experiences of
the victims. Unlike other chapters, in which the ADP findings are summarized by
means of diagrams and percentages, this chapter, through the reflections of different
investigators, presents stories of individual human beings who have a name and who
experienced enormous suffering, which is all but unimaginable to most people in the
Western world.
Tellingly, the chapter shows that what was most difficult for the investigators
were not the harsh conditions on the ground in Chad and logistical challenges, but
conducting the interviews. As Markusen puts it: ‘‘For me personally, the most heart-
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wrenching aspect of this mission was asking the respondents for details of their mur-
dered relatives—spouses, children, parents, cousins, aunts, uncles. Many lost four or
five or more relatives, and recording names, ages, gender, relationship, and cause of
death left me emotionally exhausted’’ (90).
Notably, this chapter concludes with the investigators’ bitter comments on the
lack of action from the international community. Debbie Bodkin, a Canadian police
officer and one of the ADP investigators, acknowledges, ‘‘My heart breaks knowing
that even though our work was successful in many ways, the horrors are still continu-
ing now as I write this’’ (107). Samuel Totten adds, ‘‘If the international community
continues to waver and equivocate, there is no doubt in my mind that ten years from
now the international community will apologize to the victims of Darfur just as it did
recently to the Tutsis on the tenth anniversary of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. But
such apologies are as hollow as they get when something could have and should have
been done to save the people in the first place’’ (107). The strongest statement on the
reasons for inaction comes from Vanessa Allyn, who asserts:
I also feel that the reliance on the AU [African Union] troops as some sort of piece-
meal solution is an excuse to do less . . . It seems to come down to the same old racist/
colonialist international attitude towards the ‘‘dark’’ continent: ‘‘It is an African prob-
lem, let the Africans solve it, and if they don’t solve it, the people who are dying are just
Africans anyway. Let them go on slaughtering each other until they learn their lesson
or all die, but we aren’t going to waste our precious western resources or lives on some-
thing like hopeless, chaotic Africa.’’ (106)
In Chapter 7, which opens the third part of the book, Stephen A. Kostas discusses
aspects of the determination of genocide. He does so based on interviews that he con-
ducted together with Eric Markusen, Pierre-Richard Prosper (former US Ambassador-
at-Large for War-Crimes), and Lorne Craner (former Assistant Secretary for the State
Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor). Kostas explains the
US State Department’s motives for the creation of the ADP and the subsequent geno-
cide determination. The text is very engaging, especially when Kostas reports on the
analysis of the data obtained by the ADP. The author describes how the State Depart-
ment concluded that genocidal intent, which is the most debatable issue, could be
inferred from the evidence. Although Kostas provides the reader with an in-depth
analysis of how the determination of genocide is made, one question remains: Why
was US government’s action reduced only to calling on the UN under Article VIII?
This vacuum is partly filled by Jerry Fowler, who elaborates on the legal definition
of genocide. In order to answer this question he zeroes in on two reasons. First, he
sees the problem in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) itself, when he rightly comments: ‘‘After
calling for international cooperation ‘to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’
the Convention proceeds to define the crime of genocide in terms that, from the per-
spective of ‘preventing’ or ‘suppressing’ genocide, are problematic. It then offers only
the vaguest sense of what should be done when genocide is imminent or actually under-
way’’ (127). This is accomplished by a thorough analysis of the conclusions reached by
the US government and the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI). In doing so, Fowler
presents convincing arguments when he criticizes the COI’s final report.
The second reason for inaction was the lack of political will. Fowler gets to the core
of this problem when he concludes that
the prevention and suppression of genocide and other mass atrocities will never be
accomplished by the international community or members of that community through
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a sense of legal obligation. It will happen, if at all, as a result of political or practical
necessity. Only by recognizing and acting on this reality is there hope for ending the
heartbreaking irony of a universally condemned crime that is allowed to transpire in
broad daylight. (138)
Ultimately, for those interested in the Darfur genocide, Fowler’s powerful and pas-
sionately critical analysis is a must.
Part 3 concludes with a chapter entitled ‘‘Prosecuting Gender Crimes Committed
in Darfur: Holding Leaders Accountable for Sexual Violence’’ by Kelly Dawn Askin, an
expert on international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and gender
justice. The text is not an easy read and that is for two basic reasons. First, the
author, drawing from the data obtained by the ADP, describes in minute detail the
sexual violence in Darfur. Reading about such horrific crimes is simply heartbreaking.
Second, the section of this chapter, in which the questions of responsibility and ac-
countability of the perpetrators are analyzed on the basis of examples from the ICTR
and ICTY judgements, is very demanding for non-experts because of the complex legal
terms Askin uses. Nevertheless, this chapter is well documented and surely contributes
to the better understanding of the complex issues related to prosecuting not only the
physical perpetrators of sexual violence but also the leaders who have a duty to pro-
tect the civilian population from such crimes.
Part 4 consists of short but very thought-provoking chapters that are devoted to
the analysis of the significance of the ADP and the evaluation of the international
community’s actions—and especially those of the United States—to end the crisis.
Taylor B. Seybolt stresses that the ADP is a precedent for the future as it proved
that it is possible to identify a genocide in time to stop it, but he criticizes the US gov-
ernment for inaction and claims: ‘‘The Bush administration’s declaration of genocide
has proved to be a substitute for action, not a call to action.’’ Continuing, he asserts:
‘‘Sadly, the lack of action should not surprise us. Governments are most likely to act
when they perceive threats to their primary interests or an opportunity to promote
their primary interests. When secondary or tertiary interests are at stake, we can ex-
pect to see only weak responses, especially when taking action involves risks’’ (168).
Ultimately, Seybolt draws a pessimistic, but, unfortunately, correct conclusion: ‘‘The
most troubling aspect of the rhetoric in Washington is that governments with the
power to act now understand that it is acceptable to allow mass killing even when
they cannot deny knowledge of it’’ (168–169).
In his essay entitled ‘‘From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons Learned?’’ Gerald Caplan
is even more critical than Seybolt. The value of this chapter lies not only in what is
said but also in how it is said. Caplan uses very strong language and the text is filled
with trenchant comments. He points to three lessons that emerged from the interna-
tional community’s failure in Rwanda. First, the international community will only
take serious and effective action when its political interests are involved. Second, any
time ‘‘another Rwanda’’ appears on the horizon, if it garners enough attention then
the international community would be inclined to act for it could not plead ignorance
of the event. Third, ‘‘[US President Bill] Clinton’s position that there was no full-
blown genocide in Rwanda unwittingly provided the glimmer of hope [that] if Rwanda
was ‘not quite’ a genocide, and therefore intervention was not obligatory, it surely fol-
lowed logically that if a genocide were declared in the future’’ (175), the international
community would commit to intervening in a timely and effective manner. Caplan
argues that the last two conditions were fulfilled in Darfur, and then bitterly con-
cludes: ‘‘From the point of view of the hopes raised by two of the optimistic lessons
from Rwanda, the response of the ‘international community’ to the crisis in Darfur
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can only be considered a giant, tragic set-back. It is not too much to say that Darfur
shows that only the first despairing lesson—the bottomless cynicism and self-interest
of the major powers—remains valid, while the hopes have been largely destroyed’’
(176). To continue to summarize Caplan’s chapter will only ‘‘kill the spirit’’ of his
text. Suffice it to say that it is imperative to read this essay.
Next, Gregory H. Stanton provides a legal analysis of the concept of genocide and
elaborates on the reasons why this term applies to the crimes committed in Darfur.
He argues that they are genocide as defined by the UN Genocide Convention because
‘‘[t]he atrocities are intentional, evidenced by the systematic nature of their destruc-
tion . . . , the crimes are directed against groups protected by Genocide Convention . . . ,
the crimes include all the acts of genocide enumerated in the Genocide Convention . . .’’
(183).
Stanton concludes that the reluctance to apply the appellation of genocide to Dar-
fur has its source in the misconception that the Genocide Convention contains a legal
obligation to act, that only destruction in whole constitutes genocide, and that motive
and intent are the same thing. In doing so, Stanton provides clear and logical argu-
ments to support his interpretation.
In contrast, there are and will be other legal experts who will argue that atrocities
in Darfur are not genocide. Scott Straus, in the closing essay of part 4, who supports
the view presented by Jerry Fowler, underscores that the main cause of these endless
debates is the Genocide Convention itself. He stresses that disambiguating the con-
cept is a prerequisite for effective genocide prevention. In his conclusion, he enumera-
tes the same reasons for the international community’s inaction in Darfur as those ex-
pressed by most of the contributors in this volume. However, he adds that the most
important factor is the politics within the Security Council, whose two permanent
members—Russia and China—have blocked any forceful action.
In the last essay in this volume, Samuel Totten evaluates the ADP, confronts and
successfully refutes criticism of this project made by other scholars, such as Alex de
Waal and Howard Adelman, and assesses the US government’s policy on Darfur.
Totten, on the one hand, effectively recapitulates what had been said, and, on the
other hand, complements the whole work by explaining the reasons for such US policy
on Darfur and by providing an objective critique of this policy. In doing so, he presents
not only strengths but also certain weaknesses of the ADP. In confronting criticism, he
uses very convincing arguments and poses thought-provoking questions. Totten is suc-
cessful in showing the positive consequences of ADP and the genocide determination,
but, at the same time, on numerous occasions, he expresses strong criticism concern-
ing the lack of meaningful action on the part of the US government, which is reflected
in the following statement: ‘‘The point is, though, there is plenty that the United
States could have done—and still can and should do—but it hasn’t. And that is noth-
ing short of shameful’’ (220).
Throughout the book, various authors stress the importance of the ADP and how
the genocide determination constituted ‘‘the first official investigation by a sovereign
nation of an ongoing case of mass violence for the express purpose of determining
whether or not the violence amounted to genocide . . . , the first time that one govern-
ment formally accused another government of ongoing genocide . . . , and the first time
that Chapter VIII of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide was invoked calling on the Security Council to take action’’ (xiv).
Because of these reasons, as well as others cited in this review, Genocide in Darfur is
an extremely important contribution to the literature on Darfur and especially on
genocide, particularly because it provides an in-depth analysis of these important
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events and issues. What is more, because these events and issues are analyzed from
different perspectives, readers are provided with a lot of food for thought. All contrib-
utors convey their ideas in a very logical and clear way, so even a non-expert can gain
insight into the complexity of the issue of genocide in international relations.
Ultimately, each author seems to agree with the statement made by Jan Pfund-
heller, one of the ADP investigators: ‘‘I heard it [the account of the horrors] from the
victims themselves. And having heard it, knowing in my heart that I can and will
stand up and say ‘this happened’ to whoever will listen, to whoever cares, and to those
who do not. To give a louder voice to the victims and their horrific truths’’ (106).
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